verify_system_password() trusted the first loadable libcrypt. A library that cannot speak the shadow hash's algorithm (yescrypt, NixOS's default) answers with the '*0' sentinel, which was compared to the hash and reported as a wrong password -- even though the same password still signed in at the desktop. Following the System Passwords tile's 'sign out and back in' hint then locked the user out of the Hub, asking for a 'new' Hub password that does not exist: Hub login is the free account password, verified against /etc/shadow.
Try every loadable libcrypt, treat None/'*' replies as inconclusive rather than wrong, and when no library can decide, verify via PAM -- the same check GDM performs. Also replaces the sign-out hint (server + JS fallback) with wording that says the Hub has no separate password and not to sign out unless you know the current desktop password.
Recovery for an already locked-out user whose desktop login still works: on the machine itself, clear the localhost:8937 cookies and open http://localhost:8937/auto-login (localhost-only), or run 'sudo change-free-password' in a terminal to set a known free/Hub password.
The passwords update made the System Passwords tile the only tile whose credential resolution calls system_password.verify_system_password(). That loaded libcrypt with no error handling: an unloadable LIBCRYPT (e.g. a stale Nix store path) raised OSError through _resolve_credential(), so GET /api/service-detail/root-password-setup.service returned 500 and the Hub showed only 'Could not load service details.'
Verification now fails closed, never fatal: _crypt() falls back through LIBCRYPT / find_library / libcrypt.so.1/.so.2, verify_system_password() returns False on any load or crypt failure, _resolve_credential() degrades that one credential to the 'Changed outside the Hub' hint instead of 500-ing the modal, and the login-time display-copy heal is best-effort.
Adds tests/test_system_password.py regression tests.
The Hub, GDM and sudo now share /etc/shadow as the single source of
truth. /var/lib/secrets/{free,root}-password become root-only display
copies, written only by system_password.py and verified against shadow
before being shown. The GNOME login keyring is decoupled from the login
password (blank master password, pam_gnome_keyring off), so nothing
needs re-keying or wiping when the password changes and the keyring
never pops an unlock prompt.
- add app/sovran_systemsos_web/system_password.py: the single module
that verifies / sets / displays the free + root passwords and drives
the legacy-migration onboarding step (same endpoints and UI)
- add modules/password-model.nix: PAM gnome-keyring off, blank
login.keyring seed with a one-time migration of old encrypted
keyrings, first-boot-only password application (no more boot-revert),
LIBCRYPT for the Hub
- server.py: login verifies against shadow and heals stale display
copies; change-password takes the current password; security reset
sets both passwords through the same writer (root is shown as a
password again, not a hash); all keyring wipes removed
- credentials.nix: drop root-password-setup, free-password-setup and
free-password-migration (replaced by password-model.nix) and the
keyring wipe in change-free-password
- configuration.nix: drop enableGnomeKeyring and the keyring tmpfiles
hack (replaced by password-model.nix)
- service-detail.js: "Current password" field; credentials changed
outside the Hub render with a hint instead of a stale value
Installed machines keep their exact passwords: the first-boot services
no-op once an account has a real hash, and the upgrade never writes
/etc/shadow. The legacy-migration onboarding step and "reset all
passwords" keep working.
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naturallaw777