chore(flake): update sovran-bitcoin with btcpayserver RPC whitelist fix

fix(bitcoin): expand btcpayserver RPC whitelist for NBXplorer
- Ensure services.bitcoind.rpc.users.btcpayserver.rpcwhitelist includes public.rpcwhitelist and NBXplorer capability-scan/wallet RPC methods (validateaddress, testmempoolaccept, signrawtransactionwithkey, signrawtransactionwithwallet, getblockfrompeer, generatetoaddress, getindexinfo, createwallet, loadwallet, importdescriptors, etc.).
2026-10-18 17:15:44 -05:00 · 2026-10-18 17:15:03 -05:00 · 2026-10-18 16:47:38 -05:00 · 2026-10-18 16:47:36 -05:00 · 2026-10-18 16:09:46 -05:00 · 2026-10-18 15:36:45 -05:00
20 changed files with 918 additions and 743 deletions
@@ -7,6 +7,37 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
 ---
 ## [1.2.1] - 2026-10-18
 ### Added
 - Mullvad: install the client on the Desktop Role only
 - Password-model.nix: fix Nix string escaping in the generate fallback
 - Password & keyring cleanup: one password, one truth, no prompts
 - Update security details in SECURITY.md
 - Enhance README formatting and emphasis on features
 - Revise SECURITY.md for clarity on Hub operations
 ### Changed
 - Update flake.lock (nixpkgs, Sovran_Bitcoin 1.1.1, Bisq2 2.1.14) and integration
 ### Fixed
 - Fix README formatting and clarify service exposure
 - Fix formatting and clarify server access instructions
 [1.2.1]: https://git.sovransystems.com/Sovran_Systems/Sovran_SystemsOS/releases/tag/v1.2.1
 ## [Unreleased]
 ### Added
 - Mullvad: install the VPN app and daemon, as NixOS ships them, on the Desktop Role only
 ### Changed
 - Updated `flake.lock` (`nixpkgs`, `nixpkgs-stable`, `nixvim`, `btc-clients` with Bisq2 `2.1.14`, and `Sovran_Bitcoin` `1.1.1` with RTL `0.15.13` and Nix-native `sovran-nwc` `2.0.0`)
 - Updated fallback service version map (`app/sovran_systemsos_web/versions.json`)
 - Fixed deprecated `pkgs.system` reference in `flake.nix` and guarded `config.networking.domain` in `modules/sovran-bitcoin-integration.nix` when `haven` and `nwc-wallets` are both enabled
 ---
 ## [1.2.0] - 2026-10-02
 ### Added
@@ -14,16 +14,16 @@ digital life — your files, communications, passwords, and websites — all on
 hardware you control, running auditable open-source software you can trust.
 Every installation is a private [NixOS](https://nixos.org) desktop with
-[Sparrow Wallet](https://sparrowwallet.com), [Bisq](https://bisq.network), and
+**[Sparrow Wallet](https://sparrowwallet.com)**, **[Bisq](https://bisq.network)**,
-[Bisq 2](https://github.com/bisq-network/bisq2) ready to use. Move beyond
+and **[Bisq 2](https://github.com/bisq-network/bisq2)** ready to use. Move beyond
 custodial exchanges from the first boot, and grow into your own Bitcoin node,
 Lightning infrastructure, private cloud, and communications platform when you
 are ready.
 [Visit the Website](https://sovransystems.com) ·
-[Download the ISO](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso) ·
+[Download the ISO](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso) ·
 [Try it safely in a VM](#try-it-first-in-a-virtual-machine) ·
-[Verify the Download](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256) ·
+[Verify the Download](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso.sha256) ·
 [Build from Source](#build-from-source)
 <img src="assets/desktop-screenshot.webp" alt="Sovran_SystemsOS private Bitcoin desktop" width="800" />
@@ -61,18 +61,18 @@ are ready.
 ## Why Sovran_SystemsOS?
 Bitcoin lets you hold and transfer value without asking a bank, exchange, or
-custodian for permission. But that freedom depends on the software and
+custodian for permission, but that freedom depends on the software and
 infrastructure you choose. Your wider digital life works the same way: files,
 messages, and passwords kept on someone else's servers are never fully yours.
 Sovran_SystemsOS solves both with one operating system:
- **Hold your own keys** with Sparrow Wallet. Create and manage wallets,
+- **Hold your own keys** with **Sparrow Wallet**. Create and manage wallets,
  connect hardware signing devices, use multisignature setups, build and
  inspect transactions, and control UTXOs and coin selection.
- **Buy and sell Bitcoin peer-to-peer** with Bisq and Bisq 2. No central
+- **Buy and sell Bitcoin peer-to-peer** with **Bisq** and **Bisq 2**. No
-  company holds user funds, and no exchange account stands between buyers and
+  central company holds user funds, and no exchange account stands between
-  sellers.
+  buyers and sellers.
 - **Verify your own Bitcoin** with a full node: [Bitcoin Core](https://bitcoin.org) and
  [Electrs](https://github.com/romanz/electrs), so your wallets connect to
  *your* node instead of a stranger's.
@@ -90,16 +90,11 @@ Sovran_SystemsOS solves both with one operating system:
 - **Control everything from the Sovran Hub**, on the desktop or from any
  browser on your local network.
-No custodian needs to hold your Bitcoin. No outside node needs to tell your
+Other projects solve one piece of this puzzle: a distribution that runs a
-wallet what happened on the network. No third-party cloud needs to control
+wallet, a node project that runs Bitcoin services, a self-hosting stack that
-your data or services.
+replaces a cloud app. Sovran_SystemsOS brings them together on a reproducible,
-
+auditable NixOS foundation: Bitcoin tools from the first boot, one control
-Other projects solve one piece of this puzzle: a Linux distribution that can
+center, and hardware you own.
 run a wallet, a node project that runs Bitcoin services, a self-hosting stack
 that replaces a cloud app. Sovran_SystemsOS brings those worlds together and
 makes them approachable: Bitcoin tools from the first boot, a complete path
 from desktop to node to self-hosting, one control center, hardware you own,
 and a reproducible, auditable NixOS foundation.
 > Sovran_SystemsOS provides tools for self-custody and peer-to-peer Bitcoin
 > use. Users remain responsible for protecting their keys, understanding their
@@ -110,34 +105,24 @@ and a reproducible, auditable NixOS foundation.
 ## Try it first in a virtual machine
 **Curious, but not ready to replace your current operating system?** Start with
-Sovran_SystemsOS in a virtual machine (VM). A VM runs Sovran_SystemsOS in a
+Sovran_SystemsOS in a virtual machine (VM): a window on your existing Windows,
-window on your existing Windows, macOS, or Linux computer, using a virtual disk
+macOS, or Linux computer, using a virtual disk file instead of your internal
-file instead of your computer's internal drive. You can explore the desktop,
+drive. Explore the desktop, Sovran Hub, Sparrow, Bisq, and the installation
-Sovran Hub, Sparrow, Bisq, and the installation experience before changing how
+experience before changing how you use any physical machine. Closing or
-you use any physical machine.
+deleting the VM leaves your current operating system untouched, and installing
 on a dedicated computer later is still open to you.
-This is a low-commitment way to decide whether Sovran_SystemsOS is right for
+Use the same ISO with [VirtualBox](https://www.virtualbox.org), VMware,
 you:
 - **Keep your current OS.** Closing or deleting the VM leaves the host operating
  system in place.
 - **Learn at your own pace.** Familiarize yourself with the desktop and tools
  without needing to make it your daily computer on day one.
 - **Choose your next step with confidence.** When you are ready, install it on
  a dedicated computer, or keep using the VM as a learning environment.
 You can use the same ISO with [VirtualBox](https://www.virtualbox.org), VMware,
 QEMU/KVM, Proxmox, and similar x86_64 VM software. For a first look, select
 **Desktop Only**, allocate at least **8 GB RAM**, and create a **256 GB or
-larger dynamically allocated virtual disk**. The full VM setup and installer
+larger dynamically allocated virtual disk**. Full requirements are in
-requirements are in [Installing in a virtual machine](#installing-in-a-virtual-machine-optional).
+[Installing in a virtual machine](#installing-in-a-virtual-machine-optional).
 > **A VM is for evaluation and learning, not a substitute for a dedicated,
-> hardened setup.** Do not use a trial VM to hold meaningful Bitcoin, recovery
+> hardened setup.** Do not hold meaningful Bitcoin, recovery phrases,
-> phrases, passwords, or other sensitive data. Avoid attaching physical drives
+> passwords, or other sensitive data in a trial VM. Avoid attaching physical
-> to the VM, and be deliberate about shared folders, clipboard sharing, and
+> drives, and be deliberate about shared folders, clipboard sharing, and
-> network settings. The installer only changes the disk you select, but you
+> network settings. Review VM disk selections before confirming an install.
 > should always review VM disk selections before confirming an install.
 ---
@@ -187,6 +172,7 @@ hardware you control.
 - [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) desktop
 - [Brave Origin](https://brave.com/origin/) and
  [Firefox](https://www.mozilla.org/firefox) browsers
 - [Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net) desktop app and daemon, on Desktop Only
 - File management, email, calendar, and office applications
 - System monitoring and administration tools
@@ -200,25 +186,38 @@ Bitcoin and self-hosting infrastructure runs on the machine.
 | Mode | Best for | What you get |
 |---|---|---|
-| **Desktop** | Everyday users and computers with modest hardware | Sparrow, Bisq, and Bisq 2 for self-custody and peer-to-peer Bitcoin use |
+| **Desktop** | Everyday users and computers with modest hardware | Sparrow, Bisq, and Bisq 2 for self-custody and peer-to-peer Bitcoin use, plus the Mullvad VPN app |
-| **Node** | People ready to verify and operate their own Bitcoin infrastructure | Everything in Desktop, plus the full Bitcoin stack: Bitcoin Core, Electrs, LND, Ride The Lightning, BTCPay Server, and wallet-to-node connections |
+| **Node** | People ready to verify and operate their own Bitcoin infrastructure | Everything in Desktop, plus the full Bitcoin stack: Bitcoin Core, Electrs, LND, Ride The Lightning, BTCPay Server, and wallet-to-node connections. **Publishes nothing unless you enable *Put BTCPay Server Online* or *Lightning Wallet Connections*:** [read this first](#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address) |
 | **Server + Desktop** | Bitcoiners who want the same sovereignty over their communications, cloud, passwords, and web services | The complete Node stack, plus the private self-hosted services. **Makes your home IP address public:** [read this first](#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address) |
 **Desktop: start with your keys.** Desktop is not a reduced or Bitcoin-free
-edition. It is a complete, private everyday computer with a clean GNOME
+edition: it is a complete, private everyday computer with a clean GNOME
-desktop, Tor, and the Sovran Hub, giving you a lower-hardware path to
+desktop, Tor, the Sovran Hub, and the Mullvad VPN app and daemon — which no
-self-custody and non-KYC Bitcoin tools from the first boot. You do not need a
+other role installs — and a lower-hardware path to self-custody and non-KYC
-fully synchronized node to begin; move to Node mode when your hardware,
+Bitcoin tools from the first boot. Move to Node mode when your hardware,
 storage, and needs are ready.
-**Node: verify your own money.** Instead of asking someone else's server
+Mullvad is installed the way NixOS ships it and nothing in it is configured for
-about your wallet and transactions, you operate the infrastructure that
+you: create an account at [mullvad.net](https://mullvad.net), sign in from the
-performs the verification. Your node verifies. Your wallet connects to it.
+app, and set the relay and the app's own switches to taste. It is the one thing
-Your keys remain yours.
+that reaches the network from this machine as an application rather than as a
 service, so Server + Desktop and Bitcoin Node — built to serve — do not carry
 it. On Desktop it is simply there; remove it with
 `services.mullvad-vpn.enable = lib.mkForce false;` in `custom.nix` if you would
 rather not have it.
-**Server + Desktop: sovereignty beyond money.** Bitcoin sovereignty is the
+**Node: verify your own money.** You operate the infrastructure that performs
-foundation. Server + Desktop applies the same principle to your data,
+the verification instead of asking someone else's server: your node verifies,
-communications, identity, and services.
+your wallet connects to it, your keys stay yours.
 Node publishes nothing by default. Two Node features need a public domain and
 make your home IP address public when enabled: **Put BTCPay Server Online** and
 **Lightning Wallet Connections**. Everything else, Mempool and Ride The
 Lightning included, stays on your home network or reaches you through Tor — see
 [Server + Desktop and your home IP address](#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address).
 **Server + Desktop: sovereignty beyond money.** The same principle, applied
 to your data, communications, identity, and services.
 ### Recommended hardware
@@ -234,13 +233,7 @@ communications, identity, and services.
 > the public internet, which means opening specific ports on your home network.
 > Before you start, confirm three things: you can log in to your router's admin
 > panel, the panel includes a port-forwarding section, and your internet
-> provider allows port forwarding. Most home routers and providers already
+> provider allows port forwarding.
 > support this. If you are unsure, a quick search for your router model and
 > "port forwarding" will usually turn up a step-by-step guide.
 >
 > **This mode also makes your home IP address public.** Read
 > [what that means](#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address) before you
 > choose it.
 ### Server + Desktop and your home IP address
@@ -251,50 +244,42 @@ communications, identity, and services.
 > [Njal.la](https://njal.la) and keeps it up to date, and you forward ports 80
 > and 443 on your router to this computer. From then on:
 >
-> - **Anyone can look up your domain and see your home IP address.** An IP
+> - **Anyone can look up your domain and see your home IP address,** which
->   address typically reveals your internet provider and your approximate
+>   reveals your internet provider and approximate location and ties everything
->   location, and it ties everything you publish on that domain to your home
+>   you publish on that domain to your home connection. Domain privacy does not
->   connection.
