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31 Commits
v1.1.5 .. staging-dev
Author SHA1 Message Date
Sovran Systems 5e56b07465 Fix README formatting and clarify service exposure 
Corrected formatting and clarified public service exposure details.
 2026-10-02 11:58:57 -05:00
Sovran Systems 2867954808 Update security details in SECURITY.md 
Clarified access and security details for the Hub, including SSH Remote Access and support access.
 2026-10-02 11:56:14 -05:00
Sovran Systems c20a47bab7 Enhance README formatting and emphasis on features 
Updated README to emphasize key features and improve clarity.
 2026-10-02 11:55:19 -05:00
Sovran Systems 708b502a17 Fix formatting and clarify server access instructions 2026-10-02 11:36:35 -05:00
Sovran Systems cc566016d1 Revise SECURITY.md for clarity on Hub operations 
Updated security model details for Hub operation and access control.
 2026-10-02 11:35:53 -05:00
naturallaw777 3a87302645 chore(release): prepare v1.2.0 2026-10-02 02:40:39 -05:00
Security Fix b79a6fd7f2 ssh: don't open port 22 for the loopback-only sshd 
sshd-localhost.nix turns sshd on for every role so that "ssh root@localhost"
works, and binds it to 127.0.0.1 only ("zero network exposure", as its
own comment says, and as sshd.nix expects: the sshd feature "extends this
to 0.0.0.0 and opens port 22 on the firewall when the user enables remote
SSH").

It never turned off services.openssh.openFirewall, which NixOS defaults
to true and applies whether or not sshd listens on the ports. So port 22
was open in the firewall on every role, Desktop Only included, with
nothing behind it. No listener means no live exposure today; it does mean
the firewall was not saying what the documentation says, and the day
something does bind 22 on a wider address (a listenAddresses change, a
second daemon) it would be reachable without anyone having opened it.

openFirewall is now mkDefault false there. Nothing that wants SSH
published loses it: sshd.nix (feature sshd) and remote-deploy.nix both
add 22 explicitly, and only when enabled. Found by evaluating the real
module set; grepping for allowedTCPPorts does not see a NixOS default.

Evaluated with nix eval, TCP firewall ports:

                            before     after
  Server + Desktop          22 80 443 3051 8937   80 443 3051 8937
  Bitcoin Node Only         22 3051 8937 60847    3051 8937 60847
  Desktop Only              22                    (none)
  Desktop + features.sshd   22                    22
  Desktop + deploy.enable   22 3389               22 3389

and sshd's listen addresses are unchanged: 127.0.0.1 by default,
127.0.0.1 and 0.0.0.0 with the sshd feature. Desktop Only now opens no
TCP port at all; UDP 5353 (mDNS) is the only port open there, and
SECURITY.md says so.

Add tests/test_ssh_exposure.py.
 2026-10-02 02:24:29 -05:00
Security Fix 3694ea6489 bitcoin: drop the stray UDP 3051 firewall rule 
allowedUDPPorts was set to [ 3051 ] alongside allowedTCPPorts, which looks
like it was copied from the line above. Caddy serves Ride The Lightning
over TCP on 3051; nothing listens for UDP there, so the rule only opened a
port for no reason.

The comment above the pair also said "Hub management port"; 3051 is RTL.

Evaluated with nix eval, UDP firewall ports per role: Server + Desktop
80 443 3051 5353 -> 80 443 5353, Bitcoin Node Only 3051 5353 -> 5353,
Desktop Only 5353. (80 and 443 are Caddy's; 5353 is mDNS.)
 2026-10-02 02:24:29 -05:00
Security Fix 6987d9bf2c installer: raise generated password entropy from ~23 to ~33 bits 
generate_diceware_password() built the password from 3 words out of a 96
word list plus a single digit: 96^3 x 10 = 8,847,360 combinations, about
23 bits.

That one password is the desktop login, the 'free' account password, and
the only thing standing in front of the Hub, which runs as root and
displays the root password, the SSH passphrase, the RTL password and the
Vaultwarden admin token. 23 bits is thin for something that valuable, and
the rate limiting in front of it was weaker than intended (see "hub: make
the login lockout that LOGIN_FAIL_MAX described").

Now 4 words plus 2 digits: 96^4 x 100 = 8,493,465,600, about 33 bits,
for the cost of one more word to write down.

- iso/installer.py: generate_diceware_password().
- modules/credentials.nix: the three fallback generators in
  root-password-setup, free-password-setup and free-password-migration,
  so a machine provisioned without the installer gets the same strength.

Affects new installs only; existing passwords are untouched.

Checked by running the real thing. The installer function was exercised
2000 times: 96 words in the list, always word-word-word-word-NN, 33.0
bits. For the three services, the generator lines were taken from the
script the evaluated module really produces (nix eval on the nixpkgs
revision flake.lock pins) and run 1500 times each: 96 words in each
list, always word-word-word-word-NN, every two-digit suffix from 00 to 99
seen, and no repeated password.
 2026-10-02 02:24:29 -05:00
Security Fix ebcc17ae3c caddy: stop filtering the RTL and Mempool sites by client address 
c33457f put an address check (sovran_lan_only) on the Hub, RTL and
Mempool sites. It was written for ports 80/443 being forwarded and a
Host header selecting a site, and that only ever applied to the Hub. RTL
and Mempool are sites on ports of their own (:3051, :60847): a request
on 80/443 cannot select them, whatever Host it carries.

Checked with Caddy 2.9.1 and the Caddyfile this module generates for
Server + Desktop with every domain configured, serving the public sites
on a stand-in port: Host: sovransystemsos.local, localhost:8937,
127.0.0.1 and x:3051 all get an empty 200, and Host: matrix.example.org
gets the Synapse stand-in. With the Hub off Caddy the guard has nothing
left to guard, and it could not be made right for the two sites that
remain:

- IPv6. A laptop's global address on the LAN looks exactly like a
  stranger's. The choice was between letting all of 2000::/3 through,
  which is the whole IPv6 internet and is what c33457f does, and
  refusing every LAN device that connects over a global address unless
  the operator copies the ISP's prefix into a Nix option.
- They do not need it. RTL has a random 20-character password
  (pwgen -s 20, about 119 bits) and, since 0.15.12, which Sovran_Bitcoin
  pins, a 30-minute lockout keyed on the client address. Mempool shows
  public chain data. If someone forwards 3051 or 60847 that is the same
  exposure as any other port on the machine, and SECURITY.md says not to.

Remove the snippet and its two imports, and tests/test_caddy_lan_only.py
with them. What is still worth pinning moves to test_hub_direct.py: no
address filter anywhere in caddy.nix, the two sites are plain proxies to
their loopback ports, and no option for a declared prefix is left
half-wired.

Behaviour change: RTL and Mempool answer any client that can reach :3051
or :60847, as they did before c33457f. In practice that is the local
network, because nothing asks you to forward those ports.

Checked with the real generator and Caddy 2.9.1: Node Only generates
`auto_https off` and the two plain sites and validates. Run live next to
the real Hub, a LAN client gets the Hub, RTL and Mempool; a stranger's
address gets RTL and Mempool (by design) and a 403 from the Hub; port 80
is not listening on Node Only.
 2026-10-02 02:24:29 -05:00
Security Fix 78bfc5b408 hub: serve the Hub on its own port instead of through Caddy 
Caddy fronted the Hub at http://sovransystemsos.local, but the Hub
already listens on 0.0.0.0:8937 itself, and nothing Caddy added is
something it needs:

- Not the name. That is avahi's: mDNS advertises a hostname, not a port,
  so the name resolves wherever the Hub listens.
- Not TLS (the site was plain http), not authentication, not cache
  headers. The header block duplicated NoCacheMiddleware, and its
  Clear-Site-Data ("cache") overrode the app's stronger ("cache",
  "storage").
- Not access control, and this is the point. With ports 80/443 forwarded
  for public services, a Host header on those ports reached the Hub. That
  second door is how the reported bug happened, and c33457f guards it
  with an address check instead of closing it.

The Hub is now served on port 8937 only, at
http://sovransystemsos.local:8937, and Caddy has no site for it. The
only thing Caddy answers on 80/443 is the public sites. Caddy keeps
Ride The Lightning (:3051) and Mempool (:60847), because those do need
it: Sovran_Bitcoin binds both to 127.0.0.1 and RTL's unit is sandboxed to
loopback besides, so Caddy is how the local network reaches them.

- caddy.nix: no Hub site. Caddy runs wherever RTL and Mempool do, which
  includes Bitcoin Node Only. There it did not run at all (enable was
  needsHttpsPorts || extraVhosts != ""), so :3051 and :60847 were open
  in the firewall with nothing listening. Ports 80/443 still follow
  needsHttpsPorts alone, so Node Only does not open them. The two sites
  are written only where their service exists; they were unconditional.
- sovran-hub.nix: 8937 follows the new hub.directPort, 60847 follows
  Mempool. It used to be `[ 8937 60847 ]` on every role, Desktop Only
  included.
- roles.nix: hub.directPort defaults to !roles.desktop: open on Server +
  Desktop and Bitcoin Node Only, closed on Desktop Only, where the Hub is
  reached from the machine itself through the desktop window on
  localhost.
- The bind stays 0.0.0.0, which is IPv4 only: with that bind [::1]:8937
  is refused and "localhost" falls back to 127.0.0.1. That is on purpose
  and is now said in the comment. An IPv6 listener would let in clients
  whose global addresses the Hub cannot tell from a stranger's, which is
  the question the previous commit declines to answer by guessing.
- README, SECURITY.md and two strings in index.html give the new URL.

Behaviour changes: the Hub's address gains :8937, and http://sovransystemsos.local
on port 80 no longer reaches it. Bitcoin Node Only now runs Caddy.

Evaluated with nix eval (nixpkgs as flake.lock pins it, Sovran_Bitcoin at
the locked revision), firewall TCP ports per role:

                      c33457f                      this commit
  Server + Desktop    22 80 443 3051 8937 60847    22 80 443 3051 8937
  Bitcoin Node Only   22 3051 8937 60847           22 3051 8937 60847   (Caddy now runs)
  Desktop Only        22 8937 60847                22

Port 22 is open on every role although sshd listens on loopback only;
the last commit of this series deals with that.

The Caddyfile the module really generates (the evaluated generator
script, run, then `caddy validate` with Caddy 2.9.1): Node Only gets the
two sites and nothing else; Server + Desktop with every domain
configured gets the seven domain sites plus :3051 and :60847 and no
mention of the Hub; with Bitcoin off there are no local-network sites;
Node Only with Bitcoin off and no domains leaves Caddy off.

Add tests/test_hub_direct.py and keep tests/test_caddy_lan_only.py for
the two sites it still covers.
 2026-10-02 02:24:29 -05:00
Security Fix 361b25a8bd hub: answer the local network only, whichever way a client arrives 
The reported bug was the Hub being reachable from outside the local
network when Server + Desktop is active. c33457f guards the Caddy site
for sovransystemsos.local, but the Hub is an application that also
listens on a port of its own (8937), and a check in Caddy does nothing
for a client that never goes through Caddy. Whether a client could reach
the Hub depended on which door it used.

The Hub now asks the question itself. LanOnlyMiddleware is registered
outermost, so a client that is not on this computer or the local network
gets a bare 403 before authentication is considered; it never sees the
login page.

- Local means loopback, 10/8, 172.16/12, 192.168/16, 100.64/10
  (Tailscale and other CGNAT/VPN ranges) and 169.254/16 over IPv4, and
  ::1, fc00::/7 and fe80::/10 over IPv6.
- IPv6 global addresses are not on the list. A global address belonging
  to a laptop on the LAN cannot be told apart from a stranger's by the
  address alone, and 2000::/3 is every public IPv6 address there is.
- ::ffff:a.b.c.d is read as the IPv4 address inside it.
- sovran_systemsOS.hub.extraLanNetworks adds networks (IPv4 or IPv6 CIDR)
  for setups whose own devices use addresses outside those ranges. It is
  checked at build time. The app ignores an entry it cannot parse and
  refuses 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0: it must never widen its policy by
  guessing, and "everyone" is hub.lanOnly = false, asked for by name.
- sovran_systemsOS.hub.lanOnly (default true) turns the check off.
- The first refusal from each address is logged, naming the option to
  change, so an operator whose own device is refused can find out why.
  The list is capped so a scanner cannot fill the journal or memory.

Behind Caddy the policy applies to the real client, not to Caddy: uvicorn
takes the address from X-Forwarded-For only when the peer is 127.0.0.1.

Checked, not only reviewed:
- The real app with the config.json the module really generates (nix
  eval on the nixpkgs revision flake.lock pins, read back from the
  derivation), on a real socket with the source address chosen per
  request: 127.0.0.1, 192.168/16, 100.64/10 and a declared extra
  network are served; 203.0.113.9, 8.8.4.4 and an address just outside
  the declared /28 get 403 on /login, / and /api/ping. /auto-login still
  answers 303 to loopback and 403 to everyone else.
- With c33457f's Caddy guard in front, an IPv6 client at 2001:db8::9
  passes Caddy (it is inside 2000::/3) and is refused by the Hub; an
  IPv4 stranger has the connection closed by Caddy; a LAN client is
  served.
- hub.extraLanNetworks accepts 203.0.113.0/28, 2001:db8:abcd::/48 and
  bare hosts, and fails the build for /33, 300.1.1.1/8, 0.0.0.0/0, ::/0,
  2001:db8::/129 and junk, with a message that says what to write.

Add tests/test_lan_policy.py and tests/test_hub_lan_only.py, and a note
in SECURITY.md.
 2026-10-02 02:24:29 -05:00
Security Fix 7d784eb653 hub: make the login lockout that LOGIN_FAIL_MAX described 
LOGIN_FAIL_MAX was declared as "max failures in window before extra
delay" and then never read anywhere in the file. _record_failure() only
ever slept a flat LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY. So the Hub's entire defence against
online guessing was a constant 2 second pause per wrong password: no
escalation, no lockout, no ban, and fail2ban is configured for SSH only.

Worse, the old 60 second window could not have worked even if the
constant had been wired up. With a delay per attempt, reaching 10
failures takes about 80 seconds, so the earliest failures aged out of the
window before the count could ever reach the limit.

- security_helpers.py: new LoginThrottle. The delay ramps with the
  failure count (2s, 4s, ... capped at 10s), and once LOGIN_FAIL_MAX
  failures land inside the window the address is refused outright for
  LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS (5 minutes). A successful login clears the
  address, so an operator who fumbles a password is not penalised later.
  The sleep is never taken under the lock, so one slow client cannot
  stall every other login. Tracked addresses are evicted, so a
  distributed sweep cannot grow the table without bound.
  The window moves from 60s to 900s so the whole ramp fits inside it.
  clock and sleep are injectable, which is what makes it testable.
- server.py: /api/login checks the lockout before the scrypt hash, so a
  locked-out client costs almost nothing to reject, and answers 429 with
  a human-readable wait instead of a bare 401.
- tests/test_login_throttle.py: covers the ramp, the cap, the lockout
  firing and expiring, per-address isolation, clearing on success,
  eviction, and that the limit is actually reachable inside the window.

Verified against the real app with TestClient: 10 wrong passwords return
401 and the 11th returns 429 "Too many failed attempts. Try again in
about 5 minute(s)." A correct password clears the counter.
 2026-10-02 02:24:29 -05:00
Arena.ai Agent c33457fff2 caddy: serve the Hub, RTL and Mempool sites to local clients only 
The Hub (sovransystemsos.local), Ride The Lightning (:3051) and Mempool
(:60847) sites are meant for the home network. With ports 80/443
forwarded for public services, Caddy also receives requests from other
clients, so these sites now check the client address as well as the Host
header.

A new snippet, sovran_lan_only, closes the connection unless the client
is on this computer or the local network: private_ranges, 100.64.0.0/10
(Tailscale), 169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10 and fc00::/7. IPv6 global
addresses (2000::/3) are not filtered: computers on the network often
connect over their own global address, which cannot be told apart from
one on the internet by the address alone. Only the three local sites
import the snippet; the domain sites for public services are unchanged.

Clients with a public IPv4 address on the local network are no longer
served on these sites. The Hub is still available on port 8937.

Checked with Caddy 2.11.4 and the Caddyfile the generator writes: public
IPv4 clients get the connection closed on all three sites, local clients
are served, and the public domain sites answer as before.

Add tests/test_caddy_lan_only.py and a note in SECURITY.md.
 2026-10-01 21:43:47 -05:00
Arena.ai Agent 34cfba4282 docs, hub, installer: say Server + Desktop makes the home IP public 
Server + Desktop publishes services under the operator's own domain, and
the DNS record for that domain points at the home connection, so anyone
can look up the home IP address. None of the places that offer Server +
Desktop said so.

- README: new section "Server + Desktop and your home IP address" (what
  becomes public, what does not, the alternatives, and what happens
  technically), plus a note on the role table and in the security
  overview.
- SECURITY.md: a matching section, the consequence noted next to "Public
  web services exposed only when enabled by the operator", and the
  supported versions row no longer pins 1.0.x.
- ISO installer: the Server + Desktop role card ends with the warning.
- Hub: the domain setup text (onboarding, feature setup and domain
  reconfiguration share renderDomainNeedsHtml) and the upgrade dialog
  carry the same notice.
- Add tests/test_exposure_guards.py. It fails if one of these places
  loses the notice or the README anchor stops resolving.
 2026-10-01 21:43:47 -05:00
Arena.ai Agent 2d777450e1 ddns: take the public IP from Njal.la only and give it to LiveKit 
The Hub no longer asks a STUN server, a public DNS resolver or a "what
is my IP" service for the home IP address. The DDNS update asks Njal.la
to use the address the request comes from ("&auto"), reads back the
address Njal.la says it recorded and saves it to
/var/lib/secrets/external-ip. Njal.la is the only third party that
learns the address; it has to, to publish it.

- Add app/sovran_systemsos_web/ddns_update.py, installed as
  /etc/sovran/ddns-update.py and run by sovran-ddns-update.service. It
  runs curl --ipv4 without redirects, accepts only a public IPv4
  address, and rewrites the file atomically and only when the address
  changes. Stored "&a=${IP}" URLs are converted when they are used and
  "&quiet" is dropped.
- Rewrite modules/core/njalla.nix around that runner and delete
  modules/core/public-ip.nix. Setting a sovran_systemsOS.publicIP.*
  option now fails with a message that says where the address comes
  from. Activation removes the old scripts in /var/lib/sovran. The
  existing external-ip file keeps working.
- server.py reads the saved address and starts
  sovran-ddns-update.service after a domain is saved, instead of looking
  the address up itself.
- Element calling uses sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP if
  set, otherwise the saved address, and fails with a clear message when
  neither exists or the address is not public. It no longer falls back
  to STUN. livekit-external-ip.path re-runs livekit-turn-setup and
  starts LiveKit when the address changes.
- Add tests/test_ddns_update.py.
 2026-10-01 21:43:47 -05:00
naturallaw777 726fec1990 updated nixpkgs and Sovran_Bitcoin update and the new Bisq 1.10.9 2026-10-01 13:36:12 -05:00
naturallaw777 70ccf1eba1 chore(release): prepare v1.1.7 2026-09-21 18:09:10 -05:00
naturallaw777 f6caa2ff32 updated nixpkgs 2026-09-21 18:07:21 -05:00
Sovran Contributor 8bc325b148 postgresql: drop per-database autovacuum ALTERs (rejected by Postgres) 
Follow-up to the previous two commits: the ALTER DATABASE ... SET
autovacuum_* commands fail at boot with

  ERROR: parameter "autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor" cannot be changed now

and take matrix-synapse-db-tune.service (and nextcloud-db-init.service)
down with them.

Root cause: ALTER DATABASE/ROLE ... SET validates through
set_config_option() with an interactive context, and guc.c rejects any
PGC_SIGHUP parameter set that way. All autovacuum_* GUCs are
SIGHUP-context, so per-database scoping is impossible for them — only
USERSET-level parameters (e.g. work_mem, statement_timeout) can be set
per-database.

Nothing is lost: the same values are already set cluster-wide in
configuration.nix, which covers both nextclouddb and matrix-synapse.
Remove the ALTERs from nextcloud-db-init and delete the now-purposeless
matrix-synapse-db-tune service.
 2026-09-21 14:21:01 -05:00
Sovran Contributor e31094c194 synapse: performance tuning for 32 GB Server+Desktop hosts 
Monolith Synapse spends most of its RAM on caches to avoid Postgres
round-trips, but Sovran ships stock cache settings (global_factor 0.5,
10K event cache, no autotuning) and a default 5-connection DB pool.

- caches.global_factor 4.0 + 100K event cache + autotuning capped at
  2G (target 1G), with boosts for the /sync and room-join hot paths.
- DB pool cp_min 5 / cp_max 15, txn_limit 10000 (fewer reconnects).
- gc_thresholds raised to cut GC pauses on a 32 GB box.
- cache-memory extra for cache-size statistics.
- Per-database autovacuum (ALTER DATABASE, scoped to matrix-synapse)
  matching the nextclouddb tuning.

Deliberately unchanged: presence and URL previews stay enabled
(disabling them is faster but user-visible), and no workers — monolith
is the right call under ~100 users. Workers would need Redis
replication, the redis extra, and Caddy reverse-proxy rework; revisit
if federation load ever justifies it.
 2026-09-21 14:00:19 -05:00
Sovran Contributor 09d4cc9b83 nextcloud, postgresql: fix Nextcloud 35 DB warnings on 32 GB hosts 
Nextcloud 35's Database checks flag three Performance issues out of the
box: buffer cache hit ratio ~96% (wants 99%+), 100k+ dead tuples, and
million-plus sequential scans on oc_mail_tags / oc_guests_users.

Root causes in Sovran: stock 128MB shared_buffers, stock 60s autovacuum
naptime, APCu file locking, and db:add-missing-indices running exactly
once at install time (never on upgrades or app installs).

Size Postgres for the README's Server + Desktop recommendation (32 GB
RAM, NVMe): 2GB shared_buffers, 12GB effective_cache_size, 512MB
maintenance_work_mem, 32MB work_mem, 4GB max_wal_size, 30s autovacuum
naptime with 4 workers. shared_buffers stays below the 25% rule because
Postgres shares the box with bitcoind, Electrs, LND, MariaDB and PHP-FPM.

Scope the aggressive autovacuum to nextclouddb via ALTER DATABASE so the
shared matrix-synapse DB keeps the milder cluster defaults.

Add a local Redis (127.0.0.1:6379, Nextcloud only) and move
memcache.distributed/locking to Redis; migrate existing installs with a
one-shot since nextcloud-init never re-runs.

