chore(release): prepare v1.2.3

The previous commit moved the CVE-2026-109618/109619 floor into a bare
`assert ... ; { ... }` above the module body.  That breaks evaluation:

  error: infinite recursion encountered
  ... while evaluating the module argument `pkgs` in
      /nix/store/...-source/modules/php.nix
  ... noting that argument `pkgs` is not externally provided, so querying
      `_module.args` instead, requiring `config`

A module-level assert is checked as soon as the module's attrset is forced
to WHNF, which the module system does while merging definitions (it is the
`checkUnmatched` branch in lib/modules.nix that was on the stack).  At that
point `pkgs` is not an externally supplied argument — there are no
specialArgs here — so it resolves through `config._module.args.pkgs`
(lib/modules.nix:745), and that option lives in the same fixpoint that is
still being computed.  Hence the loop.  The old code never hit this because
`phpBase` was only forced from inside `options`/`config`, i.e. after the
fixpoint existed.

Move the check to `config.assertions`, which is evaluated inside the
fixpoint once `pkgs` is available.  Behaviour is unchanged: a rolled-back
nixpkgs pin still fails the build with the floor message instead of
silently building a vulnerable PHP.

CHANGELOG.md

@@ -7,6 +7,23 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 
 ---
 
+## [1.2.3] - 2026-10-27
+
+### Added
+- Php: assert the security floor via config.assertions, not a module-level assert
+- Php: drop duplicate filter-test backport that breaks the php-filter build
+- Php: fix the filter tests that break the 8.5.12 build
+- Php: pin the shared interpreter to 8.5.12 for CVE-2026-109618/-109619
+
+### Changed
+- Updated nixpkgs
+- Updated to Bisq 1.10.10
+
+### Documentation
+- Update changelog and versions with nixpkgs and matrix-synapse 1.163.0
+[1.2.3]: https://git.sovransystems.com/Sovran_Systems/Sovran_SystemsOS/releases/tag/v1.2.3
+
+
 ## [1.2.2] - 2026-10-21
 
 ### Changed

README.md

@@ -21,9 +21,9 @@ Lightning infrastructure, private cloud, and communications platform when you
 are ready.
 
 [Visit the Website](https://sovransystems.com) ·
-[Download the ISO](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso) ·
+[Download the ISO](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso) ·
 [Try it safely in a VM](#try-it-first-in-a-virtual-machine) ·
-[Verify the Download](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso.sha256) ·
+[Verify the Download](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso.sha256) ·
 [Build from Source](#build-from-source)
 
 <img src="assets/desktop-screenshot.webp" alt="Sovran_SystemsOS private Bitcoin desktop" width="800" />
@@ -401,8 +401,8 @@ with an imaging application such as [Balena Etcher](https://etcher.balena.io).
 
 ### 1. Download the ISO and checksum
 
-- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso)
+- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso)
-- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso.sha256](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso.sha256)
+- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso.sha256](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso.sha256)
 
 The download may take some time. Do not rename or modify the ISO before
 verifying it, and keep both files in the same folder.
@@ -419,13 +419,13 @@ ISO must match the published one exactly.
 Open a terminal in the download folder and run:
 
 ```bash
-sha256sum --check Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso.sha256
+sha256sum --check Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso.sha256
 ```
 
 A successful comparison reports:
 
 ```text
-Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso: OK
+Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso: OK
 ```
 
 </details>
@@ -436,11 +436,11 @@ Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso: OK
 Open Terminal in the download folder and run:
 
 ```bash
-shasum -a 256 Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso
+shasum -a 256 Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso
 ```
 
 Compare the value shown in Terminal with the value inside
-`Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso.sha256`.
+`Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso.sha256`.
 
 </details>
 
@@ -450,7 +450,7 @@ Compare the value shown in Terminal with the value inside
 Open PowerShell in the download folder and run:
 
 ```powershell
-Get-FileHash .\Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso -Algorithm SHA256
+Get-FileHash .\Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso -Algorithm SHA256
 ```
 
 Compare the value under `Hash` with the published checksum.
@@ -465,7 +465,7 @@ match exactly.
 