+>   hide it: registrar privacy protects the registrant's identity, not the IP
-> - **Domain privacy does not hide it.** Registrar privacy protects the
+>   address in your DNS records.
 >   registrant's identity, not the IP address in your DNS records.
 > - **Your connection is open to the whole internet on those ports.** Scanners
 >   and bots constantly probe public IP addresses, so expect automated probing
 >   and login attempts against every service you publish.
 > - **Your service names are discoverable.** Public HTTPS certificates are
->   listed in public Certificate Transparency logs, so hostnames such as
+>   listed in Certificate Transparency logs, so hostnames such as
->   `vault.yourdomain.com` can be found, and then resolved to your IP address,
+>   `vault.yourdomain.com` can be found and resolved to your IP address, even
->   even if you never share them.
+>   if you never share them.
-Nothing is published until you finish domain setup and port forwarding, but that
+**Desktop** publishes nothing. **Node** publishes nothing unless you enable
-setup is the point of this mode, so assume your IP address will be public.
+*Put BTCPay Server Online* or *Lightning Wallet Connections* — see
-**Desktop** publishes nothing. **Node** publishes nothing unless you turn on a
+[Three modes](#three-modes).
 feature that needs a domain: *Put BTCPay Server Online* or *Lightning Wallet
 Connections*.
 **If you do not want your home IP address to be public,** choose Desktop or
 Node. Advanced users can put a VPS, reverse proxy, or tunnel in front of their
-services so DNS points there instead of at their home. Sovran_SystemsOS does not
+services so DNS points there instead of at their home; Sovran_SystemsOS does
-set this up for you, and the Hub's domain checks currently expect DNS to point
+not set that up, and the Hub's domain checks expect DNS to point at your home
-at your home IP address.
+IP address.
 <details>
 <summary><strong>What happens technically</strong></summary>
 - You create a **Dynamic** DNS record at Njal.la and paste its update command
-  into the Hub. The Hub only accepts `njal.la` update URLs.
+  into the Hub, which only accepts `njal.la` update URLs.
- The `sovran-ddns-update` timer asks Njal.la to point your record at the
+- The `sovran-ddns-update` timer points your record at the address the request
-  address the request came from. It does this right after you save a domain,
+  came from: after you save a domain, two minutes after boot, then every 15
-  two minutes after boot, and then every 15 minutes.
+  minutes. Element calling and the Hub use that same address. See
 - Njal.la reports that address back, and Sovran_SystemsOS keeps it for Element
  calling and the Hub. Nothing else looks up your public IP address: no STUN
  server, public DNS resolver, or "what is my IP" service is involved. See
  `modules/core/njalla.nix`.
- Once a service that needs a domain is turned on, the firewall opens TCP and
+- Once a service that needs a domain is on, the firewall opens TCP and UDP
-  UDP ports 80 and 443 for Caddy, which requests public HTTPS certificates for
+  ports 80 and 443 for Caddy, which requests public HTTPS certificates for the
-  the domains you configure. See `modules/core/caddy.nix`.
+  domains you configure. The Hub lists any additional ports a feature needs.
- Optional features can need more ports. Element calling, for example, needs
+  See `modules/core/caddy.nix`.
  TCP 7881 and UDP 3478, 7882, and 40000–40099. The Hub lists the ports each
  feature needs.
 </details>
@@ -317,10 +302,7 @@ Prefer to keep using Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, or iOS? Install
 Sovran_SystemsOS on a separate computer and let it run quietly on your local
 network, with or without a monitor. From any other device on the same network,
 open a browser, visit `http://sovransystemsos.local:8937`, and manage
-everything from [The Sovran Hub](#the-sovran-hub).
+everything from [the Hub](#the-hub).
 Your existing devices stay familiar. Sovran_SystemsOS provides the independent
 infrastructure behind them.
 ---
@@ -328,16 +310,15 @@ infrastructure behind them.
 ### Your private infrastructure, controlled from any screen.
-The Hub is the command center built into Sovran_SystemsOS. It is both a
+The Hub is the command center built into Sovran_SystemsOS: a local desktop
-local desktop application and a private web interface served directly by your
+application and a private web interface served by your Sovran_SystemsOS
-Sovran_SystemsOS machine. Nothing needs to be installed on the device opening
+machine. The device opening it needs only a modern browser and access to the
-the Hub: you only need a modern browser and access to the same local network.
+same local network.
-From one place, the Hub helps you:
+From one place, the Hub lets you:
 - Open, monitor, start, and stop your services
- See what is running and configure system features
+- Configure system features and manage service domains and credentials
 - Manage service domains and credentials
 - Reach your Bitcoin tools, private cloud, and communications
 - Perform supported system operations without everyday terminal commands
@@ -372,22 +353,36 @@ From one place, the Hub helps you:
                    └──────────────────────────┘
 ```
 Keep using the devices you already own. Sovran_SystemsOS becomes the private
 Bitcoin and digital infrastructure behind them.
 > **Local access:** the Hub is available at
 > `http://sovransystemsos.local:8937` to devices connected to the same local
 > network (not on Desktop, which publishes nothing). It is protected by
-> authentication, answers only your local network, and is not automatically
+> authentication and answers only your local network.
-> exposed to the public internet.
+
 ### Tech Support
 The Hub can give a Sovran Systems technician temporary access to your machine.
 Support runs over SSH, and **Tech Support requires SSH Remote Access, which is
 off by default.**
 Turning SSH on makes the machine listen on all interfaces and opens **TCP port
 22** in the firewall. Letting support in from outside your home means
 forwarding port 22 on your router, which puts SSH on the public internet where
 scanners and brute-force attempts will find it. Turn SSH off when the session
 ends; the Hub prompts you to.
 Support signs in as the restricted `sovran-support` account, not as root, with
 one key that expires after 24 hours. Wallet paths stay locked unless you unlock
 them for a limited time, and every session event is written to
 `/var/log/sovran-support-audit.log`. See
 [Restricted support access](SECURITY.md#restricted-support-access).
 ---
 ## Install Sovran_SystemsOS
-Sovran_SystemsOS is free and open source. You can download the installer,
+Sovran_SystemsOS is free and open source: download the installer, verify it,
-verify it, write it to a USB drive, and install it yourself, staying in
+write it to a USB drive, and install it yourself, in control from the first
-control from the very first step.
+step.
 An ISO is a complete installation image containing the operating system and
 installer. It is not copied to a USB drive like a document; it must be written
@@ -406,18 +401,17 @@ with an imaging application such as [Balena Etcher](https://etcher.balena.io).
 ### 1. Download the ISO and checksum
- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso)
+- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso)
- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256)
+- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso.sha256](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso.sha256)
 The download may take some time. Do not rename or modify the ISO before
 verifying it, and keep both files in the same folder.
 ### 2. Verify the checksum
-A checksum is a digital fingerprint of a file. Verifying it confirms that the
+A checksum is a digital fingerprint of a file. Verifying it confirms the ISO
-ISO downloaded completely, was not accidentally corrupted, and matches the
+downloaded completely and without corruption. The checksum produced from your
-published image. The checksum produced from your ISO must match the published
+ISO must match the published one exactly.
 checksum exactly.
 <details>
 <summary><strong>Linux</strong></summary>
@@ -425,18 +419,15 @@ checksum exactly.
 Open a terminal in the download folder and run:
 ```bash
-sha256sum --check Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256
+sha256sum --check Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso.sha256
 ```
 A successful comparison reports:
 ```text
-Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso: OK
+Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso: OK
 ```
 You can also run `sha256sum Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso` and compare the output
 against the checksum file manually.
 </details>
 <details>
@@ -445,11 +436,11 @@ against the checksum file manually.
 Open Terminal in the download folder and run:
 ```bash
-shasum -a 256 Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso
+shasum -a 256 Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso
 ```
 Compare the value shown in Terminal with the value inside
-`Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256`.
+`Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso.sha256`.
 </details>
@@ -459,7 +450,7 @@ Compare the value shown in Terminal with the value inside
 Open PowerShell in the download folder and run:
 ```powershell
-Get-FileHash .\Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso -Algorithm SHA256
+Get-FileHash .\Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso -Algorithm SHA256
 ```
 Compare the value under `Hash` with the published checksum.
@@ -474,7 +465,7 @@ match exactly.
 1. Download and install [Balena Etcher](https://etcher.balena.io), then
   connect the USB drive.
-2. Choose **Flash from file** and select `Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso`.
+2. Choose **Flash from file** and select `Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso`.
 3. Choose **Select target**, select the USB drive, and review your selection
   carefully.
 4. Choose **Flash** and wait for the writing and verification process to
@@ -509,14 +500,14 @@ similar x86_64 virtual machines. Use production-like resources where possible:
  allocated disks are fine; they do not consume the full size immediately.
 - Use NAT or bridged networking with internet access before opening the
  installer.
- UEFI/EFI firmware is preferred. In UEFI VMs, the installer avoids depending
+- UEFI/EFI firmware is preferred: in UEFI VMs the installer avoids depending
-  on VM NVRAM boot-entry writes. If a VM boots the ISO in legacy BIOS mode,
+  on VM NVRAM boot-entry writes, and a VM that boots the ISO in legacy BIOS
-  the installer automatically switches the installed system to GRUB.
+  mode automatically installs GRUB instead.
 - For Node or Server + Desktop, attach a **second 2 TB virtual data disk**.
  If you only attach one disk, choose **Desktop Only**.
 - Present the install target as a normal virtual disk such as VirtIO, SATA,
-  SCSI, or NVMe. USB-attached target disks are intentionally hidden by the
+  SCSI, or NVMe. USB-attached disks are hidden by the installer so you cannot
-  installer to avoid erasing the installer USB by mistake.
+  erase the installer USB by mistake.
 ### 5. Install
@@ -557,10 +548,6 @@ on the network, so in that mode open it from the desktop.
   access.
 5. Try another browser or device on the same network.
 Some networks or devices may not support `.local` address discovery correctly.
 Network isolation, custom DNS settings, VPNs, and some routers can interfere
 with local-device discovery.
 </details>
 ### Prefer guided help?
@@ -612,6 +599,8 @@ and `/etc/nix-bitcoin-secrets` remain for compatibility.
 - [GNOME](https://www.gnome.org) desktop environment
 - [Caddy](https://caddyserver.com) for local and public service routing
 - [Tor](https://www.torproject.org) for Bitcoin network privacy
 - [Mullvad VPN](https://mullvad.net), installed as the stock NixOS service on
  the Desktop Role only (`pkgs.mullvad` daemon and `pkgs.mullvad-vpn` app)
 - [AGPL-3.0](LICENSE) licensing
 ### Build from source
@@ -761,10 +750,10 @@ rebuilds the machine into the selected declarative state.
 | Optional Haven Nostr relay | `modules/haven.nix` |
 | Nextcloud, Vaultwarden, WordPress | `modules/nextcloud.nix`, `modules/vaultwarden.nix`, `modules/wordpress.nix`, `modules/php.nix` |
 | Optional remote desktop and public SSH | `modules/rdp.nix`, `modules/sshd.nix` |
 | Mullvad VPN app (Desktop Role only) | `modules/mullvad.nix` |
-Feature availability and defaults may change as Sovran_SystemsOS develops.
+Feature availability and defaults may change as Sovran_SystemsOS develops:
-Review the relevant Nix module before relying on a specific default in a
+review the relevant Nix module before relying on a default in production.
 production environment.
 ---
@@ -774,11 +763,11 @@ Wallet recovery words control the funds. Never share them with a website,
 support technician, cloud service, or chat application.
 For meaningful balances, prefer a well-reviewed hardware signer and follow its
-verified backup process. A BIP39 passphrase is optional, advanced protection;
+verified backup process. A BIP39 passphrase is optional, advanced protection,
-it is not a replacement for the recovery words. If you use one, back it up
+not a replacement for recovery words: back it up separately, because losing
-separately—losing either item can make the wallet unrecoverable.
+either item can make the wallet unrecoverable.
-Keep durable offline backups in separate secure locations. Test recovery before
+Keep durable offline backups in separate secure locations, test recovery before
 relying on a wallet, and begin with a small amount.
 ---
@@ -788,19 +777,17 @@ relying on a wallet, and begin with a small amount.
 Sovran_SystemsOS uses layered controls:
 - Pinned flake inputs and hash-pinned source archives
- Bitcoin and Lightning modules maintained in this repository
+- Firewall enabled; SSH Remote Access and remote desktop disabled by default.
- Firewall enabled; public SSH and remote desktop disabled by default
+  Enabling SSH opens TCP port 22 and the Hub then asks you to forward it
 - Separate service users, systemd sandboxing, and loopback bindings where practical
 - Tor enforcement for supported Bitcoin services
 - Restricted, time-limited support access with scoped `sudo`
- Operator-controlled public service exposure (Server + Desktop
+- Operator-controlled public service exposure (Server + Desktop Role or Node Role when enabled BTCpayserver and/or Lightning Wallet Connections
  [makes your home IP address public](#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address)
  once you set up a domain)
 See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for the threat model, limitations, reporting,
-and operator guidance. No operating system can protect funds after recovery
+and operator guidance.
 words, administrator credentials, or the root account are compromised. Apply
 updates and keep tested offline backups.
 ---
@@ -810,11 +797,9 @@ Sovran_SystemsOS stands on the work of exceptional free and open-source projects
 ### NixOS
-Deep gratitude goes to the [NixOS](https://nixos.org) team, the [Nixpkgs](https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs) maintainers, and the broader [Nix community](https://github.com/nix-community).
+Gratitude to the [NixOS](https://nixos.org) team, the [Nixpkgs](https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs) maintainers, and the broader [Nix community](https://github.com/nix-community).