Add a weekly nextcloud-db-maintenance timer (VACUUM ANALYZE +
db:add-missing-*) so upgrades and later app installs can't regress the
checks again.

Note: shared_buffers needs one 'systemctl restart postgresql', which
briefly takes down both Nextcloud and Matrix. Everything else is
reload-only or scoped to nextclouddb.
 2026-09-21 13:59:52 -05:00
naturallaw777 3341659a0c updated to php85 and fixes 2026-09-19 16:24:57 -05:00
Sovran Systems 32e1119e33 Updated to proper syntax to prevent build errors. 2026-09-17 16:28:37 -05:00
Sovran Systems 0f7ef8422d Clean up flake.nix by removing comments and LiveKit override 
Removed comments and overridden attributes for LiveKit version in flake.nix.
 2026-09-17 16:19:37 -05:00
naturallaw777 dd6042928a updated flake lock which contains Bisq 1.10.8 and Bisq2 2.1.13 2026-09-17 15:37:28 -05:00
naturallaw777 74405b2ffc chore(release): prepare v1.1.6 2026-09-15 15:17:10 -05:00
naturallaw777 258da6a337 updated nix packages includes the new mempool version 2026-09-15 14:15:20 -05:00
Sovran Systems 73ab3f40c1 Rename 'The Sovran Hub' to 'The Hub' in README 2026-09-09 11:19:50 -05:00
Sovran Systems 0768712bf7 Rename 'Sovran Hub' to 'The Hub' in README 
Updated references from 'Sovran Hub' to 'The Hub' for consistency.
 2026-09-09 11:19:03 -05:00
naturallaw777 2ac30dc10a docs: update Sovran Hub screenshot to the v1.1.5 redesign 
Replace the pre-redesign Hub capture with the new welcome dashboard
introduced in v1.1.5 — the default view showing system status, Bitcoin
sync, and the update card at a glance.

