# Security Policy

## Supported versions

| Release | Supported |
|---|:---:|
| Latest `1.0.x` stable release | Yes |
| `main` / `staging-dev` | Development only |
| Older than `1.0.0` | No |

Install the newest stable point release to receive security fixes.

## Report a vulnerability

**Do not open a public issue or pull request.** Report privately through:

- [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/naturallaw777/Sovran_SystemsOS/security/advisories/new)
- Email: [support@sovransystems.com](mailto:support@sovransystems.com)

Include the affected version, impact, reproduction steps, and a minimal proof of
concept. Never send wallet recovery words, private keys, or live credentials.

We aim to acknowledge reports within two business days. Please allow reasonable
time for a fix and coordinated disclosure.

## Security model

### Local-first operation

The Hub and core data run on operator-owned hardware. The Hub is intended for a
trusted local network and must not be port-forwarded to the internet. Public
services, DDNS, software updates, and optional third-party relays require
external networks and are outside a “fully offline” model.

The local Hub currently uses HTTP. Authentication does not encrypt local network
traffic, so use a trusted LAN and avoid public or guest Wi-Fi.

### In-repository Bitcoin stack

Bitcoin and Lightning modules are maintained under `modules/bitcoin/`. They were
adapted from nix-bitcoin, but Sovran builds do not import or fetch nix-bitcoin.
The `nix-bitcoin.*` option namespace and `/etc/nix-bitcoin-secrets` path remain
only for upgrade compatibility.

### Supply chain and integrity

`flake.lock` pins flake inputs, and fetched source archives use fixed hashes.
Builds still depend on pinned Nixpkgs, NixVim, btc-clients-nix, upstream source
archives, and any configured binary cache. Keeping the Bitcoin modules in this
repository reduces an external dependency; it does not remove supply-chain
risk.

The Hub integrity check verifies Nix store contents and compares the running
system with a build from local `/etc/nixos`. It does not authenticate the release
publisher or protect against an attacker who already controls root and can
change both the system and local configuration.

### Access and service isolation

- Firewall enabled by default
- Public SSH and remote desktop disabled by default
- Separate service users and systemd sandboxing where supported
- Administrative service ports bound to loopback where practical
- Tor enforced for supported Bitcoin traffic and onion services
- Public web services exposed only when enabled by the operator

Tor reduces network exposure for configured Bitcoin services. It is not a
guarantee against every IP leak, application bug, or traffic-analysis attack.

### Restricted support access

Support uses a per-session SSH key on the non-root `sovran-support` account.
Sessions expire after 24 hours and have a small allowlist of `sudo` commands.
Wallet paths receive deny ACLs unless the operator explicitly removes them.
Disabling support removes the key and reapplies the ACLs.

Support events are written to `/var/log/sovran-support-audit.log`. This is a
local audit log, not a cryptographically tamper-evident record.

## Out of scope

Sovran_SystemsOS cannot protect against:

- Compromised root or administrator credentials
- Stolen recovery words, private keys, or backups
- Malicious or compromised hardware, firmware, or build infrastructure
- Services the operator deliberately exposes or weakens
- Physical access without appropriate disk and firmware protections

## Operator basics

- Verify downloads and stop if the checksum does not match.
- Apply stable security updates promptly.
- Use unique passwords and keep SSH/RDP off when not needed.
- Prefer a well-reviewed hardware signer for meaningful Bitcoin balances.
- Keep tested, offline backups in separate secure locations.
- Never share recovery words or private keys with support.
- Disable support access when the session ends and review the audit log.

No software can provide absolute security. Review your configuration and threat
model before storing important funds or data.