-NixOS provides the reproducible, declarative foundation that makes Sovran_SystemsOS possible. Its module system, package ecosystem, [flakes](https://nixos.wiki/wiki/Flakes), and generation-based system management allow an entire Bitcoin operating system to be described, audited, rebuilt, upgraded, and rolled back from source.
+NixOS provides the reproducible, declarative foundation that makes Sovran_SystemsOS possible: its module system, package ecosystem, [flakes](https://nixos.wiki/wiki/Flakes), and generation-based system management allow an entire Bitcoin operating system to be described, audited, rebuilt, upgraded, and rolled back from source.
 Sovran_SystemsOS would not have the same reliability, transparency, or reproducibility without their years of work.
 ### nix-bitcoin
@@ -822,24 +807,17 @@ The in-repository Bitcoin stack began with code adapted from
 [nix-bitcoin](https://github.com/fort-nix/nix-bitcoin), primarily from commit
 [`360e30f`](https://github.com/fort-nix/nix-bitcoin/commit/360e30fee5ba32f9fecc89bc35628195d9d2dbbe).
 It has since been narrowed to Sovran's supported services and is maintained in
-this repository. nix-bitcoin is no longer a flake input or build dependency.
+this repository; nix-bitcoin is no longer a flake input or build dependency.
-
+Its MIT notice is retained in [`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md`](THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md).
 We remain grateful to the nix-bitcoin contributors for the declarative and
 security-focused foundation. Its MIT notice is retained in
 [`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md`](THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md).
 ### Emmanuel Rosa and btc-clients-nix
-Special thanks go to [Emmanuel Rosa](https://github.com/emmanuelrosa) for [btc-clients-nix](https://github.com/emmanuelrosa/btc-clients-nix).
+Thanks to [Emmanuel Rosa](https://github.com/emmanuelrosa) for [btc-clients-nix](https://github.com/emmanuelrosa/btc-clients-nix), which packages the Bitcoin desktop software included in every installation:
 The project provides Nix packages for the Bitcoin desktop software central to the Sovran_SystemsOS experience:
 - [Sparrow Wallet](https://github.com/sparrowwallet/sparrow)
 - [Bisq](https://github.com/bisq-network/bisq)
 - [Bisq 2](https://github.com/bisq-network/bisq2)
 This work helps make it possible for Sovran_SystemsOS to deliver self-custody and peer-to-peer Bitcoin tools as part of every installation.
 ### The upstream Bitcoin ecosystem
 Sovran_SystemsOS also depends on the work of the developers and communities behind:
@@ -867,27 +845,16 @@ Sovran_SystemsOS also depends on the work of the developers and communities behi
 - [WordPress](https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress)
 - Every other upstream project included in the system
-Sovran Systems did not create these foundations. Our work is to bring them together into a cohesive operating system that helps more people use Bitcoin privately, independently, and with confidence.
+Sovran Systems did not create these foundations; our work is to bring them together into one operating system that helps more people use Bitcoin privately and independently. Thank you to every developer, maintainer, reviewer, tester, documentarian, and user who keeps this ecosystem alive.
 Thank you to every developer, maintainer, reviewer, tester, documentarian, and user who keeps this ecosystem alive.
 ---
 ## License
 Sovran_SystemsOS is free and open-source software licensed under the
-[GNU Affero General Public License v3.0](LICENSE).
+[GNU Affero General Public License v3.0](LICENSE). You may use, study, modify,
-
+share, and self-host it; if you distribute a modified version, you must make
-The AGPL-3.0 protects your freedom to:
+its corresponding source code available under the same license.
 - Use Sovran_SystemsOS
 - Study how the system works
 - Modify the source code
 - Share original or modified versions
 - Build and operate the system on your own hardware
 If you distribute a modified version, you must make its corresponding source
 code available under the same license.
 Because Sovran_SystemsOS includes the browser-based Sovran Hub, operators who
 modify the covered software and make that modified version available for users
@@ -895,14 +862,9 @@ to interact with over a network must offer those users access to its
 corresponding source code, as required by the AGPL-3.0.
 Sovran_SystemsOS is provided **without warranty**, as described in the full
-license.
+license. Individual upstream applications, packages, artwork, fonts, and other
-
+components may have their own licenses and copyright holders, which the
-> Individual upstream applications, packages, artwork, fonts, and other
+AGPL-3.0 does not replace. Read [`LICENSE`](LICENSE) and
 > components included with or built by Sovran_SystemsOS may have their own
 > licenses and copyright holders. The AGPL-3.0 license for this repository does
 > not replace those licenses.
 Read [`LICENSE`](LICENSE) and
 [`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md`](THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md).
 ---
@@ -921,7 +883,7 @@ primary location for collaboration. Please read our
 ## Privacy. Sovereignty. Bitcoin.
 [Visit Sovran Systems](https://sovransystems.com) ·
-[Download Sovran_SystemsOS](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso) ·
+[Download Sovran_SystemsOS](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.1.iso) ·
 [View the License](LICENSE)
 </div>
@@ -27,109 +27,100 @@ time for a fix and coordinated disclosure.
 ### Local-first operation
-The Hub and core data run on operator-owned hardware. The Hub is intended for a
+The Hub and core data run on operator-owned hardware. The Hub is for a trusted
-trusted local network and must not be port-forwarded to the internet. Public
+local network and must not be port-forwarded to the internet. It uses HTTP, so
-services, DDNS, software updates, and optional third-party relays require
+authentication does not encrypt local network traffic.
 external networks and are outside a “fully offline” model.
-The local Hub currently uses HTTP. Authentication does not encrypt local network
+The Hub is served on port 8937 and is not fronted by Caddy. Server + Desktop and
-traffic, so use a trusted LAN and avoid public or guest Wi-Fi.
+Bitcoin Node Only open that port in the firewall, so local devices reach the Hub
-
+at `http://sovransystemsos.local:8937`. On Desktop Only the Hub is not published
-The Hub is served on port 8937, on its own: Caddy does not front it. Server +
+at all: reachable only from the machine itself, on localhost, with no TCP port
-Desktop and Bitcoin Node Only open that port in the firewall, so other devices
+open in the firewall (UDP 5353 for mDNS only).
 on your local network reach the Hub at `http://sovransystemsos.local:8937`.
 Forwarding ports 80 and 443 for public services does not put the Hub in front of
 the internet, because the only thing Caddy answers on those ports is the public
 sites.
 On Desktop Only the Hub is not published at all. It is reachable only from the
 machine itself, through the desktop application window on localhost. Desktop
 Only is the role most likely to be used away from home, and a root-capable admin
 UI has no business listening on a coffee-shop network. The firewall there opens
 no TCP port at all; the only port open is UDP 5353, for mDNS.
 `sovran_systemsOS.hub.directPort = true` in `custom.nix` opens port 8937 if you
-do want to reach a Desktop Only Hub from another device.
+want to reach a Desktop Only Hub from another device.
-The Hub also checks every client itself, before it shows a login page. It runs
+The Hub checks every client before showing a login page. It runs as root, so it
-as root, so it answers only this computer and the local network (loopback,
+answers only loopback, private, VPN and link-local addresses and turns everyone
-private, VPN and link-local addresses) and turns everyone else away, however
+else away. The check goes by the address a connection comes from, so it is a
-they reached it. The Hub listens on IPv4 only, so IPv6 clients do not reach it
+second lock and not a reason to forward port 8937: don't. Addresses outside the
-at all; if that ever changes, global IPv6 addresses would be turned away,
+local ranges go in `sovran_systemsOS.hub.extraLanNetworks` in `custom.nix`;
 because a laptop on your network and a stranger on the internet look the same
 by address alone. If your devices use addresses outside the local ranges, list
 their networks in `sovran_systemsOS.hub.extraLanNetworks` in `custom.nix`;
 `sovran_systemsOS.hub.lanOnly = false` turns the check off.
 The check goes by the address a connection comes from. A router that rewrites
 that address when it forwards a port makes an outsider look local, so the check
 is a second lock and not a reason to forward port 8937: don't.
 Ride The Lightning (port 3051) and Mempool (port 60847) listen on loopback only,
 and Caddy is how your local network reaches them. Caddy does not filter them by
 client address: forwarding ports 80 and 443 for public services does not reach
 them, because they answer on ports of their own, which nothing asks you to
 forward. Do not forward 3051 or 60847. If you do, Ride The Lightning still asks
 for its own random password and locks out repeated failures, and Mempool shows
 public blockchain data, but neither should face the internet.
 ### Public services and your home IP address
-Server + Desktop publishes services under your own domain. The Dynamic DNS
+Publishing public services on Server + Desktop points a DDNS record at your
-record at Njal.la then points at your home's public IP address, which anyone
+home's public IP address, which anyone can look up, and lists your service
 can look up (domain privacy does not hide it), and ports 80 and 443 are open
 to the whole internet. Public HTTPS certificates also list your service
 hostnames in Certificate Transparency logs. Desktop publishes nothing. Node
 publishes nothing unless *Put BTCPay Server Online* or *Lightning Wallet
 Connections* is on. See
 [Server + Desktop and your home IP address](README.md#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address)
 for what this means and the alternatives.
 Sovran_SystemsOS does not ask a STUN server, public DNS resolver, or “what is
 my IP” service for your address. The DDNS update asks Njal.la to use the
 address the request came from, and the address Njal.la reports back is the one
 Element calling and the Hub use.
 ### Bitcoin stack
-Bitcoin and Lightning modules are maintained in the standalone
+Bitcoin and Lightning modules live in the standalone
-[Sovran_Bitcoin](https://github.com/naturallaw777/Sovran_Bitcoin) repository
+[Sovran_Bitcoin](https://github.com/naturallaw777/Sovran_Bitcoin) repository,
-and consumed as a flake input. OS-specific customizations (Second_Drive paths,
+consumed as a flake input and bridged by
-operator user, Hub integration) are bridged by
+`modules/sovran-bitcoin-integration.nix`. The `nix-bitcoin.*` namespace and
-`modules/sovran-bitcoin-integration.nix`. The `nix-bitcoin.*` option namespace
+`/etc/nix-bitcoin-secrets` path remain only for upgrade compatibility.
 and `/etc/nix-bitcoin-secrets` path remain only for upgrade compatibility.
 ### Supply chain and integrity
 `flake.lock` pins flake inputs, and fetched source archives use fixed hashes.
-Builds still depend on pinned Nixpkgs, NixVim, btc-clients-nix, upstream source
+Builds still depend on pinned Nixpkgs and other inputs, upstream source
-archives, and any configured binary cache. Keeping the Bitcoin modules in this
+archives, and any configured binary cache.
 repository reduces an external dependency; it does not remove supply-chain
 risk.
-The Hub integrity check verifies Nix store contents and compares the running
+The Hub integrity check verifies Nix store contents against a build from local
-system with a build from local `/etc/nixos`. It does not authenticate the release
+`/etc/nixos`. It does not authenticate the release publisher or protect against
-publisher or protect against an attacker who already controls root and can
+an attacker who already controls root.
 change both the system and local configuration.
 ### Access and service isolation
 - Firewall enabled by default
- Public SSH and remote desktop disabled by default
+- SSH Remote Access and remote desktop disabled by default
 - Separate service users and systemd sandboxing where supported
 - Administrative service ports bound to loopback where practical
 - Tor enforced for supported Bitcoin traffic and onion services
 - Public web services exposed only when enabled by the operator (this makes
  your home IP address public)
 SSH Remote Access is the only supported administrative port that faces the
 network, and it is off by default. Enabling it listens on all interfaces and
 opens TCP port 22; the Hub then asks you to forward port 22, which puts SSH on
 the public internet. Key authentication only. Turn it off when you are done.
 Tor reduces network exposure for configured Bitcoin services. It is not a
 guarantee against every IP leak, application bug, or traffic-analysis attack.
 ### Mullvad VPN (Desktop Only)
 The Mullvad VPN client — daemon and app — is installed on the Desktop Role and
 on no other role: Server + Desktop and Bitcoin Node keep the one network
 configuration their services need. `modules/mullvad.nix` is a role gate around
 the stock NixOS service, with nothing configured by this system on top of it.
 Two behaviours are the app's own, and worth knowing before you connect:
 - While the tunnel is up, Mullvad's kill switch blocks everything outside it,
  the local network included, so Remote Desktop and other local devices stop
  answering until you switch local network sharing on in the app.
 - Name resolution follows the tunnel for as long as the client is enabled: the
  NixOS service turns on systemd-resolved and points NetworkManager at it.
 Neither is set or restricted here; both are visible and changeable in the app.
 The firewall rules, the Hub's exposure checks, the Bitcoin stack and Tor are
 untouched by this module.
 ### Restricted support access
-Support uses a per-session SSH key on the non-root `sovran-support` account.
+Tech Support runs over SSH, and the Hub refuses to start a session until SSH
 Remote Access is enabled (see above). Support uses a per-session SSH key on the
 non-root `sovran-support` account.
 Sessions expire after 24 hours and have a small allowlist of `sudo` commands.
 Wallet paths receive deny ACLs unless the operator explicitly removes them.
-Disabling support removes the key and reapplies the ACLs.
+Disabling support removes the key and reapplies the ACLs but leaves SSH
 enabled.
 Support events are written to `/var/log/sovran-support-audit.log`. This is a
 local audit log, not a cryptographically tamper-evident record.