 1. Download and install [Balena Etcher](https://etcher.balena.io), then
    connect the USB drive.
-2. Choose **Flash from file** and select `Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso`.
+2. Choose **Flash from file** and select `Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso`.
 3. Choose **Select target**, select the USB drive, and review your selection
    carefully.
 4. Choose **Flash** and wait for the writing and verification process to
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ primary location for collaboration. Please read our
 ## Privacy. Sovereignty. Bitcoin.
 
 [Visit Sovran Systems](https://sovransystems.com) ·
-[Download Sovran_SystemsOS](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.2.iso) ·
+[Download Sovran_SystemsOS](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.3.iso) ·
 [View the License](LICENSE)
 
 </div>

VERSION

@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.2.2
+1.2.3

flake.lock

@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@
         "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs"
       },
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1792500275,
+        "lastModified": 1793024720,
-        "narHash": "sha256-Y86rSoq9EWo6538kYoWZCnH9+bl0jNS1vQrnNvm8znE=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-BCWUWH/JIjBI6BlKp5FPYqE2gUNLo1o8kAjQyYy6bXs=",
         "owner": "emmanuelrosa",
         "repo": "btc-clients-nix",
-        "rev": "487c7e9ce3978601d37ac10b18610db672850f3b",
+        "rev": "ccc52fdce1278b4a5dcfa9685b7f31c5e9fecd9f",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -41,11 +41,11 @@
     },
     "nixpkgs": {
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1792155732,
+        "lastModified": 1793022574,
-        "narHash": "sha256-3Dk56anLQ1V1VklQFKFD6ul3cKQk40sThurHlPHIhOo=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-YPCj3u7PtWJxdt+wI01foiGdNSPXA5z7O4Be9rMQS/8=",
         "owner": "nixos",
         "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "7694c4f6b8537d50062ff36c21ef36de3c9322d7",
+        "rev": "a8e753600fb48f8f0dd882cc5ad284438241f85a",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -56,11 +56,11 @@
     },
     "nixpkgs-stable": {
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1792503283,
+        "lastModified": 1792898606,
-        "narHash": "sha256-vhe2jyvRCgufWPqDuDq1S3t3ypE+ka46IFutV02xKso=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-Mg3rRjsbMqhSMxop5PYMXos8SwAjejrxSgVThTvP9eg=",
         "owner": "nixos",
         "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "cd4ea8d57de16f4810bc5f14207bac45fbf19f67",
+        "rev": "1f607aa79b6356ed45d3cd3c8079c196e79efa2c",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@
     },
     "nixpkgs_2": {
       "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1792502884,
+        "lastModified": 1792773339,
-        "narHash": "sha256-IoNisKcGbUjdd45qCqywGMCYmZ5EnkxezvLII0FWwNA=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-rZLrzrC6i+jnTAlvPZHogKDulY7WWDEv9hJeHieO7Zw=",
         "owner": "NixOS",
         "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "02c087f3fe673c9e317f206a627cb6b910336dbe",
+        "rev": "3ec636362e1816bc2f0888fa0fa2c69f1bc9e504",
         "type": "github"
       },
       "original": {