The capture is rendered from the real Hub frontend (Server + Desktop
role, demo credentials/domains) at 1920x1080, and doubles as the hero
shot of the marketing kit.  Also drops the asset from 391 KB to 59 KB
with no visible loss.
 2026-09-09 11:04:57 -05:00
34 changed files with 2397 additions and 891 deletions
Expand all files Collapse all files
CHANGELOG.md
+49
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,55 @@ and this project adheres to [Semantic Versioning](https://semver.org/spec/v2.0.0
---
## [1.2.0] - 2026-10-02
### Added
- Ssh: don't open port 22 for the loopback-only sshd
- Bitcoin: drop the stray UDP 3051 firewall rule
- Installer: raise generated password entropy from ~23 to ~33 bits
- Caddy: stop filtering the RTL and Mempool sites by client address
- Hub: serve the Hub on its own port instead of through Caddy
- Hub: answer the local network only, whichever way a client arrives
- Hub: make the login lockout that LOGIN_FAIL_MAX described
- Caddy: serve the Hub, RTL and Mempool sites to local clients only
- Docs, hub, installer: say Server + Desktop makes the home IP public
- Ddns: take the public IP from Njal.la only and give it to LiveKit
### Changed
- Updated nixpkgs and Sovran_Bitcoin update and the new Bisq 1.10.9
[1.2.0]: https://git.sovransystems.com/Sovran_Systems/Sovran_SystemsOS/releases/tag/v1.2.0
## [1.1.7] - 2026-09-21
### Added
- Postgresql: drop per-database autovacuum ALTERs (rejected by Postgres)
- Synapse: performance tuning for 32 GB Server+Desktop hosts
- Nextcloud, postgresql: fix Nextcloud 35 DB warnings on 32 GB hosts
- Clean up flake.nix by removing comments and LiveKit override
### Changed
- Updated nixpkgs
- Updated to php85 and fixes
- Updated to proper syntax to prevent build errors.
- Updated flake lock which contains Bisq 1.10.8 and Bisq2 2.1.13
[1.1.7]: https://git.sovransystems.com/Sovran_Systems/Sovran_SystemsOS/releases/tag/v1.1.7
## [1.1.6] - 2026-09-15
### Added
- Rename 'The Sovran Hub' to 'The Hub' in README
- Rename 'Sovran Hub' to 'The Hub' in README
### Changed
- Updated nix packages includes the new mempool version
### Documentation
- Update Sovran Hub screenshot to the v1.1.5 redesign
[1.1.6]: https://git.sovransystems.com/Sovran_Systems/Sovran_SystemsOS/releases/tag/v1.1.6
## [1.1.5] - 2026-09-09
### Added
README.md
+178 -165
View File
@@ -14,16 +14,16 @@ digital life — your files, communications, passwords, and websites — all on
hardware you control, running auditable open-source software you can trust.
Every installation is a private [NixOS](https://nixos.org) desktop with
[Sparrow Wallet](https://sparrowwallet.com), [Bisq](https://bisq.network), and
[Bisq 2](https://github.com/bisq-network/bisq2) ready to use. Move beyond
**[Sparrow Wallet](https://sparrowwallet.com)**, **[Bisq](https://bisq.network)**,
and **[Bisq 2](https://github.com/bisq-network/bisq2)** ready to use. Move beyond
custodial exchanges from the first boot, and grow into your own Bitcoin node,
Lightning infrastructure, private cloud, and communications platform when you
are ready.
[Visit the Website](https://sovransystems.com) ·
[Download the ISO](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso) ·
[Download the ISO](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso) ·
[Try it safely in a VM](#try-it-first-in-a-virtual-machine) ·
[Verify the Download](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso.sha256) ·
[Verify the Download](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256) ·
[Build from Source](#build-from-source)
<img src="assets/desktop-screenshot.webp" alt="Sovran_SystemsOS private Bitcoin desktop" width="800" />
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ are ready.
- [What is included](#what-is-included)
- [Three modes](#three-modes)
- [Use it your way](#use-it-your-way)
- [The Sovran Hub](#the-sovran-hub)
- [The Hub](#the-hub)
- [Install Sovran_SystemsOS](#install-sovran_systemsos)
- [For developers](#for-developers)
- [Development workflow](#development-workflow)
@@ -61,18 +61,18 @@ are ready.
## Why Sovran_SystemsOS?
Bitcoin lets you hold and transfer value without asking a bank, exchange, or
custodian for permission. But that freedom depends on the software and
custodian for permission, but that freedom depends on the software and
infrastructure you choose. Your wider digital life works the same way: files,
messages, and passwords kept on someone else's servers are never fully yours.
Sovran_SystemsOS solves both with one operating system:
- **Hold your own keys** with Sparrow Wallet. Create and manage wallets,
- **Hold your own keys** with **Sparrow Wallet**. Create and manage wallets,
connect hardware signing devices, use multisignature setups, build and
inspect transactions, and control UTXOs and coin selection.
- **Buy and sell Bitcoin peer-to-peer** with Bisq and Bisq 2. No central
company holds user funds, and no exchange account stands between buyers and
sellers.
- **Buy and sell Bitcoin peer-to-peer** with **Bisq** and **Bisq 2**. No
central company holds user funds, and no exchange account stands between
buyers and sellers.
- **Verify your own Bitcoin** with a full node: [Bitcoin Core](https://bitcoin.org) and
[Electrs](https://github.com/romanz/electrs), so your wallets connect to
*your* node instead of a stranger's.
@@ -90,16 +90,11 @@ Sovran_SystemsOS solves both with one operating system:
- **Control everything from the Sovran Hub**, on the desktop or from any
browser on your local network.
No custodian needs to hold your Bitcoin. No outside node needs to tell your
wallet what happened on the network. No third-party cloud needs to control
your data or services.
Other projects solve one piece of this puzzle: a Linux distribution that can
run a wallet, a node project that runs Bitcoin services, a self-hosting stack
that replaces a cloud app. Sovran_SystemsOS brings those worlds together and
makes them approachable: Bitcoin tools from the first boot, a complete path
from desktop to node to self-hosting, one control center, hardware you own,
and a reproducible, auditable NixOS foundation.
Other projects solve one piece of this puzzle: a distribution that runs a
wallet, a node project that runs Bitcoin services, a self-hosting stack that
replaces a cloud app. Sovran_SystemsOS brings them together on a reproducible,
auditable NixOS foundation: Bitcoin tools from the first boot, one control
center, and hardware you own.
> Sovran_SystemsOS provides tools for self-custody and peer-to-peer Bitcoin
> use. Users remain responsible for protecting their keys, understanding their
@@ -110,34 +105,24 @@ and a reproducible, auditable NixOS foundation.
## Try it first in a virtual machine
**Curious, but not ready to replace your current operating system?** Start with
Sovran_SystemsOS in a virtual machine (VM). A VM runs Sovran_SystemsOS in a
window on your existing Windows, macOS, or Linux computer, using a virtual disk
file instead of your computer's internal drive. You can explore the desktop,
Sovran Hub, Sparrow, Bisq, and the installation experience before changing how
you use any physical machine.
Sovran_SystemsOS in a virtual machine (VM): a window on your existing Windows,
macOS, or Linux computer, using a virtual disk file instead of your internal
drive. Explore the desktop, Sovran Hub, Sparrow, Bisq, and the installation
experience before changing how you use any physical machine. Closing or
deleting the VM leaves your current operating system untouched, and installing
on a dedicated computer later is still open to you.
This is a low-commitment way to decide whether Sovran_SystemsOS is right for
you:
- **Keep your current OS.** Closing or deleting the VM leaves the host operating
system in place.
- **Learn at your own pace.** Familiarize yourself with the desktop and tools
without needing to make it your daily computer on day one.
- **Choose your next step with confidence.** When you are ready, install it on
a dedicated computer, or keep using the VM as a learning environment.
You can use the same ISO with [VirtualBox](https://www.virtualbox.org), VMware,
Use the same ISO with [VirtualBox](https://www.virtualbox.org), VMware,
QEMU/KVM, Proxmox, and similar x86_64 VM software. For a first look, select
**Desktop Only**, allocate at least **8 GB RAM**, and create a **256 GB or
larger dynamically allocated virtual disk**. The full VM setup and installer
requirements are in [Installing in a virtual machine](#installing-in-a-virtual-machine-optional).
larger dynamically allocated virtual disk**. Full requirements are in
[Installing in a virtual machine](#installing-in-a-virtual-machine-optional).
> **A VM is for evaluation and learning, not a substitute for a dedicated,
> hardened setup.** Do not use a trial VM to hold meaningful Bitcoin, recovery
> phrases, passwords, or other sensitive data. Avoid attaching physical drives
> to the VM, and be deliberate about shared folders, clipboard sharing, and
> network settings. The installer only changes the disk you select, but you
> should always review VM disk selections before confirming an install.
> hardened setup.** Do not hold meaningful Bitcoin, recovery phrases,
> passwords, or other sensitive data in a trial VM. Avoid attaching physical
> drives, and be deliberate about shared folders, clipboard sharing, and
> network settings. Review VM disk selections before confirming an install.
---
@@ -201,24 +186,27 @@ Bitcoin and self-hosting infrastructure runs on the machine.
| Mode | Best for | What you get |
|---|---|---|
| **Desktop** | Everyday users and computers with modest hardware | Sparrow, Bisq, and Bisq 2 for self-custody and peer-to-peer Bitcoin use |
| **Node** | People ready to verify and operate their own Bitcoin infrastructure | Everything in Desktop, plus the full Bitcoin stack: Bitcoin Core, Electrs, LND, Ride The Lightning, BTCPay Server, and wallet-to-node connections |
| **Server + Desktop** | Bitcoiners who want the same sovereignty over their communications, cloud, passwords, and web services | The complete Node stack, plus the private self-hosted services |
| **Node** | People ready to verify and operate their own Bitcoin infrastructure | Everything in Desktop, plus the full Bitcoin stack: Bitcoin Core, Electrs, LND, Ride The Lightning, BTCPay Server, and wallet-to-node connections. **Publishes nothing unless you enable *Put BTCPay Server Online* or *Lightning Wallet Connections*:** [read this first](#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address) |
| **Server + Desktop** | Bitcoiners who want the same sovereignty over their communications, cloud, passwords, and web services | The complete Node stack, plus the private self-hosted services. **Makes your home IP address public:** [read this first](#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address) |
**Desktop: start with your keys.** Desktop is not a reduced or Bitcoin-free
edition. It is a complete, private everyday computer with a clean GNOME
desktop, Tor, and the Sovran Hub, giving you a lower-hardware path to
self-custody and non-KYC Bitcoin tools from the first boot. You do not need a
fully synchronized node to begin; move to Node mode when your hardware,
storage, and needs are ready.
edition: it is a complete, private everyday computer with a clean GNOME
desktop, Tor, and the Sovran Hub, and a lower-hardware path to self-custody and
non-KYC Bitcoin tools from the first boot. Move to Node mode when your
hardware, storage, and needs are ready.
**Node: verify your own money.** Instead of asking someone else's server
about your wallet and transactions, you operate the infrastructure that
performs the verification. Your node verifies. Your wallet connects to it.
Your keys remain yours.
**Node: verify your own money.** You operate the infrastructure that performs
the verification instead of asking someone else's server: your node verifies,
your wallet connects to it, your keys stay yours.
**Server + Desktop: sovereignty beyond money.** Bitcoin sovereignty is the
foundation. Server + Desktop applies the same principle to your data,
communications, identity, and services.
Node publishes nothing by default. Two Node features need a public domain and
make your home IP address public when enabled: **Put BTCPay Server Online** and
**Lightning Wallet Connections**. Everything else, Mempool and Ride The
Lightning included, stays on your home network or reaches you through Tor — see
[Server + Desktop and your home IP address](#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address).
**Server + Desktop: sovereignty beyond money.** The same principle, applied
to your data, communications, identity, and services.
### Recommended hardware
@@ -234,9 +222,55 @@ communications, identity, and services.
> the public internet, which means opening specific ports on your home network.
> Before you start, confirm three things: you can log in to your router's admin
> panel, the panel includes a port-forwarding section, and your internet
> provider allows port forwarding. Most home routers and providers already
> support this. If you are unsure, a quick search for your router model and
> "port forwarding" will usually turn up a step-by-step guide.
> provider allows port forwarding.
### Server + Desktop and your home IP address
> **⚠️ Server + Desktop makes your home IP address public.**
> Public services need a domain name that points at your home internet
> connection. When you finish the guided domain setup, Sovran_SystemsOS puts
> your home's public IP address in a Dynamic DNS record at
> [Njal.la](https://njal.la) and keeps it up to date, and you forward ports 80
> and 443 on your router to this computer. From then on:
>
> - **Anyone can look up your domain and see your home IP address,** which
> reveals your internet provider and approximate location and ties everything
> you publish on that domain to your home connection. Domain privacy does not
> hide it: registrar privacy protects the registrant's identity, not the IP
> address in your DNS records.
> - **Your connection is open to the whole internet on those ports.** Scanners
> and bots constantly probe public IP addresses, so expect automated probing
> and login attempts against every service you publish.
> - **Your service names are discoverable.** Public HTTPS certificates are
> listed in Certificate Transparency logs, so hostnames such as
> `vault.yourdomain.com` can be found and resolved to your IP address, even
> if you never share them.
**Desktop** publishes nothing. **Node** publishes nothing unless you enable
*Put BTCPay Server Online* or *Lightning Wallet Connections* — see
[Three modes](#three-modes).
**If you do not want your home IP address to be public,** choose Desktop or
Node. Advanced users can put a VPS, reverse proxy, or tunnel in front of their
services so DNS points there instead of at their home; Sovran_SystemsOS does
not set that up, and the Hub's domain checks expect DNS to point at your home
IP address.
<details>
<summary><strong>What happens technically</strong></summary>
- You create a **Dynamic** DNS record at Njal.la and paste its update command
into the Hub, which only accepts `njal.la` update URLs.
- The `sovran-ddns-update` timer points your record at the address the request
came from: after you save a domain, two minutes after boot, then every 15
minutes. Element calling and the Hub use that same address. See
`modules/core/njalla.nix`.
- Once a service that needs a domain is on, the firewall opens TCP and UDP
ports 80 and 443 for Caddy, which requests public HTTPS certificates for the
domains you configure. The Hub lists any additional ports a feature needs.
See `modules/core/caddy.nix`.
</details>
---
@@ -256,34 +290,30 @@ the tools of your selected mode already in place.
Prefer to keep using Windows, macOS, Linux, Android, or iOS? Install
Sovran_SystemsOS on a separate computer and let it run quietly on your local
network, with or without a monitor. From any other device on the same network,
open a browser, visit `http://sovransystemsos.local`, and manage everything
from [The Sovran Hub](#the-sovran-hub).
Your existing devices stay familiar. Sovran_SystemsOS provides the independent
infrastructure behind them.
open a browser, visit `http://sovransystemsos.local:8937`, and manage
everything from [the Hub](#the-hub).
---
## The Sovran Hub
## The Hub
### Your private infrastructure, controlled from any screen.
The Sovran Hub is the command center built into Sovran_SystemsOS. It is both a
local desktop application and a private web interface served directly by your
Sovran_SystemsOS machine. Nothing needs to be installed on the device opening
the Hub: you only need a modern browser and access to the same local network.
The Hub is the command center built into Sovran_SystemsOS: a local desktop
application and a private web interface served by your Sovran_SystemsOS
machine. The device opening it needs only a modern browser and access to the
same local network.
From one place, the Hub helps you:
From one place, the Hub lets you:
- Open, monitor, start, and stop your services
- See what is running and configure system features
- Manage service domains and credentials
- Configure system features and manage service domains and credentials
- Reach your Bitcoin tools, private cloud, and communications
- Perform supported system operations without everyday terminal commands
<img src="assets/sovran-hub-screenshot.webp" alt="The Sovran Hub dashboard" width="800" />
<img src="assets/sovran-hub-screenshot.webp" alt="The Sovran Hub welcome dashboard" width="800" />
*The Sovran Hub: manage your private infrastructure from one place.*
*The Hub: your whole system at a glance — Bitcoin, Lightning, and your private apps.*
### Example home setup
@@ -294,13 +324,13 @@ From one place, the Hub helps you:
│ │ │
Windows laptop Phone or tablet Mac or Linux
│ │ │
└──────── Browser: sovransystemsos.local ────┘
└─────── Browser: sovransystemsos.local:8937 ─┘
│
▼
┌──────────────────────────┐
│ Sovran_SystemsOS │
│ │
│ • Sovran Hub │
│ • The Hub │
│ • Bitcoin node │
│ • Sparrow Wallet │
│ • Bisq and Bisq 2 │
@@ -312,21 +342,36 @@ From one place, the Hub helps you:
└──────────────────────────┘
```
Keep using the devices you already own. Sovran_SystemsOS becomes the private
Bitcoin and digital infrastructure behind them.
> **Local access:** the Hub is available at
> `http://sovransystemsos.local` to devices connected to the same local
> network. It is protected by authentication and is not automatically exposed
> to the public internet.
> `http://sovransystemsos.local:8937` to devices connected to the same local
> network (not on Desktop, which publishes nothing). It is protected by
> authentication and answers only your local network.
### Tech Support
The Hub can give a Sovran Systems technician temporary access to your machine.
Support runs over SSH, and **Tech Support requires SSH Remote Access, which is
off by default.**
Turning SSH on makes the machine listen on all interfaces and opens **TCP port
22** in the firewall. Letting support in from outside your home means
forwarding port 22 on your router, which puts SSH on the public internet where
scanners and brute-force attempts will find it. Turn SSH off when the session
ends; the Hub prompts you to.
Support signs in as the restricted `sovran-support` account, not as root, with
one key that expires after 24 hours. Wallet paths stay locked unless you unlock
them for a limited time, and every session event is written to
`/var/log/sovran-support-audit.log`. See
[Restricted support access](SECURITY.md#restricted-support-access).
---
## Install Sovran_SystemsOS
Sovran_SystemsOS is free and open source. You can download the installer,
verify it, write it to a USB drive, and install it yourself, staying in
control from the very first step.
Sovran_SystemsOS is free and open source: download the installer, verify it,
write it to a USB drive, and install it yourself, in control from the first
step.
An ISO is a complete installation image containing the operating system and
installer. It is not copied to a USB drive like a document; it must be written
@@ -345,18 +390,17 @@ with an imaging application such as [Balena Etcher](https://etcher.balena.io).
### 1. Download the ISO and checksum
- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso)
- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso.sha256](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso.sha256)
- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso)
- [Download Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256)
The download may take some time. Do not rename or modify the ISO before
verifying it, and keep both files in the same folder.
### 2. Verify the checksum
A checksum is a digital fingerprint of a file. Verifying it confirms that the
ISO downloaded completely, was not accidentally corrupted, and matches the
published image. The checksum produced from your ISO must match the published
checksum exactly.
A checksum is a digital fingerprint of a file. Verifying it confirms the ISO
downloaded completely and without corruption. The checksum produced from your
ISO must match the published one exactly.
<details>
<summary><strong>Linux</strong></summary>
@@ -364,18 +408,15 @@ checksum exactly.
Open a terminal in the download folder and run:
```bash
sha256sum --check Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso.sha256
sha256sum --check Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256
```
A successful comparison reports:
```text
Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso: OK
Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso: OK
```
You can also run `sha256sum Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso` and compare the output
against the checksum file manually.
</details>
<details>
@@ -384,11 +425,11 @@ against the checksum file manually.
Open Terminal in the download folder and run:
```bash
shasum -a 256 Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso
shasum -a 256 Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso
```
Compare the value shown in Terminal with the value inside
`Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso.sha256`.
`Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso.sha256`.
</details>
@@ -398,7 +439,7 @@ Compare the value shown in Terminal with the value inside
Open PowerShell in the download folder and run:
```powershell
Get-FileHash .\Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso -Algorithm SHA256
Get-FileHash .\Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso -Algorithm SHA256
```
Compare the value under `Hash` with the published checksum.
@@ -413,7 +454,7 @@ match exactly.
1. Download and install [Balena Etcher](https://etcher.balena.io), then
connect the USB drive.
2. Choose **Flash from file** and select `Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso`.
2. Choose **Flash from file** and select `Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso`.
3. Choose **Select target**, select the USB drive, and review your selection
carefully.
4. Choose **Flash** and wait for the writing and verification process to
@@ -448,14 +489,14 @@ similar x86_64 virtual machines. Use production-like resources where possible:
allocated disks are fine; they do not consume the full size immediately.
- Use NAT or bridged networking with internet access before opening the
installer.
- UEFI/EFI firmware is preferred. In UEFI VMs, the installer avoids depending
on VM NVRAM boot-entry writes. If a VM boots the ISO in legacy BIOS mode,
the installer automatically switches the installed system to GRUB.
- UEFI/EFI firmware is preferred: in UEFI VMs the installer avoids depending
on VM NVRAM boot-entry writes, and a VM that boots the ISO in legacy BIOS
mode automatically installs GRUB instead.
- For Node or Server + Desktop, attach a **second 2 TB virtual data disk**.
If you only attach one disk, choose **Desktop Only**.
- Present the install target as a normal virtual disk such as VirtIO, SATA,
SCSI, or NVMe. USB-attached target disks are intentionally hidden by the
installer to avoid erasing the installer USB by mistake.
SCSI, or NVMe. USB-attached disks are hidden by the installer so you cannot
erase the installer USB by mistake.
### 5. Install
@@ -476,28 +517,26 @@ Open the Hub directly from the Sovran_SystemsOS desktop, or from any other
device on the same local network at:
```text
http://sovransystemsos.local
http://sovransystemsos.local:8937
```
Sign in with your Sovran_SystemsOS credentials.
Sign in with your Sovran_SystemsOS credentials. Desktop does not publish the Hub
on the network, so in that mode open it from the desktop.
<details>
<summary><strong>If sovransystemsos.local does not open</strong></summary>
<summary><strong>If sovransystemsos.local:8937 does not open</strong></summary>
1. Make sure the Sovran_SystemsOS machine is powered on, and allow it a few
minutes to finish starting.
2. Make sure both devices are connected to the same local network, and that
you entered the full address `http://sovransystemsos.local`.
you entered the full address `http://sovransystemsos.local:8937`,
including the `:8937`.
3. Avoid guest Wi-Fi networks, which may prevent devices from seeing one
another.
4. Temporarily disconnect any VPN that may interfere with local-network
access.
5. Try another browser or device on the same network.
Some networks or devices may not support `.local` address discovery correctly.
Network isolation, custom DNS settings, VPNs, and some routers can interfere
with local-device discovery.
</details>
### Prefer guided help?
@@ -699,9 +738,8 @@ rebuilds the machine into the selected declarative state.
| Nextcloud, Vaultwarden, WordPress | `modules/nextcloud.nix`, `modules/vaultwarden.nix`, `modules/wordpress.nix`, `modules/php.nix` |
| Optional remote desktop and public SSH | `modules/rdp.nix`, `modules/sshd.nix` |
Feature availability and defaults may change as Sovran_SystemsOS develops.
Review the relevant Nix module before relying on a specific default in a
production environment.
Feature availability and defaults may change as Sovran_SystemsOS develops:
review the relevant Nix module before relying on a default in production.
---