@@ -1 +1 @@
-1.2.0
+1.2.1
@@ -5,9 +5,7 @@ from __future__ import annotations
 import asyncio
 import base64
 import contextlib
 import glob
 import hashlib
 import hmac
 import ipaddress
 import json
 import logging
@@ -38,6 +36,7 @@ from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
 from .config import load_config, load_versions
 from . import systemctl as sysctl
 from . import system_password as sp
 from sovran_nwc import nwc_hub_manager as _nwc_mgr
 from . import support_ops as _support_ops
 from .ddns_update import normalise_url as _normalise_ddns_url
@@ -150,9 +149,7 @@ AUTOLAUNCH_DISABLE_FLAG = "/var/lib/sovran/hub-autolaunch-disabled"
 # ── Hub web authentication ────────────────────────────────────────
-FREE_PASSWORD_FILE      = "/var/lib/secrets/free-password"
+# free/root password verify/set/display lives in system_password.py
 FREE_PASSWORD_FILE_WEB  = "/var/lib/secrets/free-password-web"
 MIGRATION_NEWPASS_FILE  = "/var/lib/secrets/free-password-migration-newpass"
 HUB_SESSION_SECRET_FILE  = "/var/lib/secrets/hub-session-secret"
 SESSION_COOKIE_NAME      = "hub_session"
 MANUAL_LOGOUT_COOKIE_NAME = "hub_manual_logout"
@@ -724,58 +721,20 @@ def _is_authenticated(request: Request) -> bool:
    return True
 def _read_free_password() -> str | None:
    """Return the contents of the free-password secrets file, or None."""
    try:
        with open(FREE_PASSWORD_FILE, "r") as f:
            return f.read().strip()
    except Exception:
        return None
 def _hash_password(password: str) -> str:
    """Return a scrypt-hash with 16-byte salt, formatted salt_hex:hash_hex."""
    salt = os.urandom(16)
    hashed = hashlib.scrypt(password.encode(), salt=salt, n=16384, r=8, p=1)
    return salt.hex() + ":" + hashed.hex()
 def _check_password(submitted: str) -> bool:
-    """Constant-time comparison against stored scrypt hash or legacy plaintext."""
+    """Verify against /etc/shadow -- the same password GDM accepts.
-    for fp in (FREE_PASSWORD_FILE_WEB, FREE_PASSWORD_FILE):
+
-        try:
+    On success, heal a stale display copy with the password the user just
-            with open(fp, "r") as f:
+    proved (e.g. changed in GNOME Settings or the pre-upgrade Hub)."""
-                stored = f.read().strip()
+    if not sp.verify_system_password(submitted):
        except Exception:
            continue
        if not stored:
            continue
        if ":" in stored:
            try:
                salt_hex, hash_hex = stored.split(":", 1)
                salt = bytes.fromhex(salt_hex)
                submitted_hash = hashlib.scrypt(submitted.encode(), salt=salt, n=16384, r=8, p=1)
                if hmac.compare_digest(submitted_hash.hex().encode(), hash_hex.encode()):
                    return True
            except Exception:
                pass
        else:
            if hmac.compare_digest(submitted.encode(), stored.encode()):
                try:
                    with open(FREE_PASSWORD_FILE_WEB, "w") as f:
                        f.write(_hash_password(submitted))
                    os.chmod(FREE_PASSWORD_FILE_WEB, 0o600)
                except Exception:
                    pass
                return True
        return False
    sp.record_known_password(submitted, only_if_stale=True)
    return True
 def _ensure_onboarding_reopened_for_migration() -> None:
    """Re-open onboarding when a migration password disclosure is pending."""
-    if not os.path.isfile(MIGRATION_NEWPASS_FILE):
+    if not sp.ensure_migration_pending(_generate_diceware_password):
        return
    try:
        os.remove(ONBOARDING_FLAG)
@@ -1846,6 +1805,18 @@ def _resolve_credential(cred: dict) -> dict | None:
    if not filepath:
        return None
    # free/root login passwords: shown only if the display copy really is the
    # current one (system_password verifies it against /etc/shadow).
    if filepath in (sp.DISPLAY_FILE, sp.ROOT_DISPLAY_FILE):
        pw = (sp.read_display_password() if filepath == sp.DISPLAY_FILE
              else sp.read_root_display_password())
        if pw is None:
            hint = ("Changed outside the Hub — finish the password step in onboarding to see it here."
                    if sp.migration_pending() else
                    "Changed outside the Hub — sign out and back in to show it here.")
            return {"label": label, "value": "", "unknown": True, "hint": hint}
        return {"label": label, "value": prefix + pw + suffix, "multiline": multiline}
    try:
        with open(filepath, "r") as f:
            raw = f.read().strip()
@@ -2863,69 +2834,19 @@ async def api_onboarding_complete():
@app.get("/api/migration/password-status")
 async def api_migration_password_status():
    """Return whether a migration-generated password is awaiting acknowledgement."""
-    try:
+    pw = sp.migration_pending()
-        with open(MIGRATION_NEWPASS_FILE, "r") as f:
+    return {"pending": True, "password": pw} if pw else {"pending": False}
            return {"pending": True, "password": f.read().strip()}
    except FileNotFoundError:
        return {"pending": False}
    except OSError as exc:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not read migration password: {exc}")
@app.post("/api/migration/password-acknowledge")
 async def api_migration_password_acknowledge():
-    """Acknowledge the migration password and update /etc/shadow to match."""
+    """Acknowledge the migration password: apply it to /etc/shadow and the display copy."""
    # Read the new password before deleting the file
    new_password = None
    try:
-        with open(MIGRATION_NEWPASS_FILE, "r") as f:
+        ok = await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(None, sp.acknowledge_migration)
-            new_password = f.read().strip()
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc:
-    except FileNotFoundError:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=(exc.stderr or "chpasswd failed").strip())
-        pass
+    if not ok:
-    except OSError as exc:
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=404, detail="No migration password pending.")
        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not read migration password: {exc}")
    # Update /etc/shadow so GDM accepts the new password going forward
    if new_password:
        chpasswd_bin = (
            shutil.which("chpasswd")
            or ("/run/current-system/sw/bin/chpasswd"
                if os.path.isfile("/run/current-system/sw/bin/chpasswd") else None)
        )
        if chpasswd_bin:
            try:
                result = subprocess.run(
                    [chpasswd_bin],
                    input=f"free:{new_password}",
                    capture_output=True,
                    text=True,
                )
                if result.returncode != 0:
                    logger.warning(
                        "chpasswd failed during migration acknowledge (rc=%d): %s",
                        result.returncode,
                        (result.stderr or result.stdout).strip(),
                    )
            except Exception as exc:
                logger.warning("chpasswd exception during migration acknowledge: %s", exc)
        # Clear only the locked keyring databases, leaving the directory and 'default' pointer intact.
        keyring_dir = "/home/free/.local/share/keyrings"
        keyring_files = glob.glob(os.path.join(keyring_dir, "*.keyring"))
        for kf in keyring_files:
            try:
                os.remove(kf)
            except OSError as exc:
                logger.warning("Could not remove old keyring file %s: %s", kf, exc)
    # Clear the pending marker
    try:
        os.remove(MIGRATION_NEWPASS_FILE)
    except FileNotFoundError:
        pass
    except OSError as exc:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=f"Could not clear migration password: {exc}")
    return {"ok": True}
@@ -5558,86 +5479,16 @@ async def api_security_reset():
    new_free_password = _generate_diceware_password()
    new_root_password = _generate_diceware_password()
-    # Locate chpasswd
+    # Set the new passwords (shadow first, then the plaintext display copies the
-    chpasswd_bin = (
+    # credentials view shows). No keyring handling: the login keyring is
-        shutil.which("chpasswd")
+    # password-independent and does not need re-keying or wiping.
-        or ("/run/current-system/sw/bin/chpasswd"
+    for setter, pw, tag in ((sp.set_free_password, new_free_password, "free"),
-            if os.path.isfile("/run/current-system/sw/bin/chpasswd") else None)
+                            (sp.set_root_password, new_root_password, "root")):
    )
    if chpasswd_bin:
        # Set free user password
        try:
-            result = subprocess.run(
+            setter(pw)
                [chpasswd_bin],
                input=f"free:{new_free_password}",
                capture_output=True, text=True,
            )
            if result.returncode != 0:
                logger.warning("chpasswd free failed: %s", (result.stderr or result.stdout).strip())
                errors.append("chpasswd_free_failed")
        except Exception as exc:
-            logger.warning("chpasswd free error: %s", exc)
+            logger.warning("security reset: set %s password failed: %s", tag, exc)
-            errors.append("chpasswd_free_failed")
+            errors.append(f"set_{tag}_password_failed")
        # Set root password
        try:
            result = subprocess.run(
                [chpasswd_bin],
                input=f"root:{new_root_password}",
                capture_output=True, text=True,
            )
            if result.returncode != 0:
                logger.warning("chpasswd root failed: %s", (result.stderr or result.stdout).strip())
                errors.append("chpasswd_root_failed")
        except Exception as exc:
            logger.warning("chpasswd root error: %s", exc)
            errors.append("chpasswd_root_failed")
    else:
        logger.warning("chpasswd not found; passwords not reset")
        errors.append("chpasswd_not_found")
    # Write new passwords to secrets files
    try:
        os.makedirs("/var/lib/secrets", exist_ok=True)
        try:
            import subprocess
            subprocess.run(
                ["chpasswd"],
                input=f"free:{new_free_password}\n".encode(),
                check=True,
                capture_output=True,
            )
        except Exception:
            pass
        try:
            with open(FREE_PASSWORD_FILE_WEB, "w") as f:
                f.write(_hash_password(new_free_password))
            os.chmod(FREE_PASSWORD_FILE_WEB, 0o600)
        except Exception:
            pass
    except Exception as exc:
        logger.warning("write free-password error: %s", exc)
        errors.append("write_free_password_failed")
    try:
        os.makedirs("/var/lib/secrets", exist_ok=True)
        with open("/var/lib/secrets/root-password", "w") as f:
            f.write(_hash_password(new_root_password))
        os.chmod("/var/lib/secrets/root-password", 0o600)
    except Exception as exc:
        logger.warning("write root-password error: %s", exc)
        errors.append("write_root_password_failed")
    # Clear only the locked keyring databases, leaving the directory and 'default' pointer intact.
    keyring_dir = "/home/free/.local/share/keyrings"
    keyring_files = glob.glob(os.path.join(keyring_dir, "*.keyring"))
    for kf in keyring_files:
        try:
            os.remove(kf)
        except OSError as exc:
            logger.warning("keyring wipe error for %s: %s", kf, exc)
            errors.append("keyring_wipe_failed")
    # The user performed a full security reset — the banner's purpose is served.
    try:
@@ -5753,83 +5604,29 @@ async def api_security_verify_integrity():
 class ChangePasswordRequest(BaseModel):
    current_password: str
    new_password: str
    confirm_password: str
@app.post("/api/change-password")
 async def api_change_password(req: ChangePasswordRequest):
-    """Change the system 'free' user password.
+    """Change the system 'free' user password (also the Hub login password).
-    Updates /etc/shadow via chpasswd and writes the new password to
+    Updates /etc/shadow via system_password.set_free_password, which also keeps
-    /var/lib/secrets/free-password so the Hub credentials view stays in sync.
+    the /var/lib/secrets/free-password display copy in sync."""
-    """
+    if not sp.verify_system_password(req.current_password):
        raise HTTPException(status_code=403, detail="Current password is incorrect.")
    if not req.new_password:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="New password must not be empty.")
    if req.new_password != req.confirm_password:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Passwords do not match.")
    if len(req.new_password) < 8:
        raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Password must be at least 8 characters long.")
    # Locate chpasswd binary (NixOS puts it in the Nix store, not /usr/bin)
    chpasswd_bin = (
        shutil.which("chpasswd")
        or ("/run/current-system/sw/bin/chpasswd"
            if os.path.isfile("/run/current-system/sw/bin/chpasswd") else None)
    )
    if chpasswd_bin is None:
        raise HTTPException(
            status_code=500,
            detail="chpasswd binary not found. Cannot update system password.",
        )
    # Update /etc/shadow via chpasswd
    try:
-        result = subprocess.run(
+        await asyncio.get_event_loop().run_in_executor(None, sp.set_free_password, req.new_password)
-            [chpasswd_bin],
+    except subprocess.CalledProcessError as exc:
-            input=f"free:{req.new_password}",
+        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=(exc.stderr or "chpasswd failed").strip())
            capture_output=True,
            text=True,
        )
        if result.returncode != 0:
            detail = (result.stderr or result.stdout).strip() or "chpasswd failed."
            raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail=detail)
    except HTTPException:
        raise
    except Exception as exc:
        logger.error("Failed to update system password: %s", exc)
        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to update system password.")
    # Write new password to secrets file so Hub credentials stay in sync
    try:
        os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(FREE_PASSWORD_FILE), exist_ok=True)
        # Write secure web-only hash; sync system shadow via chpasswd (memory)
        try:
            import subprocess
            subprocess.run(
                ["chpasswd"],
                input=f"free:{req.new_password}\n".encode(),
                check=True,
                capture_output=True,
            )
        except Exception as exc:
            # Log but do not block; web hash is the critical fix
            pass
        with open(FREE_PASSWORD_FILE_WEB, "w") as f:
            f.write(_hash_password(req.new_password))
        os.chmod(FREE_PASSWORD_FILE_WEB, 0o600)
    except Exception as exc:
        logger.error("Failed to write secrets file: %s", exc)
        raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to write secrets file.")