modules/php.nix

@@ -16,10 +16,44 @@
 #   • PHP 8.3 has been security-only since 2025-12-31; PHP 8.4 leaves active
 #     support on 2026-12-31; PHP 8.5 is actively supported until 2027-12-31.
 #
-# To fall back to PHP 8.4 (nixpkgs' current default `pkgs.php`) change only
+# To fall back to PHP 8.4, change only the `phpBase` line below (and drop the
-# the `phpBase` line below.
+# security floor to the matching 8.4.x release).
+#
+# Security floor (October 2026):
+#   CVE-2026-109618 (RCE via OOM corruption) and CVE-2026-109619 (RCE via
+#   stale global state) are critical, unauthenticated flaws in PHP itself,
+#   CVSS v4.0 9.2 each, fixed in 8.5.12 / 8.4.27 / 8.3.36 / 8.2.35 on
+#   2026-10-21.  PHP-FPM is named as susceptible in both advisories, so the
+#   pools below are in scope; updating is the only complete mitigation.
+#
+#   nixpkgs bumped php85 to 8.5.12 in 81513f364091c759812f716cef3c175109d07342
+#   and fixed the `filter` extension tests in
+#   a5fc1be5b6c2d0c934143b57363aef9a15cce508.  flake.lock pins nixpkgs
+#   a8e753600fb48f8f0dd882cc5ad284438241f85a, which is *after* both of them
+#   (verified: pkgs/development/interpreters/php/default.nix at that rev says
+#   php85 = 8.5.12, and pkgs/top-level/php-packages.nix already carries the
+#   oom_filter_*.phpt patch).  So the stock package is used as-is and the
+#   floor below is only an assertion that catches a rolled-back pin.
+#
+#   Do NOT re-apply the `filter` test fix locally.  It uses
+#       --replace-fail "'-n'," "'-n', '-d', 'extension=$PWD/modules/filter.so',"
+#   and the replacement text still contains the `'-n',` it searches for, so a
+#   second application silently injects `-d extension=.../filter.so` twice.
+#   PHP then emits `Module "filter" is already loaded` (Zend/zend_API.c,
+#   E_CORE_WARNING) into the php-cgi output the tests capture, all three
+#   oom_filter_*.phpt fail on the unexpected line, `make test` exits non-zero
+#   and the builder dies with exit code 2 — the exact failure the patch was
+#   meant to prevent.
 
 let
+	# The first 8.5.x release that carries the fixes above.  Bump only upward.
+	phpSecurityFloor = "8.5.12";
+
+	# Stock nixpkgs package: correct version, correct extension recipes and
+	# upstream's own test fixes.  `.override { version = ...; phpSrc = ...; }`
+	# is deliberately *not* used here — rewriting the version while keeping the
+	# extension recipes of another release is how you end up with test (or
+	# ABI) failures that look like packaging bugs.
 	phpBase = pkgs.php85;
 
 	custom-php = phpBase.buildEnv {
@@ -27,8 +61,8 @@ let
 		# module Nextcloud lists as required or recommended (ctype, curl, dom,
 		# fileinfo, gd, intl, mbstring, openssl, posix, session, simplexml,
 		# xmlreader, xmlwriter, zip, zlib, pdo_pgsql, pdo_mysql, bcmath, gmp,
-		# exif, sodium, sysvsem, pcntl, ...).  OPcache is compiled into PHP >= 8.5
+		# exif, sodium, sysvsem, pcntl, filter, ...).  OPcache is compiled into
-		# and no longer appears as a separate extension.
+		# PHP >= 8.5 and no longer appears as a separate extension.
 		extensions = { enabled, all }: enabled ++ (with all; [
 			bz2        # Nextcloud: bz2 archive support
 			apcu       # Nextcloud: memcache.local  (apc.enable_cli=1 below is mandatory for occ + cron)
@@ -77,6 +111,29 @@ in
 	};
 
 	config = {
+		# Security floor.  This has to live in `config.assertions`, NOT in a
+		# module-level `assert` above the module body: a bare
+		# `assert <cond>; { ... }` forces `phpBase` (and therefore `pkgs`) as
+		# soon as the module's attrset is forced to WHNF, which happens while
+		# the module system is still merging `_module.args`.  `pkgs` is not an
+		# externally supplied argument here, so it resolves through
+		# `config._module.args.pkgs` (lib/modules.nix:745) — which requires
+		# `config`, the very fixpoint being computed — giving
+		# "error: infinite recursion encountered" pointing at modules/php.nix.
+		# `config.assertions` is evaluated inside the fixpoint, once `pkgs`
+		# exists, which is the supported way to assert on package versions.
+		assertions = [
+			{
+				assertion = lib.versionAtLeast phpBase.version phpSecurityFloor;
+				message = ''
+					sovran_systemsOS: the pinned nixpkgs ships PHP ${phpBase.version},
+					below the security floor ${phpSecurityFloor} (CVE-2026-109618 /
+					CVE-2026-109619).  Update the nixpkgs input in flake.lock instead
+					of pinning a version in modules/php.nix.
+				'';
+			}
+		];
+
 		users.users = {
 
 			php = {
@@ -96,4 +153,3 @@ in
 		];
 	};
 }
-