@@ -711,11 +749,11 @@ Wallet recovery words control the funds. Never share them with a website,
support technician, cloud service, or chat application.
For meaningful balances, prefer a well-reviewed hardware signer and follow its
verified backup process. A BIP39 passphrase is optional, advanced protection;
it is not a replacement for the recovery words. If you use one, back it up
separately—losing either item can make the wallet unrecoverable.
verified backup process. A BIP39 passphrase is optional, advanced protection,
not a replacement for recovery words: back it up separately, because losing
either item can make the wallet unrecoverable.
Keep durable offline backups in separate secure locations. Test recovery before
Keep durable offline backups in separate secure locations, test recovery before
relying on a wallet, and begin with a small amount.
---
@@ -725,17 +763,17 @@ relying on a wallet, and begin with a small amount.
Sovran_SystemsOS uses layered controls:
- Pinned flake inputs and hash-pinned source archives
- Bitcoin and Lightning modules maintained in this repository
- Firewall enabled; public SSH and remote desktop disabled by default
- Firewall enabled; SSH Remote Access and remote desktop disabled by default.
Enabling SSH opens TCP port 22 and the Hub then asks you to forward it
- Separate service users, systemd sandboxing, and loopback bindings where practical
- Tor enforcement for supported Bitcoin services
- Restricted, time-limited support access with scoped `sudo`
- Operator-controlled public service exposure
- Operator-controlled public service exposure (Server + Desktop Role or Node Role when enabled BTCpayserver and/or Lightning Wallet Connections
[makes your home IP address public](#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address)
once you set up a domain)
See [`SECURITY.md`](SECURITY.md) for the threat model, limitations, reporting,
and operator guidance. No operating system can protect funds after recovery
words, administrator credentials, or the root account are compromised. Apply
updates and keep tested offline backups.
and operator guidance.
---
@@ -745,11 +783,9 @@ Sovran_SystemsOS stands on the work of exceptional free and open-source projects
### NixOS
Deep gratitude goes to the [NixOS](https://nixos.org) team, the [Nixpkgs](https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs) maintainers, and the broader [Nix community](https://github.com/nix-community).
Gratitude to the [NixOS](https://nixos.org) team, the [Nixpkgs](https://github.com/NixOS/nixpkgs) maintainers, and the broader [Nix community](https://github.com/nix-community).
NixOS provides the reproducible, declarative foundation that makes Sovran_SystemsOS possible. Its module system, package ecosystem, [flakes](https://nixos.wiki/wiki/Flakes), and generation-based system management allow an entire Bitcoin operating system to be described, audited, rebuilt, upgraded, and rolled back from source.
Sovran_SystemsOS would not have the same reliability, transparency, or reproducibility without their years of work.
NixOS provides the reproducible, declarative foundation that makes Sovran_SystemsOS possible: its module system, package ecosystem, [flakes](https://nixos.wiki/wiki/Flakes), and generation-based system management allow an entire Bitcoin operating system to be described, audited, rebuilt, upgraded, and rolled back from source.
### nix-bitcoin
@@ -757,24 +793,17 @@ The in-repository Bitcoin stack began with code adapted from
[nix-bitcoin](https://github.com/fort-nix/nix-bitcoin), primarily from commit
[`360e30f`](https://github.com/fort-nix/nix-bitcoin/commit/360e30fee5ba32f9fecc89bc35628195d9d2dbbe).
It has since been narrowed to Sovran's supported services and is maintained in
this repository. nix-bitcoin is no longer a flake input or build dependency.
We remain grateful to the nix-bitcoin contributors for the declarative and
security-focused foundation. Its MIT notice is retained in
[`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md`](THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md).
this repository; nix-bitcoin is no longer a flake input or build dependency.
Its MIT notice is retained in [`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md`](THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md).
### Emmanuel Rosa and btc-clients-nix
Special thanks go to [Emmanuel Rosa](https://github.com/emmanuelrosa) for [btc-clients-nix](https://github.com/emmanuelrosa/btc-clients-nix).
The project provides Nix packages for the Bitcoin desktop software central to the Sovran_SystemsOS experience:
Thanks to [Emmanuel Rosa](https://github.com/emmanuelrosa) for [btc-clients-nix](https://github.com/emmanuelrosa/btc-clients-nix), which packages the Bitcoin desktop software included in every installation:
- [Sparrow Wallet](https://github.com/sparrowwallet/sparrow)
- [Bisq](https://github.com/bisq-network/bisq)
- [Bisq 2](https://github.com/bisq-network/bisq2)
This work helps make it possible for Sovran_SystemsOS to deliver self-custody and peer-to-peer Bitcoin tools as part of every installation.
### The upstream Bitcoin ecosystem
Sovran_SystemsOS also depends on the work of the developers and communities behind:
@@ -802,27 +831,16 @@ Sovran_SystemsOS also depends on the work of the developers and communities behi
- [WordPress](https://github.com/WordPress/WordPress)
- Every other upstream project included in the system
Sovran Systems did not create these foundations. Our work is to bring them together into a cohesive operating system that helps more people use Bitcoin privately, independently, and with confidence.
Thank you to every developer, maintainer, reviewer, tester, documentarian, and user who keeps this ecosystem alive.
Sovran Systems did not create these foundations; our work is to bring them together into one operating system that helps more people use Bitcoin privately and independently. Thank you to every developer, maintainer, reviewer, tester, documentarian, and user who keeps this ecosystem alive.
---
## License
Sovran_SystemsOS is free and open-source software licensed under the
[GNU Affero General Public License v3.0](LICENSE).
The AGPL-3.0 protects your freedom to:
- Use Sovran_SystemsOS
- Study how the system works
- Modify the source code
- Share original or modified versions
- Build and operate the system on your own hardware
If you distribute a modified version, you must make its corresponding source
code available under the same license.
[GNU Affero General Public License v3.0](LICENSE). You may use, study, modify,
share, and self-host it; if you distribute a modified version, you must make
its corresponding source code available under the same license.
Because Sovran_SystemsOS includes the browser-based Sovran Hub, operators who
modify the covered software and make that modified version available for users
@@ -830,14 +848,9 @@ to interact with over a network must offer those users access to its
corresponding source code, as required by the AGPL-3.0.
Sovran_SystemsOS is provided **without warranty**, as described in the full
license.
> Individual upstream applications, packages, artwork, fonts, and other
> components included with or built by Sovran_SystemsOS may have their own
> licenses and copyright holders. The AGPL-3.0 license for this repository does
> not replace those licenses.
Read [`LICENSE`](LICENSE) and
license. Individual upstream applications, packages, artwork, fonts, and other
components may have their own licenses and copyright holders, which the
AGPL-3.0 does not replace. Read [`LICENSE`](LICENSE) and
[`THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md`](THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md).
---
@@ -856,7 +869,7 @@ primary location for collaboration. Please read our
## Privacy. Sovereignty. Bitcoin.
[Visit Sovran Systems](https://sovransystems.com) ·
[Download Sovran_SystemsOS](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.1.5.iso) ·
[Download Sovran_SystemsOS](https://downloads.sovransystems.com/Sovran_SystemsOS-1.2.0.iso) ·
[View the License](LICENSE)
</div>
SECURITY.md
+52 -25
View File
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
| Release | Supported |
|---|:---:|
| Latest `1.0.x` stable release | Yes |
| Latest stable release | Yes |
| `main` / `staging-dev` | Development only |
| Older than `1.0.0` | No |
@@ -27,54 +27,81 @@ time for a fix and coordinated disclosure.
### Local-first operation
The Hub and core data run on operator-owned hardware. The Hub is intended for a
trusted local network and must not be port-forwarded to the internet. Public
services, DDNS, software updates, and optional third-party relays require
external networks and are outside a “fully offline” model.
The Hub and core data run on operator-owned hardware. The Hub is for a trusted
local network and must not be port-forwarded to the internet. It uses HTTP, so
authentication does not encrypt local network traffic.
The local Hub currently uses HTTP. Authentication does not encrypt local network
traffic, so use a trusted LAN and avoid public or guest Wi-Fi.
The Hub is served on port 8937 and is not fronted by Caddy. Server + Desktop and
Bitcoin Node Only open that port in the firewall, so local devices reach the Hub
at `http://sovransystemsos.local:8937`. On Desktop Only the Hub is not published
at all: reachable only from the machine itself, on localhost, with no TCP port
open in the firewall (UDP 5353 for mDNS only).
`sovran_systemsOS.hub.directPort = true` in `custom.nix` opens port 8937 if you
want to reach a Desktop Only Hub from another device.
The Hub checks every client before showing a login page. It runs as root, so it
answers only loopback, private, VPN and link-local addresses and turns everyone
else away. The check goes by the address a connection comes from, so it is a
second lock and not a reason to forward port 8937: don't. Addresses outside the
local ranges go in `sovran_systemsOS.hub.extraLanNetworks` in `custom.nix`;
`sovran_systemsOS.hub.lanOnly = false` turns the check off.
### Public services and your home IP address
Publishing public services on Server + Desktop points a DDNS record at your
home's public IP address, which anyone can look up, and lists your service
hostnames in Certificate Transparency logs. Desktop publishes nothing. Node
publishes nothing unless *Put BTCPay Server Online* or *Lightning Wallet
Connections* is on. See
[Server + Desktop and your home IP address](README.md#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address)
for what this means and the alternatives.
### Bitcoin stack
Bitcoin and Lightning modules are maintained in the standalone
[Sovran_Bitcoin](https://github.com/naturallaw777/Sovran_Bitcoin) repository
and consumed as a flake input. OS-specific customizations (Second_Drive paths,
operator user, Hub integration) are bridged by
`modules/sovran-bitcoin-integration.nix`. The `nix-bitcoin.*` option namespace
and `/etc/nix-bitcoin-secrets` path remain only for upgrade compatibility.
Bitcoin and Lightning modules live in the standalone
[Sovran_Bitcoin](https://github.com/naturallaw777/Sovran_Bitcoin) repository,
consumed as a flake input and bridged by
`modules/sovran-bitcoin-integration.nix`. The `nix-bitcoin.*` namespace and
`/etc/nix-bitcoin-secrets` path remain only for upgrade compatibility.
### Supply chain and integrity
`flake.lock` pins flake inputs, and fetched source archives use fixed hashes.
Builds still depend on pinned Nixpkgs, NixVim, btc-clients-nix, upstream source
archives, and any configured binary cache. Keeping the Bitcoin modules in this
repository reduces an external dependency; it does not remove supply-chain
risk.
Builds still depend on pinned Nixpkgs and other inputs, upstream source
archives, and any configured binary cache.
The Hub integrity check verifies Nix store contents and compares the running
system with a build from local `/etc/nixos`. It does not authenticate the release
publisher or protect against an attacker who already controls root and can
change both the system and local configuration.
The Hub integrity check verifies Nix store contents against a build from local
`/etc/nixos`. It does not authenticate the release publisher or protect against
an attacker who already controls root.
### Access and service isolation
- Firewall enabled by default
- Public SSH and remote desktop disabled by default
- SSH Remote Access and remote desktop disabled by default
- Separate service users and systemd sandboxing where supported
- Administrative service ports bound to loopback where practical
- Tor enforced for supported Bitcoin traffic and onion services
- Public web services exposed only when enabled by the operator
- Public web services exposed only when enabled by the operator (this makes
your home IP address public)
SSH Remote Access is the only supported administrative port that faces the
network, and it is off by default. Enabling it listens on all interfaces and
opens TCP port 22; the Hub then asks you to forward port 22, which puts SSH on
the public internet. Key authentication only. Turn it off when you are done.
Tor reduces network exposure for configured Bitcoin services. It is not a
guarantee against every IP leak, application bug, or traffic-analysis attack.
### Restricted support access
Support uses a per-session SSH key on the non-root `sovran-support` account.
Tech Support runs over SSH, and the Hub refuses to start a session until SSH
Remote Access is enabled (see above). Support uses a per-session SSH key on the
non-root `sovran-support` account.
Sessions expire after 24 hours and have a small allowlist of `sudo` commands.
Wallet paths receive deny ACLs unless the operator explicitly removes them.
Disabling support removes the key and reapplies the ACLs.
Disabling support removes the key and reapplies the ACLs but leaves SSH
enabled.
Support events are written to `/var/log/sovran-support-audit.log`. This is a
local audit log, not a cryptographically tamper-evident record.
VERSION
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1 +1 @@
1.1.5
1.2.0
app/sovran_systemsos_web/ddns_update.py
+177
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sovran DDNS update runner (sovran-ddns-update.service).
For every stored Njal.la update URL this asks Njal.la to point the record at
the address the request came from ("&auto"), then reads back the address
Njal.la says it recorded. That address is saved to /var/lib/secrets/external-ip,
where livekit-turn-setup and the Hub read it.
Njal.la is the only party involved. It has to learn the address to publish
it, so nothing else -- no STUN server, no public resolver, no "what is my IP"
service -- is ever asked for it.
Kept from the previous runner:
* every URL goes through _validate_ddns_url() (https, njal.la only, /update/)
* curl is run directly: no shell, no redirects
* the update key is never printed or logged
The module is installed next to security_helpers.py (/etc/sovran/) and run as a
script by the service; it is also importable as
sovran_systemsos_web.ddns_update so the tests can exercise it.
"""
import ipaddress
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
try:
from .security_helpers import _validate_ddns_url # imported as part of the Hub package
except ImportError: # run as a script from /etc/sovran, next to security_helpers.py
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)))
from security_helpers import _validate_ddns_url
URLS_FILE = "/var/lib/njalla/ddns_urls.json"
IP_FILE = "/var/lib/secrets/external-ip"
_CGNAT = ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10")
def is_public_ipv4(value) -> bool:
"""True for a globally routable IPv4 literal (not private, loopback, CGNAT ...)."""
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(str(value).strip())
except ValueError:
return False
if ip.version != 4 or ip in _CGNAT:
return False
# is_global alone is not enough: CPython reports multicast as global.
return ip.is_global and not (
ip.is_multicast or ip.is_reserved or ip.is_loopback
or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_unspecified or ip.is_private
)
def normalise_url(raw: str) -> str:
"""Return the URL to call for a stored (or freshly pasted) update URL.
* Older Hubs stored "...&a=${IP}": the address was looked up locally and
substituted. Njal.la can use the address the request came from, so that
placeholder becomes "&auto".
* "&quiet" is dropped: the reply is how we learn the address Njal.la recorded.
"""
return raw.replace("&a=${IP}", "&auto").replace("&quiet", "")
def parse_reply(body: str):
"""Return the public IPv4 address Njal.la says it recorded, or None.
A successful update replies with JSON of the form
{"status": 200, "message": "record updated", "value": {"A": "203.0.113.7", ...}}
"""
try:
data = json.loads(body)
except (TypeError, ValueError):
return None
if not isinstance(data, dict) or str(data.get("status")) != "200":
return None
value = data.get("value")
ip = value.get("A") if isinstance(value, dict) else None
return str(ip).strip() if is_public_ipv4(ip) else None
def read_ip_file(path: str = None):
"""The address recorded by the last successful update, or None."""
try:
with open(path or IP_FILE) as f:
return f.read().strip() or None
except OSError:
return None
def write_ip_file(ip: str, path: str = None) -> None:
"""Replace the file atomically so a path watcher never sees a partial write."""
path = path or IP_FILE
directory = os.path.dirname(path)
os.makedirs(directory, exist_ok=True)
fd, tmp = tempfile.mkstemp(dir=directory, prefix=".external-ip-")
try:
with os.fdopen(fd, "w") as f:
f.write(ip)
os.chmod(tmp, 0o644)
os.replace(tmp, path)
except BaseException:
try:
os.unlink(tmp)
except OSError:
pass
raise
def update_all(urls, *, run=None, validate=_validate_ddns_url):
"""Call every update URL once; return the address Njal.la reported, or None.
Nothing secret is printed: URLs are only ever referred to by position.
"""
run = run or subprocess.run # resolved per call so tests can substitute it
reported = None
seen = set()
todo = []
for raw in urls:
url = normalise_url(raw)
if url not in seen: # an old "&a=${IP}" entry and its "&auto" twin are one record
seen.add(url)
todo.append(url)
for number, url in enumerate(todo, 1):
try:
validate(url)
proc = run(
["curl", "--silent", "--ipv4", "--max-time", "15", "--fail", "--no-location", url],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20, check=False,
)
except Exception:
print(f"DDNS update {number}/{len(todo)}: skipped (invalid URL or curl unavailable)")
continue
if proc.returncode != 0:
print(f"DDNS update {number}/{len(todo)}: failed (curl exit {proc.returncode})")
continue
ip = parse_reply(proc.stdout)
if ip is None:
print(f"DDNS update {number}/{len(todo)}: Njal.la did not report a public IPv4 address")
continue
print(f"DDNS update {number}/{len(todo)}: ok")
if reported is None:
reported = ip
elif ip != reported:
print("DDNS: Njal.la reported different addresses for different records; using the first")
return reported
def main() -> int:
try:
with open(URLS_FILE) as f:
urls = json.load(f)
if not isinstance(urls, list):
raise ValueError("not a list")
except Exception:
return 0 # no URLs configured -- nothing to do
urls = [u for u in urls if isinstance(u, str)]
if not urls:
return 0
ip = update_all(urls)
if ip is None:
print("DDNS: no address reported by Njal.la; keeping the last known one")
return 0
previous = read_ip_file()
if ip == previous:
print(f"DDNS: public IP unchanged ({ip})")
return 0
write_ip_file(ip)
print(f"DDNS: public IP is now {ip} (was {previous or 'unknown'})")
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
app/sovran_systemsos_web/security_helpers.py
+213
View File
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ import json
import os
import re
import tempfile
import threading
import time
import urllib.parse
@@ -245,6 +246,218 @@ def _validate_ssh_pubkey(key: str) -> str:
return key
# ── Login throttling ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# Delays applied after each failed login, and the lockout that follows once an
# address has tripped LOGIN_FAIL_MAX inside the window.
#
# LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW has to be longer than the time it takes to reach
# LOGIN_FAIL_MAX failures under the ramping delay: with a 2s ramp capped at
# LOGIN_FAIL_MAX_DELAY, 10 attempts take about 80 seconds, so a 60 second
# window would silently expire the earliest failures and the counter could
# never reach the limit. 900s (15 minutes) keeps the whole ramp inside it.
LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY = 2.0 # base delay; the nth failure waits n x this
LOGIN_FAIL_MAX_DELAY = 10.0 # ceiling for a single delay
LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW = 900.0 # rolling window failures are counted in
LOGIN_FAIL_MAX = 10 # failures in the window that trigger a lockout
LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS = 300.0 # how long the lockout lasts
# Cap on how many addresses are tracked, so a distributed sweep cannot grow
# the table without bound.
_LOGIN_THROTTLE_MAX_IPS = 4096
class LoginThrottle:
"""Per-address failed-login tracking with a ramping delay and a lockout.
The delay ramps so a script hammering the login form slows down as it goes,
and once LOGIN_FAIL_MAX failures land inside the window the address is
refused outright for LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS. A successful login clears the
address so a legitimate user who fumbles a password is not penalised later.
``sleep`` and ``clock`` are injectable so tests run without waiting.
"""
def __init__(
self,
fail_delay=LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY,
max_delay=LOGIN_FAIL_MAX_DELAY,
window=LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW,
max_failures=LOGIN_FAIL_MAX,
lockout=LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS,
max_tracked_ips=_LOGIN_THROTTLE_MAX_IPS,
sleep=None,
clock=None,
):
self._fail_delay = float(fail_delay)
self._max_delay = float(max_delay)
self._window = float(window)
self._max_failures = int(max_failures)
self._lockout = float(lockout)
self._max_tracked_ips = int(max_tracked_ips)
self._sleep = sleep if sleep is not None else time.sleep
self._clock = clock if clock is not None else time.monotonic
self._lock = threading.Lock()
self._failures: dict[str, list[float]] = {}
# ── internals ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def _prune(self, ip, now):
"""Drop timestamps outside the window; return what is left."""
keep = [t for t in self._failures.get(ip, ()) if now - t < self._window]
if keep:
self._failures[ip] = keep
else:
self._failures.pop(ip, None)
return keep
def _evict(self, now):
"""Forget addresses that can no longer affect anything."""
horizon = max(self._window, self._lockout)
for ip in [i for i, ts in self._failures.items()
if ts and now - max(ts) > horizon]:
self._failures.pop(ip, None)
while len(self._failures) > self._max_tracked_ips:
oldest = min(self._failures, key=lambda i: max(self._failures[i]))
self._failures.pop(oldest, None)
# ── public API ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
def delay_for(self, count):
"""Return the delay owed after *count* failures in the current window."""
if count <= 0:
return 0.0
return min(self._fail_delay * count, self._max_delay)
def failure_count(self, ip):
"""Return the failures currently counted against *ip*."""
with self._lock:
return len(self._prune(ip, self._clock()))
def is_locked_out(self, ip):
"""Return True while *ip* is inside a lockout."""
now = self._clock()
with self._lock:
failures = self._prune(ip, now)
if len(failures) < self._max_failures:
return False
return (now - failures[-1]) < self._lockout
def remaining_lockout(self, ip):
"""Return the seconds left in *ip*'s lockout, or 0.0 if not locked out."""
now = self._clock()
with self._lock:
failures = self._prune(ip, now)
if len(failures) < self._max_failures:
return 0.0
return max(0.0, self._lockout - (now - failures[-1]))
def record_failure(self, ip):
"""Record a failure for *ip* and serve out the delay it has earned.
Returns the delay that was applied. The lock is never held across the
sleep, so one slow client cannot stall every other login.
"""
now = self._clock()
with self._lock:
failures = list(self._prune(ip, now))
failures.append(now)
self._failures[ip] = failures
count = len(failures)
self._evict(now)
delay = self.delay_for(count)
if delay > 0:
self._sleep(delay)
return delay
def clear(self, ip):
"""Forget *ip*, e.g. after a successful login."""
with self._lock:
self._failures.pop(ip, None)
def tracked_addresses(self):
"""Return how many addresses are currently being tracked."""
with self._lock:
return len(self._failures)
# ── Local-network client policy ───────────────────────────────────────────────
#
# The Hub runs as root: it can display stored credentials, reboot the machine
# and rebuild the system. It answers this computer and the local network and
# nobody else. Whether a packet may reach its port is the firewall's and the
# router's business; this is the second lock, applied by the application itself
# so that a port forward, a firewall mistake, or a machine that has a public
# address does not put the login page in front of the internet.
#
# The Hub listens on IPv4 only (see sovran-hub.nix), so IPv6 clients never
# reach it directly and the IPv6 ranges below only matter if that bind is ever
# widened. Global IPv6 addresses (2000::/3) are deliberately not listed: a
# global address belonging to a laptop on the LAN cannot be told apart from a
# stranger's by the address alone, and allowing the range would let the whole
# IPv6 internet through.
LAN_ONLY_IPV4 = (
"127.0.0.0/8", # this computer
"10.0.0.0/8",
"172.16.0.0/12",
"192.168.0.0/16",
"100.64.0.0/10", # Tailscale and other VPN/CGNAT ranges
"169.254.0.0/16", # link-local
)
LAN_ONLY_IPV6 = (
"::1/128",
"fc00::/7", # unique-local (covers fd00::/8)
"fe80::/10", # link-local
)
class LanPolicy:
"""Decides whether a client address counts as local.
``extra_networks`` are CIDR blocks an operator has declared local in
addition to the built-in ranges, of either address family. ``enabled=False``
turns the check off entirely; it is the one explicit way to do that.
"""
def __init__(self, extra_networks=(), enabled=True):