    # Clear only the locked keyring databases, leaving the directory and 'default' pointer intact.
    keyring_dir = "/home/free/.local/share/keyrings"
    for kf in glob.glob(os.path.join(keyring_dir, "*.keyring")):
        try:
            os.remove(kf)
        except OSError:
            pass  # Non-fatal: keyring will be re-created on next login regardless
    return {"ok": True}
@@ -1520,3 +1520,6 @@
  margin-top: 10px;
  line-height: 1.5;
 }
 /* password cleanup: display copy changed outside the Hub */
 .creds-value.creds-unknown { font-style: italic; opacity: 0.75; }
@@ -34,6 +34,10 @@ function _renderCredsHtml(credentials, unit) {
      html += '<div class="creds-row"><div class="creds-label">' + escHtml(cred.label) + '</div>' + qrBlock + '</div>';
      continue;
    }
    if (cred.unknown) {
      html += '<div class="creds-row"><div class="creds-label">' + escHtml(cred.label) + '</div><div class="creds-value-wrap"><div class="creds-value creds-unknown">' + escHtml(cred.hint || "Changed outside the Hub — sign out and back in to show it here.") + '</div></div></div>';
      continue;
    }
    var displayValue = linkify(cred.value);
    html += '<div class="creds-row"><div class="creds-label">' + escHtml(cred.label) + '</div>' + qrBlock + '<div class="creds-value-wrap"><div class="creds-value" id="' + id + '">' + displayValue + '</div><button class="creds-copy-btn" data-target="' + id + '">Copy</button></div></div>';
  }
@@ -1293,6 +1297,11 @@ function openSystemChangePasswordModal(unit, name, icon) {
      '<div class="sys-chpw-title">🔑 Change Free Account &amp; Hub Login Password</div>' +
      '<div class="sys-chpw-desc">This updates the password for the <strong>free</strong> user account. <strong>This is also your Sovran Hub login password</strong> — both will change.</div>' +
    '</div>' +
    '<div class="matrix-form-group"><label class="matrix-form-label" for="sys-chpw-current">Current Password</label>' +
    '<div class="pw-input-wrap">' +
    '<input class="matrix-form-input" type="password" id="sys-chpw-current" placeholder="Current password" autocomplete="current-password">' +
    '<button type="button" class="pw-toggle-btn" id="sys-chpw-current-toggle" aria-label="Toggle password visibility">👁</button>' +
    '</div></div>' +
    '<div class="matrix-form-group"><label class="matrix-form-label" for="sys-chpw-new">New Password</label>' +
    '<div class="pw-input-wrap">' +
    '<input class="matrix-form-input" type="password" id="sys-chpw-new" placeholder="New strong password" autocomplete="new-password">' +
@@ -1315,6 +1324,13 @@ function openSystemChangePasswordModal(unit, name, icon) {
    openServiceDetailModal(unit, name, icon);
  });
  document.getElementById("sys-chpw-current-toggle").addEventListener("click", function() {
    var inp = document.getElementById("sys-chpw-current");
    var isHidden = inp.type === "password";
    inp.type = isHidden ? "text" : "password";
    this.textContent = isHidden ? "👁‍🗨" : "👁";
  });
  document.getElementById("sys-chpw-new-toggle").addEventListener("click", function() {
    var inp = document.getElementById("sys-chpw-new");
    var isHidden = inp.type === "password";
@@ -1332,12 +1348,13 @@ function openSystemChangePasswordModal(unit, name, icon) {
  document.getElementById("sys-chpw-submit-btn").addEventListener("click", async function() {
    var submitBtn = document.getElementById("sys-chpw-submit-btn");
    var resultEl = document.getElementById("sys-chpw-result");
    var currentPassword = document.getElementById("sys-chpw-current").value || "";
    var newPassword = document.getElementById("sys-chpw-new").value || "";
    var confirmPassword = document.getElementById("sys-chpw-confirm").value || "";
-    if (!newPassword || !confirmPassword) {
+    if (!currentPassword || !newPassword || !confirmPassword) {
      resultEl.className = "matrix-form-result error";
-      resultEl.textContent = "Both password fields are required.";
+      resultEl.textContent = "All password fields are required.";
      return;
    }
@@ -1362,7 +1379,7 @@ function openSystemChangePasswordModal(unit, name, icon) {
      await apiFetch("/api/change-password", {
        method: "POST",
        headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
-        body: JSON.stringify({ new_password: newPassword, confirm_password: confirmPassword })
+        body: JSON.stringify({ current_password: currentPassword, new_password: newPassword, confirm_password: confirmPassword })
      });
      resultEl.className = "matrix-form-result success";
      resultEl.textContent = "✅ Free account & Hub login password changed successfully.";
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
 """system_password.py -- the one place that knows about the 'free' (and root) password.
 Rules
  * /etc/shadow is the ONLY source of truth for authentication: Hub login == GDM login.
  * /var/lib/secrets/free-password (0600 root) is a DISPLAY copy for the Hub's credentials
    view. Only set_free_password() writes it, and it is verified against /etc/shadow before
    it is shown, so the Hub can never show a stale password.
  * Legacy / unknown-password machines go through the *migration* flow the onboarding already
    has: generate a new diceware password, show it, and apply it on acknowledgement. Until
    then the old password keeps working everywhere (shadow is untouched).
  * No keyring code anywhere: the GNOME login keyring is decoupled from the login password
    (blank-password keyring, pam_gnome_keyring off), so nothing has to be wiped or re-keyed.
 Needs libxcrypt. On NixOS the Hub service gets:  environment.LIBCRYPT = "${pkgs.libxcrypt}/lib/libcrypt.so.1"
 """
 from __future__ import annotations
 import ctypes
 import ctypes.util
 import hmac
 import os
 import secrets
 import subprocess
 import threading
 from typing import Callable
 USER = "free"
 SECRETS_DIR = "/var/lib/secrets"
 DISPLAY_FILE = f"{SECRETS_DIR}/free-password"
 ROOT_DISPLAY_FILE = f"{SECRETS_DIR}/root-password"
 MIGRATION_FILE = f"{SECRETS_DIR}/free-password-migration-newpass"   # same path the onboarding UI already uses
 LIVE_ISO_MARKER = "/iso"   # NixOS live media mounts the image here; never start a migration there
 _lock = threading.Lock()   # crypt() returns a static buffer; serialise calls
 _libcrypt = None
 # ── low level ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 def _crypt():
    global _libcrypt
    if _libcrypt is None:
        path = os.environ.get("LIBCRYPT") or ctypes.util.find_library("crypt") or "libcrypt.so.1"
        lib = ctypes.CDLL(path)
        lib.crypt.restype = ctypes.c_char_p
        lib.crypt.argtypes = [ctypes.c_char_p, ctypes.c_char_p]
        _libcrypt = lib
    return _libcrypt
 def shadow_hash(user: str = USER) -> str | None:
    """Password hash from /etc/shadow, or None if the account has none / is locked."""
    try:
        with open("/etc/shadow", encoding="utf-8") as f:
            for line in f:
                fields = line.rstrip("\n").split(":")
                if fields[0] == user:
                    h = fields[1]
                    return h if h and h[0] not in "!*" else None
    except OSError:
        return None
    return None
 def verify_system_password(password: str, user: str = USER) -> bool:
    """True iff `password` is the account's current login password
    (yescrypt, sha512crypt, ... whatever chpasswd produced)."""
    h = shadow_hash(user)
    if not h or not password:
        return False
    with _lock:
        out = _crypt().crypt(password.encode(), h.encode())
    return out is not None and hmac.compare_digest(out, h.encode())
 def _write_secret(path: str, value: str) -> None:
    os.makedirs(SECRETS_DIR, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
    tmp = path + ".tmp"
    with open(os.open(tmp, os.O_WRONLY | os.O_CREAT | os.O_TRUNC, 0o600), "w", encoding="utf-8") as f:
        f.write(value + "\n")
    os.replace(tmp, path)
 def _read_secret(path: str) -> str | None:
    try:
        with open(path, encoding="utf-8") as f:
            v = f.read().rstrip("\n")
        return v or None
    except OSError:
        return None
 def _chpasswd(user: str, password: str) -> None:
    import shutil
    bin_ = shutil.which("chpasswd") or "/run/current-system/sw/bin/chpasswd"
    subprocess.run([bin_], input=f"{user}:{password}\n", text=True, check=True, capture_output=True)
 # ── the single writers ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 def set_free_password(new_password: str) -> None:
    """System password first, then the display copy. Used by: change-password, reset,
    migration acknowledgement, the CLI."""
    if not new_password:
        raise ValueError("empty password")
    _chpasswd(USER, new_password)
    _write_secret(DISPLAY_FILE, new_password)
 def set_root_password(new_password: str) -> None:
    """Same contract for root (the credentials view lists it too)."""
    if not new_password:
        raise ValueError("empty password")
    _chpasswd("root", new_password)
    _write_secret(ROOT_DISPLAY_FILE, new_password)
 # ── what the Hub shows ─────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 def read_display_password() -> str | None:
    """The 'free' password to SHOW -- only if it really is the current one."""
    pw = _read_secret(DISPLAY_FILE)
    return pw if pw and verify_system_password(pw) else None
 def read_root_display_password() -> str | None:
    pw = _read_secret(ROOT_DISPLAY_FILE)
    if not pw or ":" in pw:          # ':' = scrypt hash written by older reset code -> not showable
        return None
    return pw if verify_system_password(pw, "root") else None
 def _display_state(path: str) -> str:
    """"missing" | "legacy" | "present" -- "present" only means a plaintext copy
    exists; it can still be stale (use read_display_password() to check that)."""
    pw = _read_secret(path)
    if pw is None:
        return "missing"
    return "legacy" if ":" in pw else "present"
 # ── migration flow (legacy machines) ────────────────────────────────────────
 def migration_pending() -> str | None:
    """The generated password awaiting acknowledgement, if any."""
    return _read_secret(MIGRATION_FILE)
 def ensure_migration_pending(generate: Callable[[], str]) -> bool:
    """Legacy detection. Call it where onboarding status is computed.
    Condition: the account HAS a password (so this is not the first boot) but the Hub
    has NO display copy of it at all (file missing or still the old hash format).
    Then generate a new password once and park it for the onboarding "migration
    password" step. Nothing is applied until the user acknowledges, so the old
    password keeps working at GDM and in the Hub. Returns True when a migration is
    pending (caller re-opens onboarding).
    A copy that exists but merely fails to verify (password changed in GNOME
    Settings, `passwd`, or the pre-upgrade Hub) is DRIFT, not a legacy install:
    it never triggers a migration and never changes any password -- it is healed
    automatically at the next login via record_known_password(pw, only_if_stale=True).
    Never fires on the live ISO (/iso) or while shadow is still locked."""
    if os.path.exists(LIVE_ISO_MARKER):
        return False
    if migration_pending():
        return True
    if shadow_hash() is None:
        return False
    if _display_state(DISPLAY_FILE) == "present":
        return False            # copy exists: current, or just stale (drift)
    _write_secret(MIGRATION_FILE, generate())
    return True
 def acknowledge_migration() -> bool:
    """User has written the new password down: make it real, then clear the pending file."""
    pw = migration_pending()
    if not pw:
        return False
    set_free_password(pw)
    os.remove(MIGRATION_FILE)
    return True
 def record_known_password(password: str, only_if_stale: bool = False) -> bool:
    """"Keep my current password" (migration step): if the user types the correct
    current password, store it as the display copy and cancel the migration.
    only_if_stale=True is the login-handler heal: write ONLY when an existing
    plaintext copy is stale, never create a missing one (a missing copy is the
    legacy case and belongs to the migration flow)."""
    if not verify_system_password(password):
        return False
    if only_if_stale and _display_state(DISPLAY_FILE) != "present":
        return False
    if _read_secret(DISPLAY_FILE) != password:
        _write_secret(DISPLAY_FILE, password)
    try:
        os.remove(MIGRATION_FILE)
    except FileNotFoundError:
        pass
    return True
 def generate_diceware_password(words: list[str] | None = None, n: int = 4) -> str:
    """word-word-word-word-NN, same shape the installer/reset produce (CSPRNG)."""
    words = words or ("apple barn brook cabin cedar cloud coral crane delta eagle ember fern field "
                      "flame flora flint frost grove haven hedge holly heron jade juniper kelp larch "
                      "lemon lilac linden loch lotus maple marsh meadow mist mossy mount oak ocean "
                      "olive petal pine pixel plum pond prism quartz raven ridge river robin rocky "
                      "rose rowan sage sand sierra silver slate snow solar spark spruce stone storm "
                      "summit swift thorn tide timber torch trout vale vault vine walnut wave willow "
                      "wren amber aspen birch blaze bloom bluff coast copper crest dune elder fjord "
                      "forge glade glen glow gulf").split()
    return "-".join(secrets.choice(words) for _ in range(n)) + f"-{secrets.randbelow(100):02d}"
 if __name__ == "__main__":   # tiny CLI for credentials.nix:  echo NEW | system_password.py set-free
    import sys
    cmd = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else ""
    if cmd in ("set-free", "set-root"):
        pw = sys.stdin.readline().rstrip("\n")
        (set_free_password if cmd == "set-free" else set_root_password)(pw)
        print("ok")
    elif cmd == "verify":
        sys.exit(0 if verify_system_password(sys.stdin.readline().rstrip("\n")) else 1)
    else:
        print("usage: system_password.py set-free|set-root|verify  (password on stdin)", file=sys.stderr)
        sys.exit(2)
@@ -1,16 +1,16 @@
 {
-  "caddy.service": "2.8.4",
+  "caddy.service": "2.11.7",
-  "tor.service": "0.4.8.12",
+  "tor.service": "0.4.9.14",
-  "gnome-remote-desktop.service": "46.0",
+  "gnome-remote-desktop.service": "50.2",
-  "bitcoind.service": "27.1.0",
+  "bitcoind.service": "31.1",
-  "electrs.service": "0.10.6",
+  "electrs.service": "0.12.0",
-  "lnd.service": "0.18.0",
+  "lnd.service": "0.21.4-beta",
-  "rtl.service": "0.15.12",
+  "rtl.service": "0.15.13",
-  "btcpayserver.service": "2.4.2",
+  "btcpayserver.service": "2.4.5",
-  "albyhub.service": "1.24.0",
+  "albyhub.service": "2.0.0",
-  "mempool.service": "3.2.1",
+  "mempool.service": "3.3.1",
-  "matrix-synapse.service": "1.115.0",
+  "matrix-synapse.service": "1.162.0",
-  "livekit.service": "1.13.6",
+  "livekit.service": "1.13.8",
-  "vaultwarden.service": "1.32.0",
+  "vaultwarden.service": "1.37.4",
-  "haven-relay.service": "0.1.0"
+  "haven-relay.service": "1.2.2"
 }
@@ -74,18 +74,6 @@
  services.printing.enable = true;
  systemd.enableEmergencyMode = false;
  environment.gnome.excludePackages = [ pkgs.gnome-tour ];
  security.pam.services.gdm-password.enableGnomeKeyring = true;
  security.pam.services.gdm-autologin.enableGnomeKeyring = true;