self.enabled = bool(enabled)
nets = [ipaddress.ip_network(c, strict=False)
for c in LAN_ONLY_IPV4 + LAN_ONLY_IPV6]
for cidr in (extra_networks or ()):
try:
net = ipaddress.ip_network(cidr, strict=False)
except ValueError:
# A malformed entry must never widen the policy. Ignore it and
# stay at the strictest interpretation.
continue
if net.prefixlen == 0:
# 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 are "everyone". That is lan_only = false,
# and it should be asked for by name, not arrive as a "network".
continue
nets.append(net)
self._nets = tuple(nets)
def allows(self, ip):
"""Return True if *ip* may reach the service."""
if not self.enabled:
return True
if not ip:
return False
try:
addr = ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
except ValueError:
return False
# A dual-stack socket reports IPv4 clients as ::ffff:a.b.c.d. The
# address that matters is the IPv4 one inside it.
if addr.version == 6 and addr.ipv4_mapped is not None:
addr = addr.ipv4_mapped
return any(addr.version == n.version and addr in n for n in self._nets)
@property
def networks(self):
return self._nets
# ── Persistent Hub session store ─────────────────────────────────────────────
def load_session_store(path: str) -> dict[str, float]:
app/sovran_systemsos_web/server.py
+128 -98
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,6 @@ import subprocess
import tempfile
import threading
import time
import sys
import urllib.error
import urllib.parse
import urllib.request
@@ -41,6 +40,7 @@ from .config import load_config, load_versions
from . import systemctl as sysctl
from sovran_nwc import nwc_hub_manager as _nwc_mgr
from . import support_ops as _support_ops
from .ddns_update import normalise_url as _normalise_ddns_url
from .security_helpers import (
_nix_escape,
NPUB_RE,
@@ -55,6 +55,13 @@ from .security_helpers import (
_bech32_convertbits_decode,
load_session_store,
save_session_store,
LoginThrottle,
LanPolicy,
LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY,
LOGIN_FAIL_MAX_DELAY,
LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW,
LOGIN_FAIL_MAX,
LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS,
)
from .update_state import effective_update_status
@@ -175,11 +182,19 @@ _sessions_lock = Lock()
_SESSION_PERSIST_MIN_INTERVAL = 30.0 # seconds
_sessions_last_persist = 0.0
# Failed login tracking: ip → list of failure timestamps
_login_failures: dict[str, list[float]] = {}
LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY = 2.0 # seconds to sleep after a failed attempt
LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW = 60.0 # rolling window (seconds) for counting failures
LOGIN_FAIL_MAX = 10 # max failures in window before extra delay
# Failed login tracking.
#
# LOGIN_FAIL_MAX used to be declared here and never read anywhere: the only
# thing a failed attempt cost an attacker was a flat 2 second delay, and there
# was no lockout, no escalation and no ban. The throttling now lives in
# security_helpers.LoginThrottle, which ramps the delay and refuses an address
# outright once it has tripped LOGIN_FAIL_MAX inside the window.
#
# The window moved from 60s to 900s. With the ramping delay, reaching
# LOGIN_FAIL_MAX takes about 80 seconds, so a 60 second window expired the
# earliest failures before the limit could ever be reached — the old constant
# could not have worked even if it had been wired up.
_login_throttle = LoginThrottle()
# Public paths that are accessible without a valid session
_AUTH_EXEMPT_PATHS = {"/login", "/api/login", "/auto-login", "/api/ping"}
@@ -770,19 +785,20 @@ def _ensure_onboarding_reopened_for_migration() -> None:
logger.warning("Could not clear onboarding flag for migration flow: %s", exc)
def _record_failure(client_ip: str) -> None:
"""Record a failed login attempt and apply a rate-limit delay.
def _record_failure(client_ip: str) -> float:
"""Record a failed login attempt and apply the throttling delay.
Must always be called via loop.run_in_executor() so that the blocking
time.sleep() does not stall the asyncio event loop.
Returns the delay that was applied.
"""
now = time.time()
failures = _login_failures.setdefault(client_ip, [])
# Prune old entries outside the window
_login_failures[client_ip] = [t for t in failures if now - t < LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW]
_login_failures[client_ip].append(now)
# Sleep in the thread-pool thread to slow brute-force without blocking the loop
time.sleep(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY)
return _login_throttle.record_failure(client_ip)
def _is_locked_out(client_ip: str) -> bool:
"""Return True while *client_ip* is inside a lockout."""
return _login_throttle.is_locked_out(client_ip)
# ── Authentication middleware ─────────────────────────────────────
@@ -806,8 +822,61 @@ class AuthMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
return await call_next(request)
# ── Local-network middleware ───────────────────────────────────
#
# The Hub runs as root. Whether a packet may reach its port is up to the
# firewall and the router; this is the second lock, so a port forward or a
# firewall mistake does not put the login page in front of the internet. It
# runs before authentication: a client that is not on the local network never
# sees the login page at all.
#
# Built from the Nix-generated config. lan_only defaults to True, so a Hub built
# without the key still turns off-network clients away rather than failing open.
_hub_cfg = load_config()
_lan_policy = LanPolicy(
enabled=bool(_hub_cfg.get("lan_only", True)),
extra_networks=tuple(_hub_cfg.get("lan_extra_networks") or ()),
)
class LanOnlyMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware):
"""Refuse clients that are not on this computer or the local network."""
# Each refused address is logged once, and the list is capped: a scanner
# must not be able to fill the journal or the process's memory.
_MAX_LOGGED = 256
def __init__(self, app, policy):
super().__init__(app)
self._policy = policy
self._logged: set = set()
async def dispatch(self, request: Request, call_next):
client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else None
if not self._policy.allows(client_ip):
self._note_refusal(client_ip)
return JSONResponse(
{"detail": "Not available from this network"}, status_code=403,
)
return await call_next(request)
def _note_refusal(self, client_ip):
if client_ip in self._logged or len(self._logged) >= self._MAX_LOGGED:
return
self._logged.add(client_ip)
logger.warning(
"Refused a Hub request from %r: not this computer or a local "
"network. If that address is yours, add its network to "
"sovran_systemsOS.hub.extraLanNetworks.",
client_ip,
)
app.add_middleware(AuthMiddleware)
app.add_middleware(NoCacheMiddleware)
# Registered last so it runs outermost: a client that is not on the local
# network is turned away before authentication is considered at all.
app.add_middleware(LanOnlyMiddleware, policy=_lan_policy)
_ICONS_DIR = os.environ.get(
"SOVRAN_HUB_ICONS",
@@ -1008,44 +1077,21 @@ def _save_internal_ip(ip: str):
pass
def _save_external_ip(ip: str):
"""Write the external IP to a file so other services (e.g. LiveKit) can
reference it without running their own detection."""
if ip and ip != "unavailable":
try:
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(EXTERNAL_IP_FILE), exist_ok=True)
with open(EXTERNAL_IP_FILE, "w") as f:
f.write(ip)
except OSError:
pass
def _get_external_ip() -> str:
"""Public IP via the shared detector (/var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py).
"""Public IP as recorded by the Njal.la DDNS runner (ddns_update.py).
The detector owns discovery (STUN -> DNS -> opt-in HTTPS echo), caches the
result in /var/lib/secrets/external-ip, and contacts at most one third
party per refresh interval. This function only reads the cache and asks
the detector to refresh when it is missing or stale — it performs no
per-call external queries of its own.
Nothing here looks the address up or contacts anyone. The DDNS update asks
Njal.la to use the address the request came from, Njal.la reports it back,
and the runner saves it to EXTERNAL_IP_FILE. Returns "unavailable" until
the first successful update (and on machines with no DDNS URL, e.g. Desktop).
"""
try:
r = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "/var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py", "check"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20,
)
if r.returncode == 0 and r.stdout.strip():
return r.stdout.strip().splitlines()[0]
except Exception:
pass
try:
with open(EXTERNAL_IP_FILE) as f:
ip = f.read().strip()
if ip:
return ip
except OSError:
pass
return "unavailable"
ipaddress.ip_address(ip)
return ip
except (OSError, ValueError):
return "unavailable"
# ── Port status helpers (local-only, no external calls) ──────────
@@ -2661,10 +2707,24 @@ async def api_login(req: LoginRequest, request: Request):
"""Validate the Hub password and issue a session cookie."""
client_ip = request.client.host if request.client else "unknown"
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
# Refuse outright while the address is locked out. This runs before the
# scrypt hash, so a locked-out client costs almost nothing to reject.
if _is_locked_out(client_ip):
remaining = int(_login_throttle.remaining_lockout(client_ip) // 60) + 1
raise HTTPException(
status_code=429,
detail=f"Too many failed attempts. Try again in about {remaining} minute(s).",
)
ok = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _check_password, req.password)
if not ok:
await loop.run_in_executor(None, _record_failure, client_ip)
raise HTTPException(status_code=401, detail="Incorrect password")
# A real login clears the address, so fumbling a password once in a while
# does not accumulate towards a lockout.
_login_throttle.clear(client_ip)
token = _create_session()
response = JSONResponse({"ok": True})
response.set_cookie(
@@ -3796,9 +3856,6 @@ async def api_network():
# Keep the internal-ip file in sync for credential lookups
_save_internal_ip(internal)
_cached_external_ip = external
# Persist the external IP so other services (e.g. LiveKit) can reuse the
# Hub's detection instead of running their own.
_save_external_ip(external)
return {"internal_ip": internal, "external_ip": external}
@@ -4723,51 +4780,26 @@ def _save_ddns_urls(urls: list[str]) -> None:
def _run_njalla_ddns() -> None:
"""Update Njal.la DDNS records immediately (best-effort).
"""Ask the DDNS runner to update Njal.la right away (best-effort, non-blocking).
Resolves the current public IP once, then invokes ``curl`` directly as a
subprocess for each stored DDNS update URL. No shell interpolation is
performed and no user-controlled value is interpreted as shell syntax.
Each URL is revalidated through ``_validate_ddns_url()`` after ``${IP}``
substitution; URLs that fail validation are silently skipped.
The runner (modules/core/njalla.nix -> ddns_update.py) is the only code that
talks to Njal.la. It validates every stored URL, calls it with "&auto" so
Njal.la uses the address the request came from, and records the address
Njal.la reports back for LiveKit and the Hub (EXTERNAL_IP_FILE).
Called when a domain/DDNS entry is saved and when a DDNS-backed feature
is enabled, so DNS is refreshed right away instead of waiting for the
15-minute timer tick (see modules/core/njalla.nix).
Called when a domain/DDNS entry is saved and when a DDNS-backed feature is
enabled, so DNS is refreshed right away instead of waiting for the
15-minute timer tick.
"""
urls = _load_ddns_urls()
if not urls:
if not _load_ddns_urls():
return
# Resolve current public IP (best-effort; skip if unavailable)
public_ip = ""
try:
ip_result = subprocess.run(
["dig", "@resolver4.opendns.com", "myip.opendns.com", "+short", "-4"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=10, check=False,
subprocess.run(
["systemctl", "start", "--no-block", "sovran-ddns-update.service"],
capture_output=True, timeout=10, check=False,
)
raw_ip = ip_result.stdout.strip().splitlines()[0] if ip_result.stdout.strip() else ""
# Validate strictly as a proper IPv4/IPv6 address before substitution
ipaddress.ip_address(raw_ip)
public_ip = raw_ip
except Exception:
public_ip = ""
if not public_ip:
return # skip to avoid sending bare ${IP} to curl
for raw_url in urls:
try:
# Replace the placeholder with the validated IP (safe string replacement)
url = raw_url.replace("${IP}", public_ip)
# Revalidate after substitution — enforces /update/ path, no $, etc.
_validate_ddns_url(url)
subprocess.run(
["curl", "--silent", "--max-time", "15", "--fail", "--no-location", url],
timeout=20, check=False,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
except Exception:
pass
pass
def _reload_caddy_for_domain_change() -> None:
@@ -4906,18 +4938,17 @@ async def api_domains_set(req: DomainSetRequest):
# Strip surrounding quotes
if len(ddns_url) >= 2 and ddns_url[0] in ('"', "'") and ddns_url[-1] == ddns_url[0]:
ddns_url = ddns_url[1:-1]
# Replace trailing &auto with the IP placeholder used by _run_njalla_ddns
if ddns_url.endswith("&auto"):
ddns_url = ddns_url[:-5] + "&a=${IP}"
# Keep Njal.la's "&auto": Njal.la then uses the address the request comes
# from, so nothing on this machine has to look the address up. Old
# "&a=${IP}" pastes and "&quiet" are normalised exactly as the runner does.
ddns_url = _normalise_ddns_url(ddns_url)
# Validate URL strictly — reject injection attempts before persisting.
# The placeholder ${IP} is replaced temporarily so the validator sees a
# real address; the original URL (with the placeholder) is kept for storage.
try:
_validate_ddns_url(ddns_url.replace("${IP}", "127.0.0.1"))
_validate_ddns_url(ddns_url)
except ValueError as exc:
raise HTTPException(status_code=400, detail=f"Invalid DDNS URL: {exc}")
# Persist the URL in the JSON store (never in executable shell source)
existing_urls = _load_ddns_urls()
existing_urls = list(dict.fromkeys(_normalise_ddns_url(u) for u in _load_ddns_urls()))
if ddns_url not in existing_urls:
existing_urls.append(ddns_url)
try:
@@ -6308,13 +6339,12 @@ async def _background_domain_reachability_checker():
consecutive_failures = 0
while True:
try:
# Keep the persisted external IP fresh (dynamic WAN IPs), so
# services like LiveKit can read /var/lib/secrets/external-ip.
# Pick up the address the Njal.la DDNS runner last recorded (a plain
# file read; nothing is looked up from here).
loop = asyncio.get_event_loop()
external = await loop.run_in_executor(None, _get_external_ip)
if external != "unavailable":
_cached_external_ip = external
_save_external_ip(external)
cfg = load_config()
services = cfg.get("services", [])
app/sovran_systemsos_web/static/js/domain-prereqs.js
+5
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,11 @@ function renderDomainNeedsHtml(opts) {
+ '<a href="https://njal.la" target="_blank" rel="noopener noreferrer" style="color:var(--accent-color);">Njal.la</a>'
+ " and connecting your services. Just follow the steps below.</p>";
}
// Every variant above ends with a domain that points at the user's home
// connection. Say what that publishes (README: "Server + Desktop and your
// home IP address").
html += "<p>⚠️ <strong>Heads-up:</strong> your domain points at your home internet connection, "
+ "so anyone can look up your home IP address. Domain privacy does not hide it.</p>";
return html;
}
app/sovran_systemsos_web/templates/index.html
+6 -2
View File
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@
<h3>Network</h3>
<div class="net-row"><span class="net-k">LAN</span><span class="ip-value" id="ip-internal">…</span></div>
<div class="net-row"><span class="net-k">WAN</span><span class="ip-value" id="ip-external">…</span></div>
<div class="sub">sovransystemsos.local</div>
<div class="sub">sovransystemsos.local:8937</div>
</div>
</div>
<div class="welcome-dyn" id="wc-more"></div>
@@ -476,6 +476,10 @@
<li>To make your services available outside your home, complete one router task: forward ports <strong>80 and 443</strong> to this computer</li>
</ul>
</div>
<p class="support-desc">
⚠️ <strong>Heads-up:</strong> your domain points at your home internet connection,
so anyone can look up your home IP address. Domain privacy does not hide it.
</p>
<p class="support-desc">
The Hub guides you through every step.
</p>
@@ -516,7 +520,7 @@
<div class="security-reset-password-box" id="security-reset-new-password">&nbsp;</div>
<p class="security-reset-password-warning">
✍️ <strong>Write this down now.</strong><br />
You will need it to log in to your computer<br />and the Sovran Hub at <em>sovransystemsos.local</em>.
You will need it to log in to your computer<br />and the Sovran Hub at <em>sovransystemsos.local:8937</em>.
</p>
<button class="security-reset-reboot-btn" id="security-reset-reboot-btn" disabled>
I have written down my new password — Restart Entire System
assets/sovran-hub-screenshot.webp
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configuration.nix
+36
View File
@@ -165,6 +165,14 @@
programs.fish = { enable = true; promptInit = "fastfetch"; };
# ── PostgreSQL base ────────────────────────────────────────
# Shared cluster for Nextcloud (nextclouddb) + Matrix Synapse.
# Sized for the README's Server + Desktop recommendation (32 GB RAM,
# 500 GB NVMe OS + 2 TB NVMe timechain). Postgres shares the box with
# Bitcoin Core, Electrs, LND, MariaDB, PHP-FPM and GNOME, so
# shared_buffers stays below the 25%-of-RAM dedicated-server rule.
# Fixes Nextcloud 35 Database checks (pg.cache_hit_ratio,
# pg.dead_tuples). Override in custom.nix for other hosts, e.g.:
# services.postgresql.settings.shared_buffers = lib.mkForce "512MB";
services.postgresql = {
enable = true;
authentication = lib.mkForce ''
@@ -172,6 +180,34 @@
host all all 127.0.0.1/32 trust
host all all ::1/128 trust
'';
settings = {
# Memory — fixes low buffer cache hit ratio (stock default is
# 128MB shared_buffers). effective_cache_size is only a planner
# hint, not an allocation, so it can be generous.
# NOTE: changing shared_buffers requires a Postgres restart.
shared_buffers = "2GB";
effective_cache_size = "12GB";
maintenance_work_mem = "512MB";
work_mem = "32MB";
wal_buffers = "64MB";
# Checkpoints — spread write bursts out on NVMe. Reload-only.
min_wal_size = "1GB";
max_wal_size = "4GB";
checkpoint_completion_target = 0.9;
# Autovacuum — the stock 60s naptime can't keep up with
# Nextcloud's and Synapse's write-heavy tables (filecache,
# activity, jobs, state). Reload-only.
autovacuum_naptime = "30s";
autovacuum_vacuum_scale_factor = 0.05;
autovacuum_analyze_scale_factor = 0.025;
autovacuum_max_workers = 4;
# NVMe planner assumptions (README: NVMe OS + data disks).
random_page_cost = "1.1";
effective_io_concurrency = 200;
};
};
# ── Backups ────────────────────────────────────────────────
flake.lock
Generated
+29 -46
View File
@@ -5,11 +5,11 @@
"nixpkgs": "nixpkgs"
},
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1788871704,
"narHash": "sha256-Vtc2SqCB7NOO028+K5JHbpWQ3XVpLyoC75MZQ12l13o=",
"lastModified": 1790862821,
"narHash": "sha256-IcLn2hPlxsbn2PKVlFD6gsDzkVurQ7b0KPtyORUGFcs=",
"owner": "emmanuelrosa",
"repo": "btc-clients-nix",
"rev": "e14502cba22806341f8c54c6f0c349094830c58b",
"rev": "99b0442dcc15198efcb62f3c1e7561a361749a6a",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -26,11 +26,11 @@
]
},
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1787559586,
"narHash": "sha256-onL0VLf9vPllmT0H/OlURIU5r5t5WIEl7t4tVNKT0Nw=",
"lastModified": 1788450739,
"narHash": "sha256-glZLQlzIn1fXH6PazR2iUmTo7kzzyYSshrWhLS9TqCU=",
"owner": "hercules-ci",
"repo": "flake-parts",
"rev": "9d0d87172c374f89da73c1cfe6d81ae62feac1f1",
"rev": "31729ca8cbdb4fa927b34e5f4353e6a83f39e993",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -41,11 +41,11 @@
},
"nixpkgs": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1788179970,
"narHash": "sha256-r5LmxzIhsu5+oDybatN/HJ8roYOKjb2Apa5xI6v46VU=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"lastModified": 1790861130,
"narHash": "sha256-cA8TrQntLbNO14wivJx7Gi2pZBhhBcMplgzIA3sk3TA=",
"owner": "nixos",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "1db62ab7d2ccf1916bbf7deb61fc9d16f1c4ab49",
"rev": "3d23ea05a8a3be3f078845c2753af10cef80e1a5",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -56,27 +56,11 @@
},
"nixpkgs-stable": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1788921488,
"narHash": "sha256-8+xWRxEkD6l217cIUdRxfeUGS9lQX0hVtUuNVsBaDzk=",
"lastModified": 1790750587,
"narHash": "sha256-VfjaoJ1Uyb7JZTrBgE5Jf2nhjtQPmD9KOd19HJwmZwM=",
"owner": "nixos",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "6aefcda9401be8acc2b74244fb3b37520ea1f0a8",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
"owner": "nixos",
"ref": "nixos-26.05",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"type": "github"
}
},
"nixpkgs-stable_2": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1788807765,
"narHash": "sha256-J9oC0bKnkXUrMegqRTXVkyDFJ0gn2U/Qpoo9HgGMQmA=",
"owner": "nixos",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "93108a538f079596c9a16c72cf03e9322782b6dd",
"rev": "78e9c786dc08cd4f3420c2395cd977206a9b1da2",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -88,11 +72,11 @@
},
"nixpkgs_2": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1788881743,
"narHash": "sha256-2V9GZGvPfrNzxFozhI9dcqV+c3QdA8YZrvAAzqEB+dI=",
"lastModified": 1790822859,
"narHash": "sha256-69xHQhAeMAD2wDXO7T2pcOZIF9Sga2W+JkmY2a11Ops=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "d6524aaca2ff07876657ae2b323f24be4874944b",
"rev": "c59305bab2065cfecc4944690d9eedbb56f3a9fa",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -104,11 +88,11 @@
},
"nixpkgs_3": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1787631388,
"narHash": "sha256-vMiXptXarfSdJb1Gkc+FYVOAibuBRj7qxGa8z68q1Uw=",
"lastModified": 1789724158,
"narHash": "sha256-nlKgrm0dsVhOSopKheVBCcOpiIticufPPVLdVOI0euA=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "ac6b2166e7a9375683b8e98f860f273222337b16",
"rev": "0a3468a402c449992505b6a9fc5b06580141b750",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -120,11 +104,11 @@
},
"nixpkgs_4": {
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1788881743,
"narHash": "sha256-2V9GZGvPfrNzxFozhI9dcqV+c3QdA8YZrvAAzqEB+dI=",
"lastModified": 1790822859,
"narHash": "sha256-69xHQhAeMAD2wDXO7T2pcOZIF9Sga2W+JkmY2a11Ops=",
"owner": "NixOS",
"repo": "nixpkgs",
"rev": "d6524aaca2ff07876657ae2b323f24be4874944b",
"rev": "c59305bab2065cfecc4944690d9eedbb56f3a9fa",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -141,11 +125,11 @@
"systems": "systems"
},
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1788190018,
"narHash": "sha256-59BAfH0txPAZrPBF4QJqwvUWppD+ICrcjA1LZAmPnrQ=",
"lastModified": 1790541651,
"narHash": "sha256-/496IQz8qNWHHLnc3Zvr0l4uxJ34igNhJhn7ZKAefFk=",
"owner": "nix-community",
"repo": "nixvim",
"rev": "41844750e55f17b1385d5b09ca7ade5f11f49506",
"rev": "5980a626794486abad69fca7667f9c11dfbc3bd7",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
@@ -165,15 +149,14 @@
},
"sovran-bitcoin": {
"inputs": {
"nixpkgs": "nixpkgs_4",
"nixpkgs-stable": "nixpkgs-stable_2"
"nixpkgs": "nixpkgs_4"
},
"locked": {
"lastModified": 1788921077,
"narHash": "sha256-k2i55M0lK3xzjsJKS/kOhQHSf8479r6RYEllnICxggg=",
"lastModified": 1790877969,
"narHash": "sha256-Ia88keP9t3B6ECVw+LP4xasPdvzw1TIWya1K+3dySu0=",
"owner": "naturallaw777",
"repo": "Sovran_Bitcoin",
"rev": "7c4d5b509c0533ea48192146f987182668bf42dc",
"rev": "b0da63bd81f1a1b1a970068b3061c6c8389db9aa",
"type": "github"
},
"original": {
flake.nix
-29
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,6 @@
nixvim.url = "github:nix-community/nixvim";
btc-clients.url = "github:emmanuelrosa/btc-clients-nix";
nixpkgs-stable.url = "github:nixos/nixpkgs/nixos-26.05";
# Bitcoin / Lightning stack — standalone flake, consumed as a module.
sovran-bitcoin.url = "github:naturallaw777/Sovran_Bitcoin";
};
@@ -19,24 +17,6 @@
system = prev.stdenv.hostPlatform.system;
config.allowUnfree = true;
};
# Pin LiveKit to 1.13.6: element-calling.nix sets
# rtc.advertise_internal_ip, which gives LAN callers a host candidate
# so calls work on Wi-Fi without the router needing NAT-hairpin. That
# flag is only honoured when node_ip is set manually from LiveKit
# v1.13.6 (mediatransportutil f234b53); nixpkgs-unstable currently
# ships 1.13.5. Remove this override once nixpkgs-unstable reaches
# >= 1.13.6.
livekit = prev.livekit.overrideAttrs (old: {
version = "1.13.6";
src = prev.fetchFromGitHub {
owner = "livekit";
repo = "livekit";
rev = "v1.13.6";
hash = "sha256-sUAx6ooeEUUqot5xuZv7xiQa3DdRFVULteTwYgFUzCI=";
};
vendorHash = "sha256-nOGSmoNuQQm/sIVI1HojsiS4GkbhA68uYMQ6X7d4a5Q=";
});
};
in
{
@@ -77,14 +57,5 @@
];
};
};
checks.x86_64-linux = let
pkgs = import nixpkgs {
system = "x86_64-linux";
};
in {
# Bitcoin hardening and package checks now live in the Sovran_Bitcoin flake.
# Run them with: nix build github:naturallaw777/Sovran_Bitcoin#checks.x86_64-linux
};
};
}
iso/installer.py
+9 -4
View File
@@ -54,9 +54,14 @@ DICEWARE_WORDS = [
]
def generate_diceware_password():
words = [secrets.choice(DICEWARE_WORDS) for _ in range(3)]
digit = secrets.randbelow(10)
return "-".join(words) + f"-{digit}"
# 4 words from a 96 word list plus 2 digits: 96^4 x 100 = ~8.5e9, about
# 33 bits. The old 3 words plus 1 digit was 96^3 x 10 = ~8.8e6, about 23
# bits, for a password that is simultaneously the desktop login, the
# 'free' account password and the only thing in front of a Hub that runs
# as root and hands out every stored credential.
words = [secrets.choice(DICEWARE_WORDS) for _ in range(4)]
digits = f"{secrets.randbelow(100):02d}"
return "-".join(words) + f"-{digits}"
try:
logfile = open(LOG, "a")
@@ -471,7 +476,7 @@ class InstallerWindow(Adw.ApplicationWindow):
# Role cards
roles = [
("Server + Desktop",
"Full sovereignty: host your own websites, cloud, chat, passwords, and Bitcoin services instead of relying on Big Tech. Sovran_SystemsOS walks you through getting your domain from Njal.la and connecting everything. One router task is required: forward ports 80 and 443 to this computer.",
"Full sovereignty: host your own websites, cloud, chat, passwords, and Bitcoin services instead of relying on Big Tech. Sovran_SystemsOS walks you through getting your domain from Njal.la and connecting everything. One router task is required: forward ports 80 and 443 to this computer. Heads-up: this makes your home IP address public.",
"Server+Desktop"),
("Desktop Only",
"A beautiful, easy-to-use desktop without the background server applications.",
modules/core/caddy.nix
+50 -35
View File
@@ -14,13 +14,54 @@ let
|| config.sovran_systemsOS.features.haven
|| config.sovran_systemsOS.features."nwc-wallets"
|| config.sovran_systemsOS.features.element-calling;
# RTL and Mempool listen on loopback only: Sovran_Bitcoin binds them to
# 127.0.0.1, and RTL's unit is sandboxed to loopback besides. Caddy is how
# the local network reaches them (:3051 and :60847), so it has to run
# wherever they do. That includes Bitcoin Node Only, which has no
# domain-based service and so no other reason to run Caddy.
#
# The Hub is not one of these. It listens on 0.0.0.0:8937 itself, so it is
# served on its own port rather than through Caddy: the one service that
# runs as root has nothing in front of it that it does not need, and the
# public sites on ports 80/443 cannot be asked for it by Host header.
servesRtl = config.sovran_systemsOS.services.bitcoin;
servesMempool = servesRtl && config.sovran_systemsOS.features.mempool;
caddyEnabled = needsHttpsPorts || extraVhosts != "" || servesRtl;
# Sites for the local network, one per loopback-only service. Written after
# the public domain sites; each exists only where its service does.
#
# They do not filter by client address. A request can only reach them on
# their own ports, which no setup step asks you to forward, so forwarding
# 80/443 for public services does not expose them (a Host header on those
# ports cannot select a site that listens elsewhere). RTL has its own
# password and lockout, and Mempool shows public chain data. An address
# check here could not be made right for IPv6 anyway: a laptop's global
# address on the LAN looks exactly like a stranger's.
bitcoinUiSites =
lib.optionalString servesRtl ''
:3051 {
reverse_proxy :3050
encode gzip zstd
}
''
+ lib.optionalString servesMempool ''
:60847 {
reverse_proxy :60845
encode gzip zstd
}
'';
in
{
services.caddy = {
# Only enable Caddy when at least one domain-based service needs it or
# the operator has defined custom vhosts. This prevents Caddy from
# running on Desktop Only installs that have no web services configured.
enable = needsHttpsPorts || extraVhosts != "";
# Caddy runs when a domain-based service needs it, when the operator has
# defined custom vhosts, or when it is the way to reach RTL and Mempool.
# Desktop Only has none of those, so Caddy stays off there.
enable = caddyEnabled;
user = "caddy";
group = "root";
};
@@ -202,37 +243,11 @@ $LIGHTNING {
EOF
fi
# ── Sovran Hub (LAN access via mDNS) ────────────
cat >> /run/caddy/Caddyfile <<EOF
http://sovransystemsos.local {
reverse_proxy localhost:8937
header {
Clear-Site-Data "\"cache\""
Cache-Control "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate, max-age=0"
Pragma "no-cache"
Expires "0"
}
}
EOF
# ── RTL (LAN access) ────────────────────────────
cat >> /run/caddy/Caddyfile <<EOF
:3051 {
reverse_proxy :3050
encode gzip zstd
}
EOF
# ── Mempool (LAN access) ────────────────────────
cat >> /run/caddy/Caddyfile <<EOF
:60847 {
reverse_proxy :60845
encode gzip zstd
}
EOF
# ── RTL and Mempool (local network) ─────────────
# Only where those services run; see bitcoinUiSites above.
cat >> /run/caddy/Caddyfile <<'LAN_SITES_EOF'
${bitcoinUiSites}
LAN_SITES_EOF
# ── Custom vhosts from custom.nix ──────────────
cat >> /run/caddy/Caddyfile <<'CUSTOM_VHOSTS_EOF'
modules/core/njalla.nix
+33 -89
View File
@@ -1,43 +1,64 @@
{ config, pkgs, lib, ... }:
{
# The public-IP detector (STUN / OpenDNS / HTTPS echo) is gone: the public
# address is whatever Njal.la reports back for the DDNS update below, and
# nothing else on the system looks it up. Fail with a pointer, instead of
# silently ignoring them, if a custom.nix still sets one of its old options.
imports = map (opt:
lib.mkRemovedOptionModule [ "sovran_systemsOS" "publicIP" opt ]
"Sovran no longer looks up the public IP: the Njal.la DDNS update reports it (modules/core/njalla.nix). To force an address for Element Calling, set sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP."
) [ "stunServer" "stunPort" "dnsResolver" "httpsEcho" "cacheTTL" ];
# ── Ensure njalla directory exists on every build ────────────────────────
systemd.tmpfiles.rules = [
"d /var/lib/njalla 0750 root root -"
];
# ── Install the shared validation helper so the DDNS runner can import it ─
# The exact same _validate_ddns_url() function used by the Hub web application
# is installed here as a read-only system file. The DDNS runner imports it
# directly so the two code paths share one validator — no weaker inline copy.
# ── Install the DDNS runner and the validator it shares with the Hub ─────
# Both files come straight from the Hub's source tree and are installed side
# by side as read-only system files. The runner imports the exact same
# _validate_ddns_url() the Hub API uses — no weaker inline copy.
environment.etc."sovran/security_helpers.py" = {
source = ../../app/sovran_systemsos_web/security_helpers.py;
mode = "0444";
user = "root";
group = "root";
};
environment.etc."sovran/ddns-update.py" = {
source = ../../app/sovran_systemsos_web/ddns_update.py;
mode = "0444";
user = "root";
group = "root";
};
# ── Safe DDNS update service ─────────────────────────────────────────────
# Reads DDNS update URLs from the JSON store written by the Hub API and
# invokes curl directly — no shell interpolation, no script execution.
# Replaces the legacy root cron job that ran /var/lib/njalla/njalla.sh.
# Njal.la is asked to use the address the request came from ("&auto") and
# reports it back; the runner saves it to /var/lib/secrets/external-ip,
# where LiveKit and the Hub read it. See app/sovran_systemsos_web/ddns_update.py.
systemd.services.sovran-ddns-update = {
description = "Sovran Njal.la DDNS update (safe JSON-based runner)";
wants = [ "network-online.target" ];
after = [ "network-online.target" ];
# curl is not in a NixOS unit's default PATH (coreutils, findutils, grep,
# sed, systemd): without this the runner cannot start it.
path = [ pkgs.curl ];
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
User = "root";
ExecStart = "${pkgs.python3}/bin/python3 /var/lib/sovran/ddns-update.py";
# Harden the service — it only needs network access and read access to
# /var/lib/njalla/ddns_urls.json.
ExecStart = "${pkgs.python3}/bin/python3 /etc/sovran/ddns-update.py";
# Harden the service — it needs network access, the URL store, and the
# file that receives the reported address.
NoNewPrivileges = true;
ProtectSystem = "strict";
ReadWritePaths = [ "/var/lib/njalla" "/var/lib/secrets" ];
ReadOnlyPaths = [ "/etc/sovran" ];
ProtectHome = true;
PrivateTmp = true;
RestrictAddressFamilies = [ "AF_INET" "AF_INET6" ];
# AF_UNIX: name lookups can go through nscd / systemd-resolved sockets.
RestrictAddressFamilies = [ "AF_UNIX" "AF_INET" "AF_INET6" ];
};
};
@@ -52,86 +73,9 @@
};
};
# Install the Python runner script at build time so the service can find it.
# The script is owned by root and not world-writable.
# Uses _validate_ddns_url() from /etc/sovran/security_helpers.py — the same
# production validator used by the Hub API — before executing any curl call.
# No shell is used; no redirects; no script execution.
# ${IP} placeholder is preserved in stored URLs and substituted at runtime;
# the URL is validated after substitution so any remaining $ is rejected.
# The runner used to be written to /var/lib/sovran by this activation script,
# next to the old public-ip.py detector. Remove those stale copies.
system.activationScripts.sovran-ddns-update-script = ''
install -d -m 0755 /var/lib/sovran
cat > /var/lib/sovran/ddns-update.py <<'PYEOF'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""Sovran safe DDNS update runner.
Reads ddns_urls.json, substitutes the public IP for the ''${IP} placeholder,
validates each URL using the production _validate_ddns_url() from
/etc/sovran/security_helpers.py, then calls curl per URL.
No shell interpolation. No redirects. No script execution.
"""
import ipaddress, json, os, subprocess, sys
sys.path.insert(0, '/etc/sovran')
try:
from security_helpers import _validate_ddns_url
except ImportError:
sys.exit(1) # validator missing — fail so systemd logs the misconfiguration
URLS_FILE = "/var/lib/njalla/ddns_urls.json"
try:
with open(URLS_FILE) as f:
urls = json.load(f)
if not isinstance(urls, list):
raise ValueError("not a list")
except Exception:
sys.exit(0) # no URLs configured — nothing to do
# Resolve current public IP via the shared detector — one script, one cache
# (STUN -> DNS -> opt-in HTTPS echo; see /var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py).
# The detector refreshes /var/lib/secrets/external-ip, which the Hub and
# LiveKit read as well, so the whole system shares a single detected value.
public_ip = ""
try:
r = subprocess.run(
[sys.executable, "/var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py", "check"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=20,
)
raw = r.stdout.strip().splitlines()[0] if r.stdout.strip() else ""
ipaddress.ip_address(raw) # validates — raises if not a real IP
public_ip = raw
except Exception:
pass
if not public_ip:
# Last resort: the shared cache file, if the detector is unavailable.
try:
with open("/var/lib/secrets/external-ip") as f:
raw = f.read().strip()
ipaddress.ip_address(raw)
public_ip = raw
except Exception:
pass
if not public_ip:
sys.exit(0) # no IP resolved — skip to avoid sending bare ''${IP}
for raw_url in urls:
try:
# Substitute ''${IP} placeholder then validate through production validator.
# After substitution there must be no $ left; _validate_ddns_url rejects
# any remaining $ expression.
url = raw_url.replace("''${IP}", public_ip)
_validate_ddns_url(url)
subprocess.run(
["curl", "--silent", "--max-time", "15", "--fail", "--no-location", url],
timeout=20, check=False,
stdout=subprocess.DEVNULL, stderr=subprocess.DEVNULL,
)
except Exception:
pass
PYEOF
chmod 0500 /var/lib/sovran/ddns-update.py
rm -f /var/lib/sovran/ddns-update.py /var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py
'';
}
modules/core/public-ip.nix
-323
View File
@@ -1,323 +0,0 @@
# ── Unified public-IP detection (privacy-first) ─────────────────────────────
#
# One script, one cache file, every consumer on the system reads the same
# value. Previously the public IP was detected independently in three places,
# each phoning home to a different third party:
# * the Hub (server.py _get_external_ip) → api.ipify.org / ifconfig.me /
# icanhazip.com over HTTPS on every /api/network call and every
# background-loop tick
# * DDNS (ddns-update.py) → myip.opendns.com via OpenDNS
# * LiveKit → STUN (its own embedded detection)
#
# This module replaces all of that with a single script
# (/var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py) that detects the IP once per TTL using the
# least-exposing mechanism available, and caches it in
# /var/lib/secrets/external-ip. Consumers (Hub, DDNS, LiveKit) read the cache
# and only invoke the script when it is missing or stale.
#
# Detection chain (first success wins, stops immediately):
# 1. pin — sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP (baked in)
# 2. cache — /var/lib/secrets/external-ip if newer than cacheTTL
# 3. STUN — UDP binding request (one packet, no application data,
# no HTTP metadata; the same protocol every WebRTC client
# uses). Server configurable via publicIP.stunServer.
# 4. DNS — "myip.opendns.com" A query via publicIP.dnsResolver
# (single DNS query, no HTTP headers)
# 5. HTTPS echo — ONLY endpoints listed in publicIP.httpsEcho (empty by
# default → never contacted)
#
# Privacy property: while the cache is fresh, zero third parties are
# contacted. When detection runs, at most ONE party learns the IP per
# refresh interval (default 5 minutes), and the STUN/DNS mechanisms expose
# nothing beyond the bare address.
{
config,
pkgs,
lib,
...
}:
let
stunServer = config.sovran_systemsOS.publicIP.stunServer;
stunPort = config.sovran_systemsOS.publicIP.stunPort;
dnsResolver = config.sovran_systemsOS.publicIP.dnsResolver;
httpsEcho = config.sovran_systemsOS.publicIP.httpsEcho;
cacheTTL = config.sovran_systemsOS.publicIP.cacheTTL;
# Optional pin shared with element-calling (baked in at build time).
pin = if config.sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP != null then config.sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP else "";
echoList = lib.concatStringsSep "," (map (u: "'${u}'") httpsEcho);
in
{
options.sovran_systemsOS.publicIP = {
stunServer = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.str;
default = "stun.l.google.com";
description = ''
STUN server used to discover the public IP over UDP. STUN is the most
privacy-preserving detection mechanism: a single stateless packet,
no HTTP metadata. Only used when the cache is stale.
'';
};
stunPort = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.port;
default = 19302;
};
dnsResolver = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.str;
default = "resolver4.opendns.com";
description = ''
DNS resolver used as fallback (myip.opendns.com trick) when STUN is
unavailable (e.g. ISP blocks UDP egress). A single DNS query, no
HTTP headers.
'';
};
httpsEcho = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
default = [ ];
example = [ "https://api.ipify.org" ];
description = ''
OPT-IN HTTPS endpoints that return the caller's public IP as a bare
IPv4 literal. Each listed endpoint observes this server's public IP
and HTTP metadata every time detection runs. Empty by default — no
HTTPS echo service is ever contacted unless you add one here. This is
the last-resort fallback after STUN and DNS.
'';
};
cacheTTL = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.int;
default = 300;
description = "Seconds the detected public IP is cached before re-detection.";
};
};
# ── Install the unified detector ──────────────────────────────────────────
# This module declares `options` above, so ALL configuration must go under
# the `config` attribute: NixOS forbids mixing bare top-level settings
# (like `system.*`) with the `options`/`config` keyword attributes in the
# same module. (Fixes: "Module ... has an unsupported attribute `system'".)
config.system.activationScripts.sovranPublicIpInstall = lib.stringAfter [ "users" ] ''
install -d -m 0755 /var/lib/sovran
cat > /var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py <<'PYEOF'
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""sovran-public-ip — one detector, one cache, every consumer reads the same IP.
Privacy-first detection chain (first success wins):
1. pin — baked in from sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP
2. cache — /var/lib/secrets/external-ip if newer than CACHE_TTL seconds
3. STUN — UDP binding request (one packet, no application data)
4. DNS — myip.opendns.com A query via the configured resolver
5. HTTPS — ONLY endpoints baked in from publicIP.httpsEcho (opt-in)
Usage:
public-ip.py check print current public IP (cache first; refresh if stale)
public-ip.py refresh force re-detection, update the cache file, print IP
Exit status: 0 with the IP on stdout on success; 1 if no IP is available
(cached value, if any, is still printed to stdout with a warning on stderr).
"""
import ipaddress
import os
import random
import socket
import struct
import sys
import time
import urllib.request
CACHE_FILE = "/var/lib/secrets/external-ip"
PIN = "${pin}"
STUN_SERVER = "${stunServer}"
STUN_PORT = ${toString stunPort}
DNS_RESOLVER = "${dnsResolver}"
DNS_HOST = "myip.opendns.com"
ECHO_URLS = [ ${echoList} ]
CACHE_TTL = ${toString cacheTTL}
TIMEOUT = 3.0
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Detection primitives
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def is_usable_ip(text: str) -> bool:
"""True if text is a globally routable IPv4 that LiveKit may advertise."""
try:
ip = ipaddress.ip_address(text)
except ValueError:
return False
if ip.version != 4:
return False
if (ip.is_private or ip.is_loopback or ip.is_link_local or ip.is_multicast
or ip.is_reserved or ip.is_unspecified or not ip.is_global):
return False
# RFC 6598 shared (CGNAT) space — not reachable from the internet.
if ip in ipaddress.ip_network("100.64.0.0/10"):
return False
return True
def stun_public_ip() -> str | None:
"""RFC 5389 Binding request over UDP; returns the mapped (public) IPv4."""
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock.settimeout(TIMEOUT)
try:
txid = random.randbytes(12)
req = struct.pack("!HHI", 0x0001, 0, 0) + txid # Binding request
sock.sendto(req, (STUN_SERVER, STUN_PORT))
data, _ = sock.recvfrom(2048)
except OSError:
return None
finally:
sock.close()
if len(data) < 20:
return None
mtype, _mlen = struct.unpack("!HH", data[:4])
if mtype != 0x0101: # Binding success response
return None
cookie = data[4:8]
i = 20
while i + 4 <= len(data):
atype, alen = struct.unpack("!HH", data[i : i + 4])
aval = data[i + 4 : i + 4 + alen]
if atype in (0x0001, 0x0020) and len(aval) >= 8: # MAPPED / XOR-MAPPED
family = aval[1]
if family == 0x01: # IPv4
raw = aval[4:8]
if atype == 0x0020: # XOR with magic cookie + txid prefix
raw = bytes(b ^ c for b, c in zip(raw, cookie + txid[:4]))
return socket.inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET, raw)
i += 4 + ((alen + 3) // 4) * 4
return None
def dns_public_ip() -> str | None:
"""Minimal DNS A query for myip.opendns.com against the given resolver."""
qid = random.randint(0, 0xFFFF)
qname = b"".join(bytes([len(p)]) + p.encode() for p in DNS_HOST.split(".")) + b"\x00"
query = struct.pack("!HHHHHH", qid, 0x0100, 1, 0, 0, 0) + qname + struct.pack("!HH", 1, 1)
sock = socket.socket(socket.AF_INET, socket.SOCK_DGRAM)
sock.settimeout(TIMEOUT)
try:
sock.sendto(query, (DNS_RESOLVER, 53))
data, _ = sock.recvfrom(4096)
except OSError:
return None
finally:
sock.close()
try:
if len(data) < 12:
return None
rid, _flags, _qd, an, _ns, _ar = struct.unpack("!HHHHHH", data[:12])
if rid != qid or an == 0:
return None
i = 12
for _ in range(_qd): # skip question
while data[i] != 0:
i += 1 + data[i]
i += 5
for _ in range(an):
if data[i] & 0xC0 == 0xC0:
i += 2
else:
while data[i] != 0:
i += 1 + data[i]
i += 1
rtype, _rclass, _ttl, rdlen = struct.unpack("!HHIH", data[i : i + 10])
i += 10
if rtype == 1 and rdlen == 4:
return socket.inet_ntop(socket.AF_INET, data[i : i + 4])
i += rdlen
except (IndexError, struct.error):
return None
return None
def echo_public_ip() -> str | None:
"""Opt-in HTTPS echo endpoints (baked in at build time; empty by default)."""
for url in ECHO_URLS:
try:
req = urllib.request.Request(url, headers={"User-Agent": "sovran-public-ip"})
with urllib.request.urlopen(req, timeout=TIMEOUT) as resp:
text = resp.read().decode().strip()
if is_usable_ip(text):
return text
except Exception:
continue
return None
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# Cache handling
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
def read_cache() -> str:
try:
with open(CACHE_FILE) as f:
return f.read().strip()
except OSError:
return ""
def write_cache(ip: str) -> None:
try:
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(CACHE_FILE), exist_ok=True)
tmp = f"{CACHE_FILE}.tmp"
with open(tmp, "w") as f:
f.write(ip + "\n")
os.replace(tmp, CACHE_FILE)
except OSError:
pass
def cache_fresh() -> bool:
try:
return time.time() - os.path.getmtime(CACHE_FILE) < CACHE_TTL
except OSError:
return False
def detect() -> str:
"""Run the chain; returns usable IP or an empty string."""
if PIN and is_usable_ip(PIN):
return PIN
for fn in (stun_public_ip, dns_public_ip, echo_public_ip):
try:
cand = fn()
except Exception:
continue
if cand and is_usable_ip(cand):
return cand
return ""
def main() -> int:
force = len(sys.argv) > 1 and sys.argv[1] == "refresh"
ip = ""
if not force and cache_fresh():
ip = read_cache()
if not ip:
ip = detect()
if ip:
write_cache(ip)
else:
stale = read_cache()
if stale:
print(stale)
print("WARNING: detection failed; using last known public IP", file=sys.stderr)
return 0
print("ERROR: could not determine a public IP (STUN/DNS unreachable)", file=sys.stderr)
return 1
print(ip)
return 0
if __name__ == "__main__":
sys.exit(main())
PYEOF
chmod 0555 /var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py
'';
}
modules/core/roles.nix
+66 -3
View File
@@ -61,6 +61,67 @@
sshd = lib.mkEnableOption "SSH remote access";
};
# ── Hub ───────────────────────────────────────────────────
hub = {
lanOnly = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.bool;
default = true;
description = ''
Refuse Hub requests from clients that are not on this computer or on
the local network: loopback, private (10.0.0.0/8, 172.16.0.0/12,
192.168.0.0/16), VPN/CGNAT (100.64.0.0/10) and link-local addresses,
plus anything listed in sovran_systemsOS.hub.extraLanNetworks.
The Hub runs as root and can display stored credentials and reboot
the machine. Whether a packet may reach its port is up to the
firewall and your router; this check is the second lock, so that a
port forward or a firewall mistake does not put the Hub's login page
in front of the internet.
Set it to false only if this computer sits on a network that hands
out public addresses to your own devices and you would rather not
list them.
'';
};
directPort = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.bool;
default = !config.sovran_systemsOS.roles.desktop;
defaultText = lib.literalExpression "!config.sovran_systemsOS.roles.desktop";
description = ''
Open port 8937 on the firewall, so that other devices on the local
network can reach the Hub at http://sovransystemsos.local:8937.
On by default for Server + Desktop and Bitcoin Node Only. Off on
Desktop Only, the role most likely to be used away from home: there
nothing is published, and the Hub is reachable only from this
computer, through the desktop application window on localhost. Set it
to true in custom.nix if you do want to reach a Desktop Only Hub from
another device.
The Hub runs as root, so it checks every client itself (see
sovran_systemsOS.hub.lanOnly); the firewall opening only decides
whether a packet may reach it at all.
'';
};
extraLanNetworks = lib.mkOption {
type = lib.types.listOf lib.types.str;
default = [ ];
example = [ "203.0.113.0/28" ];
description = ''
Extra networks, in CIDR notation, that the Hub should treat as local
in addition to the built-in ranges. Needed only if devices on your
local network use addresses outside the private ranges, for example a
public IPv4 block your provider routes onto your LAN.
Keep each entry as narrow as you can: every address inside it is let
through. To let everything through, set sovran_systemsOS.hub.lanOnly
to false instead; 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 are not accepted here.
'';
};
};
# ── Web exposure (controls Caddy vhosts) ──────────────────
web = {
btcpayserver = lib.mkOption {
@@ -107,9 +168,11 @@
description = ''
Optional pin: force LiveKit to advertise this public IPv4 in its
host/TURN ICE candidates. Not required in normal operation — the
module auto-detects the public IP at runtime (HTTPS egress
detection, falling back to STUN). Set it only to override a
mis-detected address (e.g. multi-WAN/VPN setups).
address is the one Njal.la reports for the DDNS update (set up in
the Hub's Domains page), and nothing on this system looks it up
anywhere else. Set it for a fixed public address with no Njal.la
DDNS entry, or to override the reported one (e.g. multi-WAN/VPN
setups).
'';
};
};
modules/core/sovran-hub.nix
+42 -1
View File
@@ -115,6 +115,15 @@ let
else if cfg.roles.node then "node"
else "server_plus_desktop";
# IPv4 a.b.c.d[/0-32] or IPv6 [/0-128], and never a /0 (that is "everyone").
octet = "(25[0-5]|2[0-4][0-9]|1[0-9][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9])";
lanNetworkOk = p:
(
builtins.match "${octet}(\\.${octet}){3}(/(3[0-2]|[12]?[0-9]))?" p != null
|| builtins.match "[0-9a-fA-F:]*:[0-9a-fA-F:]*(/(12[0-8]|1[01][0-9]|[1-9]?[0-9]))?" p != null
)
&& builtins.match ".*/0" p == null;
generatedConfig = pkgs.writeText "sovran-hub-config.json"
(builtins.toJSON {
refresh_interval = 5;
@@ -122,6 +131,9 @@ let
role = activeRole;
services = monitoredServices;
feature_manager = true;
# Read by LanOnlyMiddleware in server.py.
lan_only = cfg.hub.lanOnly;
lan_extra_networks = cfg.hub.extraLanNetworks;
feature_states = {
bitcoin-tor-gossip = cfg.features.bitcoin-tor-gossip;
};
@@ -475,6 +487,12 @@ os.environ["SOVRAN_HUB_ICONS"] = os.path.join("$out", "share", "sovran-hub", "i
import uvicorn
uvicorn.run(
"sovran_systemsos_web.server:app",
# IPv4 only, on purpose. The desktop launcher uses "localhost", which
# falls back to 127.0.0.1, and other devices reach the Hub over IPv4 too.
# An IPv6 listener would admit clients whose global addresses the Hub's own
# check cannot tell from a stranger's (see LanPolicy). Which devices may
# connect is up to the firewall (hub.directPort) and that check
# (hub.lanOnly), not this bind.
host="0.0.0.0",
port=8937,
log_level="info",
@@ -503,6 +521,22 @@ in
};
config = {
# Catch a typo'd network at build time. The Hub ignores an entry it cannot
# parse (it must never widen its policy by guessing), so without this the
# only symptom would be a client that is refused for no visible reason.
assertions = [
{
assertion = builtins.all lanNetworkOk cfg.hub.extraLanNetworks;
message = ''
sovran_systemsOS.hub.extraLanNetworks must be a list of IPv4 or IPv6
networks in CIDR notation, for example [ "203.0.113.0/28" ]. A /0
prefix is not accepted; set sovran_systemsOS.hub.lanOnly = false to
let every client through. Got:
${builtins.toJSON cfg.hub.extraLanNetworks}
'';
}
];
systemd.services.sovran-hub-web = {
description = "Sovran_SystemsOS Hub Web Interface";
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
@@ -571,7 +605,14 @@ in
environment.systemPackages = [ sovran-hub-web ];
networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = [ 8937 60847 ];
# The Hub is served on its own port, not through Caddy (see caddy.nix).
# Nothing here filters by client address: that is the Hub's own check
# (sovran_systemsOS.hub.lanOnly), and which networks can route to this
# computer at all is the router's call.
# 60847 is where Caddy serves Mempool, so it is open only when Mempool is.
networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts =
lib.optionals cfg.hub.directPort [ 8937 ]
++ lib.optionals (cfg.services.bitcoin && cfg.features.mempool) [ 60847 ];
# ── Auto-launch Hub in browser on login ───────────────────────
environment.etc."xdg/autostart/sovran-hub-autolaunch.desktop".text = ''
modules/core/sshd-localhost.nix
+7
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,13 @@
services.openssh = {
enable = true;
# sshd listens on 127.0.0.1 only here, so there is nothing for the firewall
# to let in. NixOS opens sshd's ports by default (openFirewall = true)
# whether or not sshd listens on them, which left port 22 open on every
# role, Desktop Only included. The roles that do publish SSH open it
# themselves: the sshd feature (sshd.nix) and remote deploy
# (remote-deploy.nix) both add 22 explicitly.
openFirewall = lib.mkDefault false;
listenAddresses = lib.mkDefault [
{ addr = "127.0.0.1"; port = 22; }
];
modules/credentials.nix
+11 -8
View File
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ in
SECRET_FILE="/var/lib/secrets/root-password"
if [ ! -f "$SECRET_FILE" ]; then
mkdir -p /var/lib/secrets
# Generate a diceware-style passphrase: word-word-word-N
# Generate a diceware-style passphrase: word-word-word-word-NN
WORDS="apple barn brook cabin cedar cloud coral crane delta eagle ember \
fern field flame flora flint frost grove haven hedge holly heron \
jade juniper kelp larch lemon lilac linden loch lotus maple marsh \
@@ -106,8 +106,9 @@ in
W1=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
W2=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
W3=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
DIGIT=$((RANDOM % 10))
ROOT_PASS="$W1-$W2-$W3-$DIGIT"
W4=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
DIGIT=$(printf '%02d' $((RANDOM % 100)))
ROOT_PASS="$W1-$W2-$W3-$W4-$DIGIT"
echo "$ROOT_PASS" > "$SECRET_FILE"
chmod 600 "$SECRET_FILE"
fi
@@ -170,7 +171,7 @@ in
fi
mkdir -p /var/lib/secrets
# Generate a diceware-style passphrase: word-word-word-N
# Generate a diceware-style passphrase: word-word-word-word-NN
WORDS="apple barn brook cabin cedar cloud coral crane delta eagle ember \
fern field flame flora flint frost grove haven hedge holly heron \
jade juniper kelp larch lemon lilac linden loch lotus maple marsh \
@@ -185,8 +186,9 @@ in
W1=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
W2=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
W3=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
DIGIT=$((RANDOM % 10))
FREE_PASS="$W1-$W2-$W3-$DIGIT"
W4=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
DIGIT=$(printf '%02d' $((RANDOM % 100)))
FREE_PASS="$W1-$W2-$W3-$W4-$DIGIT"
echo "$FREE_PASS" > "$SECRET_FILE"
chmod 600 "$SECRET_FILE"
echo "free:$FREE_PASS" | chpasswd
@@ -229,8 +231,9 @@ in
W1=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
W2=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
W3=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
DIGIT=$((RANDOM % 10))
FREE_PASS="$W1-$W2-$W3-$DIGIT"
W4=''${WORD_ARRAY[$((RANDOM % COUNT))]}
DIGIT=$(printf '%02d' $((RANDOM % 100)))
FREE_PASS="$W1-$W2-$W3-$W4-$DIGIT"
printf '%s\n' "$FREE_PASS" > "$SECRET_FILE"
chmod 600 "$SECRET_FILE"
modules/element-calling.nix
+43 -39
View File
@@ -204,35 +204,37 @@ EOF
# NAT with port-forwarding. It does not need to be assigned to this box,
# and it may be dynamic.
#
# Reuse the shared detector (/var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py — see
# modules/core/public-ip.nix) instead of running our own: one script,
# one cache, privacy-first (STUN -> DNS -> opt-in HTTPS echo). Priority:
# Nothing here looks the address up. Priority:
# 1. sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP (explicit pin, if set)
# 2. /var/lib/secrets/external-ip (the shared cache)
# 3. run the detector now (it refreshes the cache)
# 4. STUN auto-detection (use_external_ip) as the fallback, with a
# warning — this is where broken installs used to silently end up
# advertising a private IP, causing "call connects but no video".
# 2. /var/lib/secrets/external-ip — the address Njal.la reported for the
# last DDNS update (modules/core/njalla.nix). The runner rewrites that
# file only when the address changes, and livekit-external-ip.path
# then re-runs this script.
# With neither, or with an address that is not public, this unit fails with
# a clear message instead of guessing: advertising a wrong or private
# address is what produces "call connects but no video".
EXTERNAL_IP='${if config.sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP != null then config.sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP else ""}'
PUBLIC_IP="$EXTERNAL_IP"
if [ -z "$PUBLIC_IP" ] && [ -f /var/lib/secrets/external-ip ]; then
PUBLIC_IP=$(tr -d '[:space:]' < /var/lib/secrets/external-ip 2>/dev/null)
fi
if [ -z "$PUBLIC_IP" ] && [ -x /var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py ]; then
PUBLIC_IP=$(python3 /var/lib/sovran/public-ip.py check 2>/dev/null | head -n1)
if [ -z "$PUBLIC_IP" ]; then
echo "ERROR: no public IP is known for LiveKit yet." >&2
echo "ERROR: It is recorded after the first successful Njal.la DDNS update (Hub, Domains)." >&2
echo "ERROR: To use a fixed address instead, set sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP." >&2
exit 1
fi
# Reject non-routable addresses (loopback, private, link-local, CGNAT).
# A detected/pinned address like this must never be advertised.
if [ -n "$PUBLIC_IP" ] && printf '%s' "$PUBLIC_IP" | grep -qE \
'^(0\.|127\.|10\.|100\.64\.|169\.254\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.)'; then
echo "WARNING: external IP '$PUBLIC_IP' is not routable; falling back to STUN auto-detection." >&2
PUBLIC_IP=""
if printf '%s' "$PUBLIC_IP" | grep -qE \
'^(0\.|127\.|10\.|100\.(6[4-9]|[7-9][0-9]|1[01][0-9]|12[0-7])\.|169\.254\.|172\.(1[6-9]|2[0-9]|3[01])\.|192\.168\.)'; then
echo "ERROR: $PUBLIC_IP is not a public address, so remote peers cannot reach LiveKit there." >&2
exit 1
fi
if [ -n "$PUBLIC_IP" ]; then
cat > /run/livekit/livekit.yaml <<EOF
cat > /run/livekit/livekit.yaml <<EOF
port: 7880
rtc:
use_external_ip: false
@@ -244,22 +246,7 @@ rtc:
includes:
- $IFACE
EOF
echo "LiveKit will advertise public IP: $PUBLIC_IP"
else
cat > /run/livekit/livekit.yaml <<EOF
port: 7880
rtc:
use_external_ip: true
skip_external_ip_validation: true
advertise_internal_ip: true
tcp_port: 7881
udp_port: 7882
interfaces:
includes:
- $IFACE
EOF
echo "WARNING: could not determine a public IP for LiveKit; using STUN auto-detection. If calls connect without media, check STUN egress or set sovran_systemsOS.elementCalling.externalIP." >&2
fi
echo "LiveKit will advertise public IP: $PUBLIC_IP"
# Webhooks → lk-jwt-service. The JWT service validates the HMAC
# signature against the same key file it issues tokens with, and uses
@@ -414,15 +401,32 @@ EOF
# Restart LiveKit / lk-jwt-service when a rebuild regenerates their runtime
# configs (new domains, externalIP, full-access list), mirroring the domain
# change flow.
# Re-run the config generator and restart LiveKit when a rebuild regenerates
# the runtime config, or when the Hub persists a new external IP (dynamic
# WAN IPs), so the advertised ICE candidate stays current without a manual
# restart. The trigger chain: external-ip change → livekit-turn-setup
# re-runs → rewrites livekit.yaml → livekit restarts with the new config.
systemd.services.livekit-turn-setup.restartTriggers = [ "/var/lib/secrets/external-ip" ];
systemd.services.livekit.restartTriggers = [ "/run/livekit/livekit.yaml" ];
systemd.services.lk-jwt-service.restartTriggers = [ "/run/lk-jwt-service/env" ];
# Follow a changing public IP. ddns-update.py rewrites
# /var/lib/secrets/external-ip only when Njal.la reports a different address;
# this path unit then re-runs livekit-turn-setup (new node_ip and TURN
# address) and starts LiveKit if it is not running, e.g. because no address
# was known yet at boot. restartTriggers cannot do this: it is evaluated when
# the system is built, so it cannot watch a file that changes at runtime.
systemd.paths.livekit-external-ip = {
description = "Watch the public IP recorded by the Njal.la DDNS runner";
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
pathConfig.PathChanged = "/var/lib/secrets/external-ip";
};
systemd.services.livekit-external-ip = {
description = "Re-run LiveKit setup for a changed public IP";
serviceConfig.Type = "oneshot";
unitConfig.ConditionPathExists = "/var/lib/domains/element-calling";
script = ''
# livekit.service requires livekit-turn-setup, so it restarts with it.
systemctl restart livekit-turn-setup.service
# No-op if LiveKit is already running; starts it after an earlier failure.
systemctl start livekit.service
'';
};
####### PUBLIC REACHABILITY SELF-CHECK #######
# Diagnostic only — never a hard dependency of livekit/caddy. Catches the
# classic "call connects but no media" setup errors at boot instead of at
modules/modules.nix
-1
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,6 @@
./core/no-sleep.nix
./core/cpu-performance.nix
./core/local-domain-loopback.nix
./core/public-ip.nix
# ── Always on (no flag) ───────────────────────────────────
./php.nix
modules/nextcloud.nix
+112 -3
View File
@@ -3,10 +3,22 @@
lib.mkIf config.sovran_systemsOS.services.nextcloud {
# ── PostgreSQL database ───────────────────────────────────
# Cluster-wide tuning (shared_buffers, autovacuum) lives in
# configuration.nix so it is shared with Matrix Synapse.
services.postgresql = {
enable = true;
};
# ── Redis for Nextcloud distributed cache + file locking ───
# Nextcloud does not recommend APCu for memcache.locking in production.
# TCP on localhost avoids unix-socket permission juggling with the caddy user.
# Scoped to Nextcloud only — Synapse / MariaDB / Bitcoin are unaffected.
services.redis.servers.nextcloud = {
enable = true;
bind = "127.0.0.1";
port = 6379;
};
# ── Auto-generate DB password and initialize ──────────────
systemd.services.nextcloud-db-init = {
description = "Initialize Nextcloud PostgreSQL database with auto-generated password";
@@ -47,14 +59,20 @@ lib.mkIf config.sovran_systemsOS.services.nextcloud {
if ! psql -U postgres -lqt | cut -d \| -f 1 | grep -qw "nextclouddb"; then
psql -U postgres -c "CREATE DATABASE nextclouddb WITH OWNER ncusr TEMPLATE template0 LC_COLLATE = 'C' LC_CTYPE = 'C';"
fi
# NOTE: autovacuum GUCs are SIGHUP-context, so they cannot be set
# per-database — ALTER DATABASE ... SET rejects them with
# 'parameter "..." cannot be changed now'. They are set
# cluster-wide in configuration.nix instead, which already covers
# both nextclouddb and matrix-synapse.
'';
};
# ── Fully automated Nextcloud setup ───────────────────────
systemd.services.nextcloud-init = {
description = "Download, extract, and fully configure Nextcloud";
after = [ "network-online.target" "postgresql.service" "phpfpm-nextcloud.service" "nextcloud-db-init.service" ];
wants = [ "network-online.target" ];
after = [ "network-online.target" "postgresql.service" "phpfpm-nextcloud.service" "nextcloud-db-init.service" "redis-nextcloud.service" ];
wants = [ "network-online.target" "redis-nextcloud.service" ];
requires = [ "postgresql.service" "nextcloud-db-init.service" ];
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
@@ -150,7 +168,11 @@ lib.mkIf config.sovran_systemsOS.services.nextcloud {
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set default_phone_region --value='US'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set maintenance_window_start --type=integer --value=1
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set memcache.local --value='\OC\Memcache\APCu'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set memcache.locking --value='\OC\Memcache\APCu'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set memcache.distributed --value='\OC\Memcache\Redis'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set memcache.locking --value='\OC\Memcache\Redis'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set redis host --value='127.0.0.1'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set redis port --type=integer --value=6379
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set redis timeout --value='1.5'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set server_id --value='$SERVER_ID'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ background:cron
"
@@ -247,6 +269,93 @@ CREDS
'';
};
# ── Migrate existing installs to Redis locking ────────────
# nextcloud-init only runs on fresh installs (ConditionPathExists
# !config.php), so pre-existing / pre-Sovran installs would keep
# APCu locking forever. This one-shot is idempotent and safe to
# re-run on every boot — occ just overwrites the same values.
systemd.services.nextcloud-redis-migrate = {
description = "Point existing Nextcloud installs at Redis locking";
after = [ "postgresql.service" "redis-nextcloud.service" "phpfpm-nextcloud.service" ];
wants = [ "redis-nextcloud.service" ];
wantedBy = [ "multi-user.target" ];
unitConfig = {
ConditionPathExists = [
"/var/lib/www/nextcloud/occ"
"/var/lib/www/nextcloud/config/config.php"
];
};
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
RemainAfterExit = true;
};
path = with pkgs; [ coreutils shadow ];
script = ''
set -euo pipefail
INSTALL_DIR="/var/lib/www/nextcloud"
# Wait briefly for Redis (TCP localhost:6379).
for i in $(seq 1 15); do
if (echo > /dev/tcp/127.0.0.1/6379) >/dev/null 2>&1; then
break
fi
sleep 2
done
/run/wrappers/bin/su -s /bin/sh caddy -c "
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set memcache.local --value='\OC\Memcache\APCu'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set memcache.distributed --value='\OC\Memcache\Redis'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set memcache.locking --value='\OC\Memcache\Redis'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set redis host --value='127.0.0.1'
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set redis port --type=integer --value=6379
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ config:system:set redis timeout --value='1.5'
"
'';
};
# ── Recurring DB maintenance (Nextcloud 35 checks) ───────────
# nextcloud-init runs db:add-missing-indices exactly once. Upgrades
# (e.g. to NC35) and later app installs (Mail, Guests) add tables
# like oc_mail_tags / oc_guests_users that then seq-scan forever.
# Weekly: VACUUM ANALYZE (dead tuples) + backfill missing indices.
# Scoped to nextclouddb only — matrix-synapse is untouched.
systemd.services.nextcloud-db-maintenance = {
description = "Nextcloud DB maintenance: VACUUM + missing indices";
after = [ "postgresql.service" "redis-nextcloud.service" "phpfpm-nextcloud.service" ];
wants = [ "postgresql.service" ];
unitConfig = {
ConditionPathExists = [
"/var/lib/www/nextcloud/occ"
"/var/lib/www/nextcloud/config/config.php"
];
};
serviceConfig = {
Type = "oneshot";
};
path = [ config.services.postgresql.package pkgs.coreutils pkgs.shadow ];
script = ''
set -euo pipefail
INSTALL_DIR="/var/lib/www/nextcloud"
echo "Vacuuming nextclouddb..."
psql -U postgres -d nextclouddb -c "VACUUM (ANALYZE);"
echo "Backfilling Nextcloud indices..."
/run/wrappers/bin/su -s /bin/sh caddy -c "
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ db:add-missing-indices
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ db:add-missing-columns
php $INSTALL_DIR/occ db:add-missing-primary-keys
"
echo "Nextcloud DB maintenance complete."
'';
};
systemd.timers.nextcloud-db-maintenance = {
description = "Weekly Nextcloud DB maintenance";
wantedBy = [ "timers.target" ];
timerConfig = {
OnCalendar = "Sun 03:30";
Persistent = true;
RandomizedDelaySec = "30m";
};
};
services.cron.systemCronJobs = [
"*/5 * * * * caddy /run/current-system/sw/bin/php -f /var/lib/www/nextcloud/cron.php"
];
modules/php.nix
+59 -17
View File
@@ -1,29 +1,70 @@
{ config, pkgs, lib, ... }:
# ── Shared PHP for Nextcloud + WordPress ──────────────────────────────────────
#
# One interpreter (with one extension set and one php.ini) is shared by the
# phpfpm-nextcloud and phpfpm-wordpress pools, the Nextcloud cron job and the
# occ / wp-cli helper scripts. Every consumer must reference
# config.sovran_systemsOS.phpPackage (or /run/current-system/sw/bin/php) so
# that the CLI and the FPM pools always run the *same* PHP.
#
# Version policy (September 2026):
# • Nextcloud 35 supports PHP 8.3 / 8.4 / 8.5 and recommends 8.5. Its setup
# check flags 8.3 as "deprecated since Nextcloud 35" and warns that
# Nextcloud 36 may require at least 8.4.
# • WordPress 6.9 / 7.0 fully support PHP 8.4 and 8.5.
# • PHP 8.3 has been security-only since 2025-12-31; PHP 8.4 leaves active
# support on 2026-12-31; PHP 8.5 is actively supported until 2027-12-31.
#
# To fall back to PHP 8.4 (nixpkgs' current default `pkgs.php`) change only
# the `phpBase` line below.
let
phpBase = pkgs.php85;
custom-php = phpBase.buildEnv {
# `enabled` is nixpkgs' default extension set. It already contains every
# module Nextcloud lists as required or recommended (ctype, curl, dom,
# fileinfo, gd, intl, mbstring, openssl, posix, session, simplexml,
# xmlreader, xmlwriter, zip, zlib, pdo_pgsql, pdo_mysql, bcmath, gmp,
# exif, sodium, sysvsem, pcntl, ...). OPcache is compiled into PHP >= 8.5
# and no longer appears as a separate extension.
extensions = { enabled, all }: enabled ++ (with all; [
bz2 # Nextcloud: bz2 archive support
apcu # Nextcloud: memcache.local (apc.enable_cli=1 below is mandatory for occ + cron)
redis # Nextcloud: memcache.distributed / file locking once a Redis server is configured
imagick # Nextcloud: previews + theming (nixpkgs ImageMagick is built with SVG support)
memcached # WordPress object-cache plugins (legacy option for Nextcloud)
]);
custom-php = pkgs.php83.buildEnv {
extensions = { enabled, all }: enabled ++ (with all; [ bz2 apcu redis imagick memcached ]);
extraConfig = ''
display_errors = On
display_startup_errors = On
; ── Error handling (production) ─────────────────────────────────
display_errors = Off
display_startup_errors = Off
log_errors = On
; ── Limits ──────────────────────────────────────────────────────
max_execution_time = 10000
max_input_time = 3000
memory_limit = 1G;
opcache.enable=1;
opcache.memory_consumption=512;
opcache_revalidate_freq = 240;
opcache.max_accelerated_files=20000;
memory_limit = 1G
post_max_size = 3G
upload_max_filesize = 3G
apc.enable_cli=1
; ── OPcache (Nextcloud "Server tuning" recommendations) ─────────
opcache.enable = 1
opcache.memory_consumption = 512
opcache.interned_strings_buffer = 192
redis.session.locking_enabled=1
redis.session.lock_retries=-1
redis.session.lock_wait_time=10000
opcache.max_accelerated_files = 20000
opcache.revalidate_freq = 240
opcache.save_comments = 1
; ── APCu ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
apc.enable_cli = 1
; ── phpredis session locking (only used with session.save_handler = redis)
redis.session.locking_enabled = 1
redis.session.lock_retries = -1
redis.session.lock_wait_time = 10000
'';
};
in
@@ -46,12 +87,13 @@ in
};
users.users.php.group = "php";
users.groups.php = {};
environment.systemPackages = with pkgs; [
custom-php
];
};
}
modules/sovran-bitcoin-integration.nix
+4 -2
View File
@@ -105,9 +105,11 @@ in {
'';
};
# ── 5. Firewall — Hub management port ──────────────────────────
# ── 5. Firewall — RTL ──────────────────────────────────────────
# RTL is a web app served by Caddy over TCP on 3051. The matching UDP rule
# that used to sit here was carried over from the TCP line and opened a port
# nothing listens on.
networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts = lib.mkIf cfg.services.bitcoin [ 3051 ];
networking.firewall.allowedUDPPorts = lib.mkIf cfg.services.bitcoin [ 3051 ];
# ── 6. NWC / LNURL — Sovran Hub integration ───────────────────
# Sovran_Bitcoin's albyhub.nix and lnurl.nix handle the base services.
modules/synapse.nix
+33
View File
@@ -94,16 +94,23 @@ EOF
# ── Synapse service ─────────────────────────────────────────
services.matrix-synapse = {
enable = true;
# cache-memory provides cache-size statistics for the autotuning below
# (in addition to the NixOS defaults).
extras = [ "systemd" "postgres" "url-preview" "cache-memory" ];
extraConfigFiles = [
"/run/matrix-synapse/runtime-config.yaml"
];
settings = {
database = {
name = "psycopg2";
# Recycle pooled connections less often (fewer reconnects).
txn_limit = 10000;
args = {
host = "localhost";
database = "matrix-synapse";
user = "matrix-synapse";
cp_min = 5;
cp_max = 15;
};
};
push.include_content = false;
@@ -120,6 +127,32 @@ EOF
];
presence.enabled = true;
enable_registration = false;
# ── Performance (32 GB Server + Desktop) ─────────────────
# Synapse trades RAM for fewer Postgres round-trips; most RAM goes
# to caches. Stock is global_factor 0.5 + 10K event cache, which
# leaves syncs hitting the database on every request.
# Deliberately unchanged: presence and URL previews stay enabled —
# disabling them is faster but changes user-visible behavior.
event_cache_size = "100K";
caches = {
global_factor = 4.0;
expire_caches = true;
cache_entry_ttl = "30m";
sync_response_cache_duration = "2m";
cache_autotuning = {
max_cache_memory_usage = "2G";
target_cache_memory_usage = "1G";
min_cache_ttl = "30s";
};
per_cache_factors = {
# Hot paths for /sync and room joins.
get_users_in_room = 3.0;
get_current_state_ids = 3.0;
get_unread_event_push_actions_by_room_for_user = 5.0;
};
};
# Fewer GC pauses at the cost of a little more memory.
gc_thresholds = [ 1500 20 10 ];
listeners = [
{
port = 8008;
tests/test_ddns_update.py
+249
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,249 @@
"""Tests for the DDNS runner (sovran_systemsos_web.ddns_update).
The runner asks Njal.la to use the address the request came from ("&auto"),
reads back the address Njal.la recorded and saves it for LiveKit and the Hub.
Tests must never:
- access the network (curl is replaced by a fake ``run``)
- write to system paths (the URL and IP files live in a temp dir)
"""
import contextlib
import io
import json
import os
import subprocess
import sys
import tempfile
import unittest
from unittest import mock
_REPO_ROOT = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
_APP_PARENT = os.path.join(_REPO_ROOT, "app")
if _APP_PARENT not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, _APP_PARENT)
from sovran_systemsos_web import ddns_update as d # noqa: E402
KEY = "SECRETKEY123"
AUTO_URL = f"https://njal.la/update/?h=sub.example.com&k={KEY}&auto"
LEGACY_URL = f"https://njal.la/update/?h=sub.example.com&k={KEY}&a=${{IP}}"
PUBLIC_IP = "93.184.216.34"
OTHER_IP = "8.8.4.4"
def reply(ip=PUBLIC_IP, status=200):
return json.dumps({"status": status, "message": "record updated", "value": {"A": ip}})
class FakeRun:
"""Stands in for subprocess.run; records every command it is given."""
def __init__(self, stdout=None, returncode=0, raises=None):
self.stdout = reply() if stdout is None else stdout
self.returncode = returncode
self.raises = raises
self.calls = []
def __call__(self, cmd, **kwargs):
self.calls.append(cmd)
if self.raises:
raise self.raises
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(cmd, self.returncode, stdout=self.stdout, stderr="")
class NormaliseUrlTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_legacy_placeholder_becomes_auto(self):
self.assertEqual(d.normalise_url(LEGACY_URL), AUTO_URL)
def test_quiet_is_dropped_so_the_reply_can_be_read(self):
self.assertEqual(d.normalise_url(AUTO_URL + "&quiet"), AUTO_URL)
def test_plain_auto_is_unchanged(self):
self.assertEqual(d.normalise_url(AUTO_URL), AUTO_URL)
def test_explicit_address_is_unchanged(self):
url = "https://njal.la/update/?h=a.example.com&k=K&a=93.184.216.34"
self.assertEqual(d.normalise_url(url), url)
class IsPublicIpv4Tests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_public_addresses(self):
for ip in ("93.184.216.34", "8.8.8.8", " 1.1.1.1\n"):
self.assertTrue(d.is_public_ipv4(ip), ip)
def test_everything_else_is_rejected(self):
for ip in ("10.0.0.1", "192.168.1.5", "172.16.0.9", "127.0.0.1", "169.254.1.1",
"100.64.0.1", "0.0.0.0", "224.0.0.1", "::1", "2001:4860:4860::8888",
"not-an-ip", "", None):
self.assertFalse(d.is_public_ipv4(ip), ip)
class ParseReplyTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_success_returns_the_recorded_address(self):
self.assertEqual(d.parse_reply(reply()), PUBLIC_IP)
def test_status_may_be_a_string(self):
self.assertEqual(d.parse_reply(reply(status="200")), PUBLIC_IP)
def test_error_status_is_rejected(self):
body = json.dumps({"status": 401, "message": "invalid host or key"})
self.assertIsNone(d.parse_reply(body))
def test_garbage_is_rejected(self):
for body in ("", "not json", "[]", "null", "{}", json.dumps({"status": 200})):
self.assertIsNone(d.parse_reply(body), body)
def test_non_public_or_non_ipv4_address_is_rejected(self):
for ip in ("10.1.2.3", "100.64.9.9", "127.0.0.1", "::1", "2001:4860:4860::8888", "x"):
self.assertIsNone(d.parse_reply(reply(ip)), ip)
class IpFileTests(unittest.TestCase):
def test_write_then_read(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
path = os.path.join(tmp, "secrets", "external-ip")
d.write_ip_file(PUBLIC_IP, path)
self.assertEqual(d.read_ip_file(path), PUBLIC_IP)
self.assertEqual(open(path).read(), PUBLIC_IP) # no trailing newline
self.assertEqual(os.stat(path).st_mode & 0o777, 0o644)
def test_replace_is_atomic_and_leaves_no_temp_files(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
path = os.path.join(tmp, "external-ip")
d.write_ip_file(PUBLIC_IP, path)
d.write_ip_file(OTHER_IP, path)
self.assertEqual(d.read_ip_file(path), OTHER_IP)
self.assertEqual(os.listdir(tmp), ["external-ip"])
def test_missing_file_reads_as_none(self):
with tempfile.TemporaryDirectory() as tmp:
self.assertIsNone(d.read_ip_file(os.path.join(tmp, "nope")))
class UpdateAllTests(unittest.TestCase):
def run_update(self, urls, fake):
out = io.StringIO()
with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out):
result = d.update_all(urls, run=fake)
return result, out.getvalue()
def test_curl_is_called_directly_with_ipv4_and_no_redirects(self):
fake = FakeRun()
result, _ = self.run_update([AUTO_URL], fake)