  # Declaratively guarantee the GNOME Keyring default pointer exists.
  # Defining the full path ensures root doesn't accidentally lock the user out of .local
  systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
    "d /home/free/.local 0700 free users -"
    "d /home/free/.local/share 0700 free users -"
    "d /home/free/.local/share/keyrings 0700 free users -"
    "f /home/free/.local/share/keyrings/default 0600 free users - login\n"
  ];
  # ── Audio ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
  services.pulseaudio.enable = false;
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
  # ─── Add your custom NixOS configuration below ───────────
  # ─── Mullvad VPN (Desktop Only) ───────────────────────────
  # Installed on the Desktop Role as the stock NixOS service; account, relay
  # and settings belong to the app. To take it off a Desktop machine:
  # services.mullvad-vpn.enable = lib.mkForce false;
  # ─── Custom Caddy virtual hosts ──────────────────────────
  # Uncomment and edit below to add your own Caddy sites:
  #
@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@
        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs"
      },
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1790862821,
+        "lastModified": 1792157233,
-        "narHash": "sha256-IcLn2hPlxsbn2PKVlFD6gsDzkVurQ7b0KPtyORUGFcs=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-XQnyEc+Pj0Tg21ckbPMri0fiK/exCzhBw6wNgd1INqw=",
        "owner": "emmanuelrosa",
        "repo": "btc-clients-nix",
-        "rev": "99b0442dcc15198efcb62f3c1e7561a361749a6a",
+        "rev": "990d29e23437f30b8573f640d3e323167de1dc7b",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@
        ]
      },
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1788450739,
+        "lastModified": 1790898470,
-        "narHash": "sha256-glZLQlzIn1fXH6PazR2iUmTo7kzzyYSshrWhLS9TqCU=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-zTwuwezD0w3hpga6a6P8emidzAZFyWqlNeRBlpWOOl8=",
        "owner": "hercules-ci",
        "repo": "flake-parts",
-        "rev": "31729ca8cbdb4fa927b34e5f4353e6a83f39e993",
+        "rev": "024633cd702b10285db5cb19b40ad48d2399ba60",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -41,11 +41,11 @@
    },
    "nixpkgs": {
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1790861130,
+        "lastModified": 1792155732,
-        "narHash": "sha256-cA8TrQntLbNO14wivJx7Gi2pZBhhBcMplgzIA3sk3TA=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-3Dk56anLQ1V1VklQFKFD6ul3cKQk40sThurHlPHIhOo=",
        "owner": "nixos",
        "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "3d23ea05a8a3be3f078845c2753af10cef80e1a5",
+        "rev": "7694c4f6b8537d50062ff36c21ef36de3c9322d7",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -56,11 +56,11 @@
    },
    "nixpkgs-stable": {
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1790750587,
+        "lastModified": 1792030654,
-        "narHash": "sha256-VfjaoJ1Uyb7JZTrBgE5Jf2nhjtQPmD9KOd19HJwmZwM=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-OaQwAtPMTjQiY2sT/2/62UbSPhzP/0aDnWzMm/NCiUw=",
        "owner": "nixos",
        "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "78e9c786dc08cd4f3420c2395cd977206a9b1da2",
+        "rev": "26f4107e47e3ad0ffd0db220469ba83b6f6d96e8",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -72,11 +72,11 @@
    },
    "nixpkgs_2": {
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1790822859,
+        "lastModified": 1792094642,
-        "narHash": "sha256-69xHQhAeMAD2wDXO7T2pcOZIF9Sga2W+JkmY2a11Ops=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-zp8ToDMnqZcu4o4IH9pdwXFXGp7yLm/M0dEnNWnyd7I=",
        "owner": "NixOS",
        "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "c59305bab2065cfecc4944690d9eedbb56f3a9fa",
+        "rev": "fe13242281a67641c0102cdb1087f0ebe586c7df",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -88,11 +88,11 @@
    },
    "nixpkgs_3": {
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1789724158,
+        "lastModified": 1791487292,
-        "narHash": "sha256-nlKgrm0dsVhOSopKheVBCcOpiIticufPPVLdVOI0euA=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-tqM7xDEsaeK1p6VvRygeZ9LkQRpUUkbRT02BHv6hnTM=",
        "owner": "NixOS",
        "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "0a3468a402c449992505b6a9fc5b06580141b750",
+        "rev": "8edc0c72e3a38faf5434e40d1f19431125fe4b30",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -104,11 +104,11 @@
    },
    "nixpkgs_4": {
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1790822859,
+        "lastModified": 1791956154,
-        "narHash": "sha256-69xHQhAeMAD2wDXO7T2pcOZIF9Sga2W+JkmY2a11Ops=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-jBYGPi4udQ9uo4KQp9m2J0546nJVQitG15gvZSaVVAs=",
        "owner": "NixOS",
        "repo": "nixpkgs",
-        "rev": "c59305bab2065cfecc4944690d9eedbb56f3a9fa",
+        "rev": "55bfb4d7437bd4e09ab7cba58a43bd68eb310044",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@
        "systems": "systems"
      },
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1790541651,
+        "lastModified": 1792203519,
-        "narHash": "sha256-/496IQz8qNWHHLnc3Zvr0l4uxJ34igNhJhn7ZKAefFk=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-yJ072hxngo/srNdLTp4BlFeo0hedwnKicI3TGlSXLFE=",
        "owner": "nix-community",
        "repo": "nixvim",
-        "rev": "5980a626794486abad69fca7667f9c11dfbc3bd7",
+        "rev": "453dc9c5037e6d1bec81d2a51ddacd58a2f44e9c",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -152,11 +152,11 @@
        "nixpkgs": "nixpkgs_4"
      },
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1790877969,
+        "lastModified": 1792361662,
-        "narHash": "sha256-Ia88keP9t3B6ECVw+LP4xasPdvzw1TIWya1K+3dySu0=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-EySy/HbufH9trjH0kEuZ2nVVk0+Sn5FoxJI7YtHrspo=",
        "owner": "naturallaw777",
        "repo": "Sovran_Bitcoin",
-        "rev": "b0da63bd81f1a1b1a970068b3061c6c8389db9aa",
+        "rev": "5c13bf5e01beccc4a225a36cde833f00b2595718",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -168,11 +168,11 @@
    "systems": {
      "flake": false,
      "locked": {
-        "lastModified": 1774449309,
+        "lastModified": 1791244623,
-        "narHash": "sha256-brhZ8DmuGtzkCYHJg4HEd602amKm89Y9ytsFZ5uWD1w=",
+        "narHash": "sha256-uuanbkFk8a313Zfrxdcz8Us/yQtaxNnKJtX8v0ZPpd8=",
        "owner": "nix-systems",
        "repo": "default",
-        "rev": "c29398b59d2048c4ab79345812849c9bd15e9150",
+        "rev": "d36eeed142f88b5a636f2e3856a53c61654cf29b",
        "type": "github"
      },
      "original": {
@@ -51,9 +51,9 @@
 			];
 			config = {
 				environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
-					btc-clients.packages.${pkgs.system}.bisq
+					btc-clients.packages.${pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.bisq
-					btc-clients.packages.${pkgs.system}.bisq2
+					btc-clients.packages.${pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.bisq2
-					btc-clients.packages.${pkgs.system}.sparrow
+					btc-clients.packages.${pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.system}.sparrow
 				];
 			};
 		};
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ class InstallerWindow(Adw.ApplicationWindow):
             "Full sovereignty: host your own websites, cloud, chat, passwords, and Bitcoin services instead of relying on Big Tech. Sovran_SystemsOS walks you through getting your domain from Njal.la and connecting everything. One router task is required: forward ports 80 and 443 to this computer. Heads-up: this makes your home IP address public.",
             "Server+Desktop"),
            ("Desktop Only",
-             "A beautiful, easy-to-use desktop without the background server applications.",
+             "A beautiful, easy-to-use desktop without the background server applications. Includes the Mullvad VPN app.",
             "Desktop Only"),
            ("Node Only",
             "Full Bitcoin node with Lightning and non-KYC buying and selling. No desktop.",
@@ -33,9 +33,6 @@ let
    echo "$NEW_PASS" > "$SECRET_FILE"
    chmod 600 "$SECRET_FILE"
    echo "Password for 'free' updated and saved."
    # Delete the old GNOME Keyring databases so a fresh one is created on next GDM login.
    rm -f /home/free/.local/share/keyrings/*.keyring
    echo "GNOME Keyring files cleared — a fresh keyring will be created on next login."
  '';
 in
 {
@@ -76,172 +73,4 @@ in
      command passwd $argv
    end
  '';
  # ── 1. Auto-Generate Root Password (Runs once) ─────────────
  systemd.services.root-password-setup = {
    description = "Generate and set a random root password";
    wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
    serviceConfig = {
      Type = "oneshot";
      RemainAfterExit = true;
    };
    path = [ pkgs.shadow pkgs.coreutils ];
    script = ''
      set -euo pipefail
      SECRET_FILE="/var/lib/secrets/root-password"
      if [ ! -f "$SECRET_FILE" ]; then
        mkdir -p /var/lib/secrets
        # Generate a diceware-style passphrase: word-word-word-word-NN
        WORDS="apple barn brook cabin cedar cloud coral crane delta eagle ember \
               fern field flame flora flint frost grove haven hedge holly heron \
               jade juniper kelp larch lemon lilac linden loch lotus maple marsh \
               meadow mist mossy mount oak ocean olive petal pine pixel plum pond \
               prism quartz raven ridge river robin rocky rose rowan sage sand \
               sierra silver slate snow solar spark spruce stone storm summit \
               swift thorn tide timber torch trout vale vault vine walnut wave \
               willow wren amber aspen birch blaze bloom bluff coast copper crest \
               dune elder fjord forge glade glen glow gulf"
        WORD_ARRAY=($WORDS)
        COUNT=''${#WORD_ARRAY[@]}
        W1=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
        W2=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
        W3=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
        W4=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
        DIGIT=$(printf '%02d' $((RANDOM % 100)))
        ROOT_PASS="$W1-$W2-$W3-$W4-$DIGIT"
        echo "$ROOT_PASS" > "$SECRET_FILE"
        chmod 600 "$SECRET_FILE"
      fi
      # If the file contains a scrypt hash (salt:hash), skip chpasswd — the
      # password was already set via the Hub security reset endpoint and this
      # service is only re-running as a manual recovery step.
      CONTENT="$(cat "$SECRET_FILE")"
      if echo "$CONTENT" | grep -qE '^[0-9a-f]{32}:[0-9a-f]{64,}$'; then
        echo "root-password-setup: stored value is already hashed — skipping chpasswd" >&2
      else
        echo "root:$CONTENT" | chpasswd
      fi
    '';
  };
  # ── 1b. Generate random 'free' password on first boot ──────
  systemd.services.free-password-setup = {
    description = "Generate and set a random 'free' user password";
    wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
    before = [ "display-manager.service" ];
    after = [ "systemd-user-sessions.service" ];
    serviceConfig = {
      Type = "oneshot";
      RemainAfterExit = true;
    };
    path = [ pkgs.shadow pkgs.coreutils ];
    script = ''
      set -euo pipefail
      SECRET_FILE="/var/lib/secrets/free-password"
      PENDING_FILE="/var/lib/secrets/free-password-migration-pending"
      if [ -f "$SECRET_FILE" ]; then
        echo "free:$(cat "$SECRET_FILE")" | chpasswd
        exit 0
      fi
      SHADOW_HASH=""
      while IFS=: read -r user hash _; do
        if [ "$user" = "free" ]; then
          SHADOW_HASH="$hash"
          break
        fi
      done < /etc/shadow
      HAS_REAL_HASH=0
      case "$SHADOW_HASH" in
        ""|"!"|"*"|"!!"|"!"*|"*"*)
          HAS_REAL_HASH=0
          ;;
        *)
          HAS_REAL_HASH=1
          ;;
      esac
      if [ "$HAS_REAL_HASH" -eq 1 ]; then
        mkdir -p /var/lib/secrets
        touch "$PENDING_FILE"
        chmod 600 "$PENDING_FILE"
        exit 0
      fi
      mkdir -p /var/lib/secrets
      # Generate a diceware-style passphrase: word-word-word-word-NN
      WORDS="apple barn brook cabin cedar cloud coral crane delta eagle ember \
             fern field flame flora flint frost grove haven hedge holly heron \
             jade juniper kelp larch lemon lilac linden loch lotus maple marsh \
             meadow mist mossy mount oak ocean olive petal pine pixel plum pond \
             prism quartz raven ridge river robin rocky rose rowan sage sand \
             sierra silver slate snow solar spark spruce stone storm summit \
             swift thorn tide timber torch trout vale vault vine walnut wave \
             willow wren amber aspen birch blaze bloom bluff coast copper crest \
             dune elder fjord forge glade glen glow gulf"
      WORD_ARRAY=($WORDS)
      COUNT=''${#WORD_ARRAY[@]}
      W1=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
      W2=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
      W3=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
      W4=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
      DIGIT=$(printf '%02d' $((RANDOM % 100)))
      FREE_PASS="$W1-$W2-$W3-$W4-$DIGIT"
      echo "$FREE_PASS" > "$SECRET_FILE"
      chmod 600 "$SECRET_FILE"
      echo "free:$FREE_PASS" | chpasswd
    '';
  };
  systemd.services.free-password-migration = {
    description = "Generate and set 'free' password for migrated machines";
    wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
    before = [ "display-manager.service" ];
    after = [ "systemd-user-sessions.service" "free-password-setup.service" ];
    requires = [ "free-password-setup.service" ];
    serviceConfig = {
      Type = "oneshot";
      RemainAfterExit = true;
    };
    path = [ pkgs.shadow pkgs.coreutils ];
    script = ''
      set -euo pipefail
      PENDING_FILE="/var/lib/secrets/free-password-migration-pending"
      SECRET_FILE="/var/lib/secrets/free-password"
      NEWPASS_FILE="/var/lib/secrets/free-password-migration-newpass"
      [ -f "$PENDING_FILE" ] || exit 0
      mkdir -p /var/lib/secrets
      WORDS="apple barn brook cabin cedar cloud coral crane delta eagle ember \
             fern field flame flora flint frost grove haven hedge holly heron \
             jade juniper kelp larch lemon lilac linden loch lotus maple marsh \
             meadow mist mossy mount oak ocean olive petal pine pixel plum pond \
             prism quartz raven ridge river robin rocky rose rowan sage sand \
             sierra silver slate snow solar spark spruce stone storm summit \
             swift thorn tide timber torch trout vale vault vine walnut wave \
             willow wren amber aspen birch blaze bloom bluff coast copper crest \
             dune elder fjord forge glade glen glow gulf"
      WORD_ARRAY=($WORDS)
      COUNT=''${#WORD_ARRAY[@]}
      W1=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
      W2=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
      W3=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
      W4=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
      DIGIT=$(printf '%02d' $((RANDOM % 100)))
      FREE_PASS="$W1-$W2-$W3-$W4-$DIGIT"
      printf '%s\n' "$FREE_PASS" > "$SECRET_FILE"
      chmod 600 "$SECRET_FILE"
      printf '%s\n' "$FREE_PASS" > "$NEWPASS_FILE"
      chmod 600 "$NEWPASS_FILE"
      rm -f "$PENDING_FILE"
    '';
  };
 }
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@
    # ── Always on (no flag) ───────────────────────────────────
    ./php.nix
    ./credentials.nix
    ./password-model.nix
    # ── Services (default ON — disable in custom.nix) ─────────
    ./synapse.nix
@@ -34,5 +35,8 @@
    ./element-calling.nix
    ./rdp.nix
    ./sshd.nix
    # ── Desktop Role only (gated inside the module) ───────────
    ./mullvad.nix
  ];
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
 # ── modules/mullvad.nix ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 # Mullvad VPN client — Desktop Role only.
 #
 # A plain install: the daemon (pkgs.mullvad) and the graphical app
 # (pkgs.mullvad-vpn) exactly as NixOS ships them, enabled and nothing more. The
 # account, the relay, the kill switch and every other setting are the app's
 # business; nothing here configures them, and nothing here is wired into the
 # Hub or into any other part of the system.
 #
 # The role gate is the whole point: Server + Desktop and Bitcoin Node are
 # machines that serve, and a VPN client with its own DNS and routing policy is
 # not something their services asked for. Only roles.desktop builds it.
 #
 # Turning it off on a Desktop machine: uncomment
 #   services.mullvad-vpn.enable = lib.mkForce false;
 # in custom.nix (the mkForce is needed because this module sets it too).
 { config, lib, ... }:
 lib.mkIf config.sovran_systemsOS.roles.desktop {
  services.mullvad-vpn = {
    # The daemon and its systemd service.
    enable = true;
    # The desktop app.
    gui.enable = true;
  };
 }
@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
 { config, pkgs, lib, ... }:
 # Sovran_SystemsOS -- password model cleanup (GNOME 50 / gnome-keyring 50)
 #
 #   * /etc/shadow is the only source of truth for authentication (Hub login == GDM login).
 #   * /var/lib/secrets/{free,root}-password are root-only DISPLAY copies for the Hub, written
 #     by exactly one module (system_password.py) and verified against shadow before shown.
 #   * The GNOME login keyring is decoupled from the login password: it is created with a
 #     blank password and pam_gnome_keyring never hands the login password to the daemon.
 #     => no "unlock your login keyring" prompts, ever (also on the autologin live ISO);
 #        Brave's cookie/password key survives every password change; no *.keyring wiping.
 #   * Legacy machines (password unknown to the Hub) are handled by the Hub's existing
 #     onboarding "migration password" step -- not by a boot service any more.
 #
 # Import from configuration.nix and DELETE these lines there:
 #   security.pam.services.gdm-password.enableGnomeKeyring = true;
 #   security.pam.services.gdm-autologin.enableGnomeKeyring = true;
 #   the four systemd.tmpfiles.rules for /home/free/.local/share/keyrings/{,default}
 # and in modules/credentials.nix delete root-password-setup, free-password-setup,
 # free-password-migration and the `rm -f /home/free/.local/share/keyrings/*.keyring` lines.
 let
  user = "free";
  home = "/home/${user}";
  # A login keyring with a blank password. gnome-keyring stores those in this textual
  # format and auto-unlocks them on demand without any prompt (verified on 48; the rule in
  # gkm-secret-collection.c that picks the textual format for a blank master is unchanged
  # in 50 and the 50.0 release notes contain no behavioural changes).
  blankLoginKeyring = pkgs.writeText "login.keyring" ''
    [keyring]
    display-name=login
    ctime=0
    mtime=0
    lock-on-idle=false
    lock-after=false
  '';
  # Apply the installer's plaintext password ONCE: only while the account still has no
  # usable hash (nixos-install --no-root-password leaves both accounts locked). After that
  # the file is display-only and the Hub (system_password.py) is the only thing that
  # writes it. This replaces the old services, which re-applied the file on EVERY boot
  # and silently reverted any password changed elsewhere.
  # On already-installed machines the case below matches `*)` (real hash) -> no-op:
  # an upgrade can never change or generate a password.
  applyOnce = { account, fallback ? false }: ''
    set -euo pipefail
    f=/var/lib/secrets/${account}-password
    hash="$(getent shadow ${account} | cut -d: -f2 || true)"
    case "$hash" in
      ""|"!"*|"*"*)
        if [ -s "$f" ] && ! grep -qE '^[0-9a-f]{32}:[0-9a-f]{64,}$' "$f"; then
          echo "${account}:$(head -n1 "$f")" | chpasswd
        ${lib.optionalString fallback ''
        else
          # Installer left no usable file: generate one so GDM is always reachable
          # (the user reads it in the Hub). Never runs once the account has a password.
          W="apple barn brook cabin cedar cloud coral crane delta eagle ember fern field flame
             flora flint frost grove haven hedge holly heron jade juniper kelp larch lemon lilac
             linden loch lotus maple marsh meadow mist mossy mount oak ocean olive petal pine
             pixel plum pond prism quartz raven ridge river robin rocky rose rowan sage sand
             sierra silver slate snow solar spark spruce stone storm summit swift thorn tide
             timber torch trout vale vault vine walnut wave willow wren"
          pw=$(echo $W | tr ' ' '\n' | shuf -n4 | paste -sd- -)-$(printf '%02d' $((RANDOM % 100)))
          umask 077; printf '%s\n' "$pw" > "$f"
          echo "${account}:$pw" | chpasswd
        ''}
        fi ;;
      *) ;;  # password already set: never touch it here again
    esac
  '';
 in
 {
  # ── 1. Keyring: never learns the login password ───────────────────────────
  # nixpkgs' gnome-keyring module turns this on for `login` (gdm-password includes it).
  # If the daemon ever receives the login password it re-encrypts the blank keyring with
  # it on the next save -- so it must be off everywhere.
  security.pam.services.login.enableGnomeKeyring = lib.mkForce false;
  security.pam.services.gdm-password.enableGnomeKeyring = lib.mkForce false;
  security.pam.services.gdm-autologin.enableGnomeKeyring = lib.mkForce false;
  security.pam.services.passwd.enableGnomeKeyring = lib.mkForce false;
  # Seed the blank keyring. `C` copies only if the file does not exist, so an existing
  # keyring is never overwritten -- which is also what makes a reset's `rm *.keyring`
  # harmless: the next boot re-seeds a fresh blank keyring.
  systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
    "d ${home}/.local 0700 ${user} users -"
    "d ${home}/.local/share 0700 ${user} users -"
    "d ${home}/.local/share/keyrings 0700 ${user} users -"
    "C ${home}/.local/share/keyrings/login.keyring 0600 ${user} users - ${blankLoginKeyring}"
  ];
  # One-time migration for machines that already have a keyring encrypted with the
  # (old) login password: move it aside and seed the blank one. Runs before GDM; the old
  # file is kept. Same cost users pay today on every password change (Brave logs you out
  # of sites once) -- but only once, ever.
  system.activationScripts.sovranBlankKeyring = lib.stringAfter [ "users" ] ''
    d=${home}/.local/share/keyrings
    if [ -f "$d/login.keyring" ] && ! head -c 9 "$d/login.keyring" | grep -q '^\[keyring\]'; then
      mv "$d/login.keyring" "$d/login.keyring.encrypted-$(date +%Y%m%d)"
      install -o ${user} -g users -m 0600 ${blankLoginKeyring} "$d/login.keyring"
    fi
  '';
  # ── 2. First-boot password hand-off (unit names kept: the Hub's "System Passwords"
  #       service card is bound to root-password-setup.service) ───────────────────────
  systemd.services.free-password-setup = {
    description = "Apply the installer's 'free' password (first boot only)";
    wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
    before = [ "display-manager.service" ];
    serviceConfig = { Type = "oneshot"; RemainAfterExit = true; };
    path = [ pkgs.shadow pkgs.coreutils pkgs.gnugrep pkgs.getent ];
    script = applyOnce { account = user; fallback = true; };
  };
  systemd.services.root-password-setup = {
    description = "Apply the installer's root password (first boot only)";
    wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
    serviceConfig = { Type = "oneshot"; RemainAfterExit = true; };
    path = [ pkgs.shadow pkgs.coreutils pkgs.gnugrep pkgs.getent ];
    script = applyOnce { account = "root"; };
  };
  # Legacy detection now lives in the Hub (system_password.ensure_migration_pending).
  systemd.services.free-password-migration.enable = false;
  # ── 3. The Hub verifies passwords against /etc/shadow via libxcrypt ───────
  systemd.services.sovran-hub-web.environment.LIBCRYPT = "${pkgs.libxcrypt}/lib/libcrypt.so.1";
 }
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 #   3. Applies OS-specific overrides (Second_Drive paths, operator "free",
 #      forced wallet enable, Hub firewall port, domain requirements)
 #   4. Wires the Sovran Hub's NWC environment to the Alby Hub service
-{ config, pkgs, lib, ... }:
+{ config, pkgs, lib, options, ... }:
 let
  cfg = config.sovran_systemsOS;
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ let
    NWC_LND_CERT_FILE = lndCertPath;
    NWC_LND_MACAROON_FILE = "/run/lnd/albyhub.macaroon";
    NWC_RELAY =
-      if cfg.features.haven
+      if cfg.features.haven && config.networking.domain != null && config.networking.domain != ""
      then "wss://haven.${config.networking.domain}/nostr"
      else "wss://relay.getalby.com,wss://relay2.getalby.com";
  };
@@ -55,11 +55,34 @@ in {
  };
  # ── 2. Second_Drive data paths (OS-specific) ──────────────────
-  services.bitcoind = lib.mkIf cfg.services.bitcoin {
+  services.bitcoind = lib.mkIf cfg.services.bitcoin ({
    dataDir = "/run/media/Second_Drive/BTCEcoandBackup/Bitcoin_Node";
    # The OS always enables the bitcoind wallet — the Hub and BTCPay need it.
    disablewallet = lib.mkForce false;
-  };
+    # electrs 0.12.0 (bindex) requires bitcoind's REST interface (rest=1).
    extraConfig = lib.optionalString (!(options.services.bitcoind ? rest)) "rest=1";
  } // lib.optionalAttrs cfg.web.btcpayserver {
    rpc.users.btcpayserver.rpcwhitelist = lib.mkForce (lib.unique (config.services.bitcoind.rpc.users.public.rpcwhitelist ++ [
      "setban"
      "generatetoaddress"
      "getrpcinfo"
      "gettransaction"
      "getwalletinfo"
      "getnewaddress"
      "listunspent"
      "listtransactions"
      "listreceivedbyaddress"
      "importmulti"
      "importdescriptors"
      "importaddress"
      "importprivkey"
      "importpubkey"
      "rescanblockchain"
      "createwallet"
      "loadwallet"
      "signrawtransactionwithwallet"
    ]));
  });
  services.electrs = lib.mkIf cfg.services.bitcoin {
    dataDir = "/run/media/Second_Drive/BTCEcoandBackup/Electrs_Data";
@@ -72,11 +95,38 @@ in {
    serviceConfig.PrivateUsers = lib.mkForce false;
  };
-  systemd.services.electrs = lib.mkIf cfg.services.bitcoin {
+  systemd.services.electrs = lib.mkIf cfg.services.bitcoin (
    let
      bitcoind = config.services.bitcoind;
      electrsCfg = config.services.electrs;
      nbLib = config.nix-bitcoin.lib;
    in {
      requires = lib.mkForce [ "run-media-Second_Drive.mount" ];
      after    = [ "run-media-Second_Drive.mount" "bitcoind.service" ];
      wants    = [ "bitcoind.service" ];
-  };
+    } // lib.optionalAttrs (!(options.services.bitcoind ? rest)) {
      # Fallback when locked against Sovran_Bitcoin <= 1.1.1:
      # electrs 0.12.0 removed --daemon-p2p-addr and switched to bindex (format v1).
      preStart = lib.mkAfter ''
        dbNetDir='${electrsCfg.dataDir}/${bitcoind.makeNetworkName "bitcoin" "regtest"}'
        if [[ -d "$dbNetDir" ]] && grep -q 'prefix_extractor=rocksdb\.FixedPrefix\.8' "$dbNetDir"/OPTIONS-* 2>/dev/null; then
          echo "electrs: removing pre-0.12.0 database at $dbNetDir for bindex 0.12.0 reindex"
          rm -rf "$dbNetDir"
        fi
      '';
      serviceConfig.ExecStart = lib.mkForce ''
        ${pkgs.electrs}/bin/electrs \
        --log-filters=INFO \
        --network=${bitcoind.makeNetworkName "bitcoin" "regtest"} \
        --db-dir='${electrsCfg.dataDir}' \
        --daemon-dir='${bitcoind.dataDir}' \
        --electrum-rpc-addr=${electrsCfg.address}:${toString electrsCfg.port} \
        --monitoring-addr=${electrsCfg.address}:${toString electrsCfg.monitoringPort} \
        --daemon-rpc-addr=${nbLib.addressWithPort bitcoind.rpc.address bitcoind.rpc.port} \
        ${electrsCfg.extraArgs}
      '';
    }
  );
  systemd.services.lnd = lib.mkIf cfg.services.bitcoin {
    wants    = [ "bitcoind.service" ];
@@ -0,0 +1,112 @@
 """Guards for the Mullvad VPN client being a plain Desktop Role install.
 The desktop app and its daemon ship with Desktop Only and with no other role:
 Server + Desktop and Bitcoin Node are machines that serve, and a VPN client with
 its own DNS and routing policy is not something their services asked for.
 Beyond that the install is deliberately boring. It is the NixOS service exactly
 as NixOS ships it — no local-network boot service, no DNS or firewall edits of
 our own, no Hub tile, no Feature Manager card, no toggles. The account, the
 relay and the kill switch belong to the app.
 Like the other nix-file checks these read the shipped sources as text: nothing is
 run and nothing touches the network.
 """
 import os
 import unittest
 _ROOT = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
 def _read(*parts):
    with open(os.path.join(_ROOT, *parts), encoding="utf-8") as f:
        return f.read()
 def _without_comments(src):
    """The source with whole-line `#` comments removed."""
    return "\n".join(l for l in src.splitlines() if not l.lstrip().startswith("#"))
 class TheClientIsBuiltOnDesktopAndNowhereElse(unittest.TestCase):
    @classmethod
    def setUpClass(cls):
        cls.module = _read("modules", "mullvad.nix")
        cls.code = _without_comments(cls.module)
    def test_the_module_is_imported(self):
        self.assertIn("./mullvad.nix", _read("modules", "modules.nix"))
    def test_the_gate_is_the_desktop_role(self):
        self.assertRegex(
            self.code,
            r"lib\.mkIf\s+config\.sovran_systemsOS\.roles\.desktop\s*\{",
        )
    def test_no_other_role_is_mentioned(self):
        self.assertNotIn("server_plus_desktop", self.code)
        self.assertNotIn("roles.node", self.code)
    def test_the_install_is_the_daemon_and_the_app(self):
        self.assertRegex(self.code, r"services\.mullvad-vpn\s*=\s*\{")
        self.assertRegex(self.code, r"(?m)^    enable = true;$")
        self.assertRegex(self.code, r"gui\.enable = true;")
 class TheInstallStaysVanilla(unittest.TestCase):
    """Nothing is configured for the user, in the module or out of it."""
    @classmethod
    def setUpClass(cls):
        cls.module = _without_comments(_read("modules", "mullvad.nix"))
    def test_no_extra_services_are_added(self):
        self.assertNotIn("systemd.services", self.module)
    def test_no_dns_or_network_edits_of_our_own(self):
        # The NixOS module already turns on systemd-resolved and points
        # NetworkManager at it; re-declaring either here would be our policy,
        # not the distribution's.
        for key in ("services.resolved", "networkmanager", "networking."):
            self.assertNotIn(key, self.module)
    def test_no_firewall_or_kernel_edits(self):
        self.assertNotIn("firewall", self.module)
        self.assertNotIn("boot.", self.module)
    def test_no_packages_are_forced_in(self):
        self.assertNotIn("environment.systemPackages", self.module)
    def test_the_feature_flag_does_not_come_back(self):
        # A Hub-managed feature flag on an app that is simply installed would
        # put a toggle in front of something that has no decision to make.
        for path in (("modules", "core", "roles.nix"),
                     ("modules", "core", "role-logic.nix")):
            self.assertNotIn("mullvad", _read(*path).lower(), f"{path[-1]} mentions mullvad")
 class TheHubDoesNotMentionIt(unittest.TestCase):
    """The app is not a service the Hub manages or announces."""
    def test_the_hub_tiles_and_roles_are_untouched(self):
        self.assertNotIn("mullvad", _read("modules", "core", "sovran-hub.nix").lower())
    def test_the_hub_backend_is_untouched(self):
        self.assertNotIn("mullvad", _read("app", "sovran_systemsos_web", "server.py").lower())
    def test_the_desktop_shell_is_untouched(self):
        # The app appears in the GNOME app grid by itself; no folder edit, no
        # dock entry.
        self.assertNotIn(
            "mullvad", _read("modules", "core", "sovran_systemsos-desktop.nix").lower())
    def test_there_is_no_icon_for_it(self):
        # app/icons holds Hub tile icons only.
        self.assertFalse(
            os.path.exists(os.path.join(_ROOT, "app", "icons", "mullvad.svg")))
 if __name__ == "__main__":
    unittest.main()
Author	SHA1	Message	Date
naturallaw777	1d59a995e8	chore(flake): update sovran-bitcoin with btcpayserver RPC whitelist fix	2026-10-18 17:15:44 -05:00
Sovran Systems	f1f0bf0d11	fix(bitcoin): expand btcpayserver RPC whitelist for NBXplorer - Ensure services.bitcoind.rpc.users.btcpayserver.rpcwhitelist includes public.rpcwhitelist and NBXplorer capability-scan/wallet RPC methods (validateaddress, testmempoolaccept, signrawtransactionwithkey, signrawtransactionwithwallet, getblockfrompeer, generatetoaddress, getindexinfo, createwallet, loadwallet, importdescriptors, etc.).	2026-10-18 17:15:03 -05:00
naturallaw777	7b5f25d599	chore(flake): update sovran-bitcoin with electrs 0.12.0 fix	2026-10-18 16:47:38 -05:00
Sovran Systems	497ac49cfd	fix(bitcoin): support electrs 0.12.0 (drop --daemon-p2p-addr, enable bitcoind rest=1) - Ensure bitcoind enables rest=1 and electrs.service omits the removed --daemon-p2p-addr flag even before Sovran_Bitcoin flake input is re-locked. - Clean up pre-0.12.0 (FixedPrefix.8) RocksDB directories in electrs preStart so bindex 0.12.0 reindexes cleanly.	2026-10-18 16:47:36 -05:00
naturallaw777	8fd0318083	chore(release): prepare v1.2.1	2026-10-18 16:09:46 -05:00
Sovran Systems	aed1ed5bd6	chore: update flake.lock (nixpkgs, Sovran_Bitcoin 1.1.1, Bisq2 2.1.14) and integration - Update flake.lock inputs: - sovran-bitcoin: b0da63b -> 50a8b76 (1.1.1 with RTL 0.15.13 and Nix-native sovran-nwc 2.0.0) - nixpkgs (nixos-unstable): c59305b -> fe13242 (Caddy 2.11.7, Tor 0.4.9.14, GNOME Remote Desktop 50.2, Bitcoin Core 31.1, Electrs 0.12.0, LND 0.21.4-beta, BTCPay Server 2.4.5, Matrix Synapse 1.162.0, LiveKit 1.13.8, Vaultwarden 1.37.4, Haven 1.2.2) - nixpkgs-stable (nixos-26.05): 78e9c78 -> 26f4107 - btc-clients: 99b0442 -> 990d29e (Bisq 1.10.9, Bisq2 2.1.14, Sparrow 2.5.5) - nixvim: 5980a62 -> 453dc9c - flake.nix: replace deprecated pkgs.system with pkgs.stdenv.hostPlatform.system for btc-clients packages - modules/sovran-bitcoin-integration.nix: guard config.networking.domain against null/empty when both haven and nwc-wallets features are enabled - app/sovran_systemsos_web/versions.json: sync static fallback service versions with updated flake inputs - CHANGELOG.md: document updates under [Unreleased]	2026-10-18 15:36:45 -05:00
Sovran_SystemsOS contributor	8f5e5394e6	mullvad: install the client on the Desktop Role only The Mullvad VPN app and its daemon now ship with Desktop Only, as the stock NixOS service with nothing configured on top of it: no local-network boot service, no DNS or firewall edits of our own, no Hub tile, no Feature Manager card, no toggles. The account, the relay, the kill switch and the app's other switches belong to the app. modules/mullvad.nix is the whole change to the system: a role gate around services.mullvad-vpn = { enable = true; # daemon, pkgs.mullvad gui.enable = true; # app, pkgs.mullvad-vpn }; Server + Desktop and Bitcoin Node are machines that serve; a VPN client with its own routing and DNS policy is not something their services asked for, so only roles.desktop builds it. Every other option stays at the distribution's default (early boot blocking off, the mullvad-exclude wrapper on), and the only consequences are the ones the NixOS module already defines — the tun module, and systemd-resolved with NetworkManager pointed at it while the client is enabled. The Hub and the desktop shell are untouched: no tile, no feature card, no service description, no icon, no GNOME folder edit. An app that is simply installed has no decision to put in front of the user, and no state to report. README, SECURITY.md (what the app's own kill switch and DNS behaviour mean, so the change in network behaviour is not a surprise), CHANGELOG, the custom.nix template (the mkForce line that removes it) and the installer's Desktop card document it as an app rather than a service. tests/test_mullvad_desktop_only.py guards the gate and the restraint: the client builds on Desktop and nowhere else, the module adds no services, no DNS or firewall edits and no packages, the Hub and desktop shell never mention it, and it ships no tile icon. Checked by evaluating the real module against the revision flake.lock pins (3d23ea05a8a3) with eval-config.nix, four cases: Desktop -> daemon and GUI on, one unit (mullvad-daemon), mullvad + mullvad-vpn in systemPackages, every other option at the distribution default; Bitcoin Node and Server + Desktop -> nothing at all, not even the tun module or resolved; Desktop with `services.mullvad-vpn.enable = lib.mkForce false;` -> no unit, no package.	2026-10-16 13:07:29 -05:00
naturallaw777	36bd2b4e78	password-model.nix: fix Nix string escaping in the generate fallback The word-picking one-liner used `eval echo \${...}`, but in a Nix indented string a backslash does not escape `${` -- it starts interpolation, so evaluation failed with "syntax error, unexpected invalid token". Replace the eval/positional-parameter trick with a plain `shuf` pipeline that contains no `${` at all. Found by nixos-rebuild boot on staging-dev. The shell logic itself was tested; the file had not been parse-checked by Nix. Re-scanned the whole module: every remaining `${` is an intended interpolation and every `''` is a string delimiter.	2026-10-16 12:39:01 -05:00
naturallaw777	4a25ef24d1	password & keyring cleanup: one password, one truth, no prompts The Hub, GDM and sudo now share /etc/shadow as the single source of truth. /var/lib/secrets/{free,root}-password become root-only display copies, written only by system_password.py and verified against shadow before being shown. The GNOME login keyring is decoupled from the login password (blank master password, pam_gnome_keyring off), so nothing needs re-keying or wiping when the password changes and the keyring never pops an unlock prompt. - add app/sovran_systemsos_web/system_password.py: the single module that verifies / sets / displays the free + root passwords and drives the legacy-migration onboarding step (same endpoints and UI) - add modules/password-model.nix: PAM gnome-keyring off, blank login.keyring seed with a one-time migration of old encrypted keyrings, first-boot-only password application (no more boot-revert), LIBCRYPT for the Hub - server.py: login verifies against shadow and heals stale display copies; change-password takes the current password; security reset sets both passwords through the same writer (root is shown as a password again, not a hash); all keyring wipes removed - credentials.nix: drop root-password-setup, free-password-setup and free-password-migration (replaced by password-model.nix) and the keyring wipe in change-free-password - configuration.nix: drop enableGnomeKeyring and the keyring tmpfiles hack (replaced by password-model.nix) - service-detail.js: "Current password" field; credentials changed outside the Hub render with a hint instead of a stale value Installed machines keep their exact passwords: the first-boot services no-op once an account has a real hash, and the upgrade never writes /etc/shadow. The legacy-migration onboarding step and "reset all passwords" keep working.	2026-10-16 12:25:16 -05:00
Sovran Systems	5e56b07465	Fix README formatting and clarify service exposure Corrected formatting and clarified public service exposure details.	2026-10-02 11:58:57 -05:00
Sovran Systems	2867954808	Update security details in SECURITY.md Clarified access and security details for the Hub, including SSH Remote Access and support access.	2026-10-02 11:56:14 -05:00
Sovran Systems	c20a47bab7	Enhance README formatting and emphasis on features Updated README to emphasize key features and improve clarity.	2026-10-02 11:55:19 -05:00
Sovran Systems	708b502a17	Fix formatting and clarify server access instructions	2026-10-02 11:36:35 -05:00
Sovran Systems	cc566016d1	Revise SECURITY.md for clarity on Hub operations Updated security model details for Hub operation and access control.	2026-10-02 11:35:53 -05:00