self.assertEqual(result, PUBLIC_IP)
self.assertEqual(len(fake.calls), 1)
cmd = fake.calls[0]
self.assertEqual(cmd[0], "curl")
for flag in ("--ipv4", "--no-location", "--fail", "--silent"):
self.assertIn(flag, cmd)
self.assertEqual(cmd[-1], AUTO_URL)
def test_legacy_entry_and_its_auto_twin_are_one_call(self):
fake = FakeRun()
self.run_update([LEGACY_URL, AUTO_URL], fake)
self.assertEqual(fake.calls[0][-1], AUTO_URL)
self.assertEqual(len(fake.calls), 1)
def test_url_for_another_host_is_never_called(self):
fake = FakeRun()
result, _ = self.run_update([f"https://evil.example/update/?h=x&k={KEY}&auto"], fake)
self.assertIsNone(result)
self.assertEqual(fake.calls, [])
def test_failed_curl_yields_nothing(self):
result, _ = self.run_update([AUTO_URL], FakeRun(returncode=22))
self.assertIsNone(result)
def test_reply_without_an_address_yields_nothing(self):
result, _ = self.run_update([AUTO_URL], FakeRun(stdout=json.dumps({"status": 200})))
self.assertIsNone(result)
def test_missing_curl_is_survived(self):
result, out = self.run_update([AUTO_URL], FakeRun(raises=FileNotFoundError("curl")))
self.assertIsNone(result)
self.assertIn("skipped", out)
def test_first_reported_address_wins(self):
calls = iter([reply(PUBLIC_IP), reply(OTHER_IP)])
def fake(cmd, **kwargs):
return subprocess.CompletedProcess(cmd, 0, stdout=next(calls), stderr="")
other = f"https://njal.la/update/?h=other.example.com&k={KEY}&auto"
out = io.StringIO()
with contextlib.redirect_stdout(out):
result = d.update_all([AUTO_URL, other], run=fake)
self.assertEqual(result, PUBLIC_IP)
def test_the_key_is_never_printed(self):
for fake in (FakeRun(), FakeRun(returncode=22), FakeRun(stdout="junk"),
FakeRun(raises=FileNotFoundError("curl"))):
_, out = self.run_update([AUTO_URL, LEGACY_URL], fake)
self.assertNotIn(KEY, out)
class MainTests(unittest.TestCase):
def setUp(self):
self.tmp = tempfile.TemporaryDirectory()
self.addCleanup(self.tmp.cleanup)
self.urls_file = os.path.join(self.tmp.name, "ddns_urls.json")
self.ip_file = os.path.join(self.tmp.name, "secrets", "external-ip")
for patch in (mock.patch.object(d, "URLS_FILE", self.urls_file),
mock.patch.object(d, "IP_FILE", self.ip_file)):
patch.start()
self.addCleanup(patch.stop)
def store(self, urls):
with open(self.urls_file, "w") as f:
json.dump(urls, f)
def main(self, fake):
out = io.StringIO()
with mock.patch.object(d.subprocess, "run", fake), contextlib.redirect_stdout(out):
code = d.main()
self.assertEqual(code, 0)
return out.getvalue()
def test_first_update_records_the_address(self):
self.store([LEGACY_URL])
out = self.main(FakeRun())
self.assertEqual(d.read_ip_file(self.ip_file), PUBLIC_IP)
self.assertIn("now " + PUBLIC_IP, out)
self.assertNotIn(KEY, out)
def test_unchanged_address_does_not_touch_the_file(self):
# A path unit restarts LiveKit whenever the file is written, so an
# unchanged address must not rewrite it.
self.store([AUTO_URL])
self.main(FakeRun())
before = os.stat(self.ip_file)
out = self.main(FakeRun())
after = os.stat(self.ip_file)
self.assertEqual((before.st_ino, before.st_mtime_ns), (after.st_ino, after.st_mtime_ns))
self.assertIn("unchanged", out)
def test_changed_address_is_recorded(self):
self.store([AUTO_URL])
self.main(FakeRun(stdout=reply(PUBLIC_IP)))
out = self.main(FakeRun(stdout=reply(OTHER_IP)))
self.assertEqual(d.read_ip_file(self.ip_file), OTHER_IP)
self.assertIn(f"now {OTHER_IP} (was {PUBLIC_IP})", out)
def test_failed_update_keeps_the_last_known_address(self):
self.store([AUTO_URL])
self.main(FakeRun(stdout=reply(PUBLIC_IP)))
self.main(FakeRun(returncode=7))
self.assertEqual(d.read_ip_file(self.ip_file), PUBLIC_IP)
def test_nothing_configured_does_nothing(self):
fake = FakeRun()
self.main(fake) # no URL file at all
self.store([])
self.main(fake) # empty list
self.assertEqual(fake.calls, [])
self.assertFalse(os.path.exists(self.ip_file))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/test_exposure_guards.py
+68
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
"""Guards for the home-IP warnings.
Server + Desktop publishes the home IP address (the domain points at it), so every
place that offers Server + Desktop must say so, and the README section they point
at must exist.
These read the shipped source files like the nix-file checks in test_security.py:
nothing is run and nothing touches the network.
"""
import os
import re
import unittest
_ROOT = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
_PHRASE = "home ip address"
def _read(*parts):
with open(os.path.join(_ROOT, *parts), encoding="utf-8") as f:
return f.read()
def _github_slug(heading):
slug = re.sub(r"[^\w\- ]", "", heading.strip().lower())
return slug.replace(" ", "-")
class HomeIpWarnings(unittest.TestCase):
def test_installer_role_card(self):
src = _read("iso", "installer.py")
card = re.search(r'\("Server \+ Desktop",\s*"((?:[^"\\]|\\.)*)"', src, re.S)
self.assertIsNotNone(card, "Server + Desktop role card not found")
self.assertIn(_PHRASE, card.group(1).lower())
def test_hub_domain_setup_text(self):
# domain-prereqs.js is the single source for onboarding, feature setup
# and domain reconfiguration; the notice must follow every variant.
js = _read("app", "sovran_systemsos_web", "static", "js", "domain-prereqs.js")
body = js[js.index("function renderDomainNeedsHtml"):]
body = body[:body.index("\n}\n")]
self.assertIn(_PHRASE, body.lower())
self.assertGreater(body.lower().index(_PHRASE), body.rindex("} else {"),
"the notice must come after the last variant, not inside one")
def test_hub_upgrade_dialog(self):
html = _read("app", "sovran_systemsos_web", "templates", "index.html")
dialog = html[html.index('id="upgrade-modal"'):html.index("Security Reset overlay")]
self.assertIn(_PHRASE, " ".join(dialog.lower().split()))
def test_readme_and_security_policy(self):
self.assertIn(_PHRASE, _read("README.md").lower())
self.assertIn(_PHRASE, " ".join(_read("SECURITY.md").lower().split()))
def test_links_to_the_readme_section_resolve(self):
readme = _read("README.md")
slugs = {_github_slug(m.group(2))
for m in re.finditer(r"^(#{1,6})\s+(.+?)\s*$", readme, re.M)}
links = re.findall(r"\]\(#(server--desktop[^)]*)\)", readme)
links += re.findall(r"README\.md#(server--desktop[^)\s]*)", _read("SECURITY.md"))
self.assertTrue(links, "expected links to the home-IP section")
for anchor in links:
self.assertIn(anchor, slugs)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/test_hub_direct.py
+193
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
"""Guards for serving the Hub on its own port instead of through Caddy.
The Hub is the one service that runs as root. It listens on 0.0.0.0:8937
itself, so Caddy adds nothing it needs: not TLS (the site was plain http), not
authentication, not cache headers (the app sets its own). What it did add was a
second door: with ports 80/443 forwarded for public services, a Host header on
those ports reached the Hub. The Hub is therefore served on port 8937 only, and
Caddy keeps the two services it is actually needed for, because they listen on
loopback only: Ride The Lightning (:3051) and Mempool (:60847).
Like the other nix-file checks these read the modules as text: nothing is run
and nothing touches the network.
"""
import os
import re
import unittest
_ROOT = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
def _read(*parts):
with open(os.path.join(_ROOT, *parts), encoding="utf-8") as f:
return f.read()
def _without_comments(src):
"""The Nix source with `#` comment lines removed."""
return "\n".join(l for l in src.splitlines() if not l.lstrip().startswith("#"))
def _binding(src, name):
"""The right-hand side of a top-level `name = ...;` binding in a let/attrset."""
m = re.search(r"^\s*" + re.escape(name) + r"\s*=\s*(?P<v>.*?);\s*$", src, re.M | re.S)
assert m, f"{name} not found"
return m.group("v")
class HubIsNotACaddySite(unittest.TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
cls.caddy = _read("modules", "core", "caddy.nix")
cls.code = _without_comments(cls.caddy)
def test_there_is_no_site_for_the_hub(self):
self.assertNotRegex(self.code, r"sovransystemsos\.local")
self.assertNotIn("8937", self.code)
def test_the_public_ports_still_belong_to_the_public_sites(self):
# Caddy now also runs to bridge RTL and Mempool (even on Node Only),
# which must not open 80/443 by itself: those follow the domain-based
# services and nothing else.
self.assertRegex(
self.code,
r"networking\.firewall\.allowedTCPPorts\s*=\s*lib\.mkIf\s+needsHttpsPorts\s*\[\s*80\s+443\s*\]",
)
class CaddyDoesNoAddressFiltering(unittest.TestCase):
"""Caddy is a bridge for RTL and Mempool and a TLS front for public sites.
It used to carry a client-address guard (sovran_lan_only). That guard was
never aimed at these two sites: the bug was a Host header on ports 80/443
reaching the Hub, and RTL and Mempool sit on ports of their own. It also
could not be made right for IPv6, where a laptop's global address on the
LAN is indistinguishable from a stranger's.
"""
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
cls.caddy = _read("modules", "core", "caddy.nix")
cls.code = _without_comments(cls.caddy)
def test_there_is_no_address_filter(self):
# (private_ranges is deliberately not on this list: the Nextcloud site
# uses it for trusted_proxies, which is not a filter on who may connect.)
for needle in ("sovran_lan_only", "remote_ip", "abort @"):
with self.subTest(needle=needle):
self.assertNotIn(needle, self.code)
def test_the_bitcoin_sites_are_plain_proxies(self):
for site, upstream in ((":3051", ":3050"), (":60847", ":60845")):
with self.subTest(site=site):
m = re.search(r"^" + re.escape(site) + r" \{\n(.*?)^\}$", self.code, re.S | re.M)
self.assertIsNotNone(m, f"{site} site not found")
directives = [l.strip() for l in m.group(1).splitlines() if l.strip()]
self.assertEqual(directives, [f"reverse_proxy {upstream}", "encode gzip zstd"])
def test_the_options_for_a_declared_prefix_are_gone(self):
# Never needed once Caddy stops guessing: neither the option nor its
# build-time assertion may linger half-wired.
roles = _read("modules", "core", "roles.nix")
self.assertNotIn("lanIPv6Prefixes", roles)
self.assertNotIn("lanIPv6Prefixes", self.caddy)
class CaddyRunsWhereItIsNeeded(unittest.TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
cls.caddy = _read("modules", "core", "caddy.nix")
cls.code = _without_comments(cls.caddy)
def test_it_runs_for_domains_vhosts_or_the_bitcoin_uis(self):
self.assertRegex(
self.code,
r"caddyEnabled\s*=\s*needsHttpsPorts\s*\|\|\s*extraVhosts\s*!=\s*\"\"\s*\|\|\s*servesRtl\s*;",
)
self.assertRegex(self.code, r"enable\s*=\s*caddyEnabled\s*;")
def test_rtl_and_mempool_follow_their_services(self):
self.assertRegex(self.code,
r"servesRtl\s*=\s*config\.sovran_systemsOS\.services\.bitcoin\s*;")
self.assertRegex(
self.code,
r"servesMempool\s*=\s*servesRtl\s*&&\s*config\.sovran_systemsOS\.features\.mempool\s*;",
)
def test_each_site_exists_only_where_its_service_does(self):
self.assertRegex(self.code, r"lib\.optionalString\s+servesRtl\s*''\s*\n+:3051 \{")
self.assertRegex(self.code, r"lib\.optionalString\s+servesMempool\s*''\s*\n+:60847 \{")
# ... and they are written into the Caddyfile from that one place
self.assertIn("${bitcoinUiSites}", self.caddy)
def test_rtl_and_mempool_still_proxy_to_their_loopback_ports(self):
self.assertRegex(self.code, r":3051 \{[^}]*reverse_proxy :3050")
self.assertRegex(self.code, r":60847 \{[^}]*reverse_proxy :60845")
class HubPortExposure(unittest.TestCase):
@classmethod
def setUpClass(cls):
cls.hub = _read("modules", "core", "sovran-hub.nix")
cls.roles = _read("modules", "core", "roles.nix")
def _firewall_value(self):
m = re.search(
r"^ networking\.firewall\.allowedTCPPorts =\s*(?P<value>.*?);\s*$",
self.hub, re.S | re.M,
)
self.assertIsNotNone(m, "networking.firewall.allowedTCPPorts not found")
return m.group("value")
def test_the_hub_port_is_never_opened_unconditionally(self):
# Regression: this used to be `allowedTCPPorts = [ 8937 60847 ]` with
# no mkIf and no option gate, on every role, Desktop Only included.
value = self._firewall_value()
self.assertNotRegex(value, r"^\s*\[")
self.assertRegex(value, r"lib\.optionals\s+cfg\.hub\.directPort\s+\[\s*8937\s*\]")
def test_the_mempool_port_follows_mempool(self):
self.assertRegex(
self._firewall_value(),
r"lib\.optionals\s+\(cfg\.services\.bitcoin\s*&&\s*cfg\.features\.mempool\)\s+\[\s*60847\s*\]",
)
def test_nothing_else_is_opened_here(self):
ports = re.findall(r"\[\s*(\d+)\s*\]", self._firewall_value())
self.assertEqual(sorted(ports), ["60847", "8937"])
def test_direct_port_is_on_for_the_server_roles_and_off_for_desktop_only(self):
m = re.search(r"directPort\s*=\s*lib\.mkOption\s*\{(.*?)\n \};", self.roles, re.S)
self.assertIsNotNone(m, "hub.directPort option not found")
self.assertRegex(m.group(1), r"default\s*=\s*!config\.sovran_systemsOS\.roles\.desktop\s*;")
def test_the_bind_is_ipv4_only_on_purpose(self):
# IPv6 clients cannot reach the Hub, so the question of which IPv6
# addresses are "local" never comes up. Widening the bind reopens it.
self.assertIn('host="0.0.0.0"', self.hub)
self.assertNotRegex(self.hub, r'host="::"')
self.assertNotRegex(self.hub, r"both IPv4 and IPv6")
class TheHubIsDocumentedAtItsPort(unittest.TestCase):
def test_no_document_still_sends_people_to_port_80(self):
for name in (("README.md",), ("SECURITY.md",),
("app", "sovran_systemsos_web", "templates", "index.html")):
with self.subTest(file=name[-1]):
text = _read(*name)
self.assertNotRegex(text, r"sovransystemsos\.local(?!:8937)(?![a-z])",
f"{name[-1]} sends people to sovransystemsos.local without :8937")
def test_the_documents_name_the_port(self):
self.assertIn("http://sovransystemsos.local:8937", _read("README.md"))
self.assertIn("http://sovransystemsos.local:8937", _read("SECURITY.md"))
self.assertIn("hub.directPort", _read("SECURITY.md"))
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/test_hub_lan_only.py
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"""Guards for the Hub checking its own clients.
The Hub runs as root. Whether a packet may reach its port is up to the firewall
and the router; the application adds a second lock by answering only this
computer and the local network. These read the modules as text, like the other
nix-file checks: nothing is run and nothing touches the network.
"""
import os
import re
import unittest
_ROOT = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
def _read(*parts):
with open(os.path.join(_ROOT, *parts), encoding="utf-8") as f:
return f.read()
def _option(src, name):
m = re.search(name + r"\s*=\s*lib\.mkOption\s*\{(.*?)\n \};", src, re.S)
return m.group(1) if m else None
class HubChecksItsOwnClients(unittest.TestCase):
def test_lan_only_option_exists_and_defaults_on(self):
body = _option(_read("modules", "core", "roles.nix"), "lanOnly")
self.assertIsNotNone(body, "hub.lanOnly option not found")
self.assertRegex(body, r"default\s*=\s*true")
def test_extra_networks_option_exists_and_defaults_empty(self):
body = _option(_read("modules", "core", "roles.nix"), "extraLanNetworks")
self.assertIsNotNone(body, "hub.extraLanNetworks option not found")
self.assertRegex(body, r"default\s*=\s*\[\s*\]")
def test_policy_is_baked_into_the_generated_config(self):
hub = _read("modules", "core", "sovran-hub.nix")
self.assertRegex(hub, r"lan_only\s*=\s*cfg\.hub\.lanOnly\s*;")
self.assertRegex(hub, r"lan_extra_networks\s*=\s*cfg\.hub\.extraLanNetworks\s*;")
def test_a_typo_is_caught_at_build_time(self):
hub = _read("modules", "core", "sovran-hub.nix")
self.assertIn("builtins.all lanNetworkOk cfg.hub.extraLanNetworks", hub)
def test_the_hub_enforces_it_in_its_own_middleware(self):
server = _read("app", "sovran_systemsos_web", "server.py")
self.assertIn("class LanOnlyMiddleware(BaseHTTPMiddleware)", server)
self.assertIn("app.add_middleware(LanOnlyMiddleware", server)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/test_lan_policy.py
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"""Tests for the Hub's local-network policy and the middleware that enforces it.
The Hub runs as root, so it answers this computer and the local network and
nobody else: LanPolicy in security_helpers decides, LanOnlyMiddleware in
server.py enforces it before authentication is considered.
LanPolicy is exercised directly. The middleware is exercised over real HTTP
where the environment allows it; server.py cannot be imported from this repo
(it needs sovran_nwc from the Sovran_Bitcoin flake), so those tests skip rather
than fail, and the wiring is additionally asserted from source so it is always
checked.
"""
import logging
import os
import sys
import unittest
_REPO_ROOT = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
_APP_PARENT = os.path.join(_REPO_ROOT, "app")
if _APP_PARENT not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, _APP_PARENT)
from sovran_systemsos_web.security_helpers import ( # noqa: E402
LanPolicy,
LAN_ONLY_IPV4,
LAN_ONLY_IPV6,
)
_LOCAL = (
"127.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1", "172.16.0.1", "172.31.255.254", "192.168.1.10",
"100.64.0.1", "169.254.1.1",
"::1", "fd12:3456::1", "fc00::1", "fe80::1",
)
_REMOTE = (
"8.8.8.8", "1.1.1.1", "203.0.113.9", "9.255.255.255",
"172.15.255.255", "172.32.0.1", "192.169.0.1", "100.63.255.255",
# public IPv6 — every address in 2000::/3 is on the internet
"2001:4860:4860::8888", "2606:4700:4700::1111",
"2a00:1450:4001::1", "2400:cb00::1",
)
class LanPolicyMatrix(unittest.TestCase):
def test_local_addresses_are_allowed(self):
policy = LanPolicy()
for address in _LOCAL:
with self.subTest(local=address):
self.assertTrue(policy.allows(address))
def test_remote_addresses_are_refused(self):
policy = LanPolicy()
for address in _REMOTE:
with self.subTest(remote=address):
self.assertFalse(policy.allows(address))
def test_ipv6_global_is_not_whitelisted(self):
# 2000::/3 is the whole IPv6 global unicast space: allowing it would
# let every public IPv6 address through.
joined = " ".join(LAN_ONLY_IPV4 + LAN_ONLY_IPV6)
self.assertNotIn("2000::/3", joined)
for net in LanPolicy().networks:
if net.version == 6:
with self.subTest(range=str(net)):
self.assertTrue(str(net).startswith(("::1", "fc00", "fe80")),
f"{net} is not a local-only IPv6 range")
class LanPolicyConfiguration(unittest.TestCase):
def test_declared_networks_are_allowed(self):
policy = LanPolicy(extra_networks=["203.0.113.0/28", "2001:db8:abcd::/48"])
self.assertTrue(policy.allows("203.0.113.9"))
self.assertFalse(policy.allows("203.0.113.16"))
self.assertTrue(policy.allows("2001:db8:abcd::5"))
self.assertFalse(policy.allows("2001:db8:abce::5"))
def test_a_bare_address_is_a_single_host(self):
policy = LanPolicy(extra_networks=["203.0.113.9"])
self.assertTrue(policy.allows("203.0.113.9"))
self.assertFalse(policy.allows("203.0.113.10"))
def test_disabled_allows_everything(self):
policy = LanPolicy(enabled=False)
for address in _REMOTE:
with self.subTest(remote=address):
self.assertTrue(policy.allows(address))
def test_malformed_network_does_not_widen_the_policy(self):
# A typo must fail closed, not open the Hub to everything.
policy = LanPolicy(extra_networks=["not-a-network", "203.0.113.0/28"])
self.assertTrue(policy.allows("203.0.113.9"))
self.assertFalse(policy.allows("8.8.8.8"))
def test_a_zero_length_prefix_is_not_a_network(self):
# 0.0.0.0/0 and ::/0 mean "everyone". That is lan_only = false and it
# has to be asked for by name rather than arrive as a "network".
policy = LanPolicy(extra_networks=["0.0.0.0/0", "::/0"])
for address in _REMOTE:
with self.subTest(remote=address):
self.assertFalse(policy.allows(address))
def test_missing_or_unparseable_client_is_refused(self):
policy = LanPolicy()
for address in (None, "", "testclient", "not-an-ip"):
with self.subTest(client=address):
self.assertFalse(policy.allows(address))
def test_a_dual_stack_socket_does_not_hide_the_ipv4_client(self):
# With an IPv6 listener, IPv4 clients arrive as ::ffff:a.b.c.d. The
# address that counts is the IPv4 one inside it, both ways round.
policy = LanPolicy()
for address in ("::ffff:192.168.1.5", "::ffff:127.0.0.1", "::ffff:10.1.2.3"):
with self.subTest(local=address):
self.assertTrue(policy.allows(address))
for address in ("::ffff:8.8.8.8", "::ffff:203.0.113.9"):
with self.subTest(remote=address):
self.assertFalse(policy.allows(address))
# ── Middleware ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
try:
from fastapi import FastAPI # noqa: E402
from fastapi.testclient import TestClient # noqa: E402
from sovran_systemsos_web.server import LanOnlyMiddleware # noqa: E402
HAVE_MIDDLEWARE = True
except Exception: # fastapi / sovran_nwc unavailable from this repo
HAVE_MIDDLEWARE = False
def _app_with(policy):
app = FastAPI()
@app.get("/ping")
async def ping():
return {"ok": True}
app.add_middleware(LanOnlyMiddleware, policy=policy)
return app
@unittest.skipUnless(HAVE_MIDDLEWARE, "server.py is not importable here")
class LanOnlyMiddlewareOverHttp(unittest.TestCase):
def _status(self, policy, client_ip):
client = TestClient(_app_with(policy), client=(client_ip, 51234))
return client.get("/ping").status_code
def test_local_client_is_served(self):
for address in ("127.0.0.1", "192.168.1.10", "10.0.0.1"):
with self.subTest(local=address):
self.assertEqual(self._status(LanPolicy(), address), 200)
def test_remote_client_is_refused(self):
for address in ("203.0.113.9", "8.8.8.8", "2001:4860:4860::8888"):
with self.subTest(remote=address):
self.assertEqual(self._status(LanPolicy(), address), 403)
def test_refusal_says_nothing_about_the_configuration(self):
# An outsider learns that the answer is no, not why or what to change.
client = TestClient(_app_with(LanPolicy()), client=("203.0.113.9", 51234))
response = client.get("/ping")
self.assertEqual(response.status_code, 403)
self.assertEqual(response.json(), {"detail": "Not available from this network"})
def test_disabled_policy_admits_remote_clients(self):
self.assertEqual(self._status(LanPolicy(enabled=False), "203.0.113.9"), 200)
def test_a_refused_address_is_logged_once(self):
# The operator whose own device is refused needs to find out why; a
# scanner must not be able to fill the journal.
client = TestClient(_app_with(LanPolicy()), client=("203.0.113.9", 51234))
with self.assertLogs("sovran_systemsos_web.server", level="WARNING") as seen:
for _ in range(5):
client.get("/ping")
self.assertEqual(len(seen.records), 1)
message = seen.records[0].getMessage()
self.assertIn("203.0.113.9", message)
self.assertIn("sovran_systemsOS.hub.extraLanNetworks", message)
def test_a_served_client_is_not_logged(self):
records = []
class _Collect(logging.Handler):
def emit(self, record):
records.append(record)
logger = logging.getLogger("sovran_systemsos_web.server")
handler = _Collect(level=logging.WARNING)
logger.addHandler(handler)
try:
client = TestClient(_app_with(LanPolicy()), client=("192.168.1.10", 51234))
client.get("/ping")
finally:
logger.removeHandler(handler)
self.assertEqual(records, [])
# ── Wiring, checked from source so it always runs ─────────────────────────────
def _server_source():
with open(os.path.join(_APP_PARENT, "sovran_systemsos_web", "server.py"),
encoding="utf-8") as f:
return f.read()
class LanOnlyWiring(unittest.TestCase):
def test_middleware_is_registered_outermost(self):
# Starlette makes the last-registered middleware the outermost one, so
# an off-network client is turned away before auth is considered.
src = _server_source()
auth = src.index("app.add_middleware(AuthMiddleware)")
nocache = src.index("app.add_middleware(NoCacheMiddleware)")
lan = src.index("app.add_middleware(LanOnlyMiddleware")
self.assertLess(auth, nocache)
self.assertLess(nocache, lan)
def test_policy_comes_from_the_generated_config(self):
src = _server_source()
self.assertIn("LanPolicy(", src)
self.assertIn('_hub_cfg.get("lan_only", True)', src)
self.assertIn('_hub_cfg.get("lan_extra_networks")', src)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/test_login_throttle.py
+196
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"""Tests for the Hub's login throttling.
These exercise the exact production implementation in
sovran_systemsos_web.security_helpers.LoginThrottle. The clock and the sleep are
injected, so the tests cover hours of lockout behaviour instantly.
No network access, no filesystem writes, no real delays.
"""
import os
import sys
import unittest
_REPO_ROOT = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
_APP_PARENT = os.path.join(_REPO_ROOT, "app")
if _APP_PARENT not in sys.path:
sys.path.insert(0, _APP_PARENT)
from sovran_systemsos_web.security_helpers import ( # noqa: E402
LoginThrottle,
LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY,
LOGIN_FAIL_MAX_DELAY,
LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW,
LOGIN_FAIL_MAX,
LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS,
)
class FakeClock:
"""A clock that only moves when the test says so."""
def __init__(self):
self.now = 1000.0
def __call__(self):
return self.now
def advance(self, seconds):
self.now += seconds
class FakeSleeper:
"""Records the delays it was asked to apply instead of sleeping."""
def __init__(self, clock):
self.clock = clock
self.calls = []
def __call__(self, seconds):
self.calls.append(seconds)
self.clock.advance(seconds)
def _make(**kwargs):
clock = kwargs.pop("clock", None) or FakeClock()
sleep = kwargs.pop("sleep", None) or FakeSleeper(clock)
return LoginThrottle(clock=clock, sleep=sleep, **kwargs), clock, sleep
def _trip(throttle, ip="203.0.113.9"):
"""Fail LOGIN_FAIL_MAX times. The fake sleeper advances the clock for us."""
for _ in range(LOGIN_FAIL_MAX):
throttle.record_failure(ip)
class DelayRamp(unittest.TestCase):
def test_delay_ramps_with_the_failure_count(self):
throttle, _, _ = _make()
self.assertEqual(throttle.delay_for(0), 0.0)
self.assertEqual(throttle.delay_for(1), LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY)
self.assertEqual(throttle.delay_for(3), LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY * 3)
def test_delay_is_capped(self):
# Unbounded ramping would let a single client park a thread-pool worker
# for minutes at a time.
throttle, _, _ = _make()
self.assertLessEqual(throttle.delay_for(999), LOGIN_FAIL_MAX_DELAY)
self.assertEqual(throttle.delay_for(999), LOGIN_FAIL_MAX_DELAY)
def test_first_failure_is_not_delayed_much(self):
throttle, _, sleep = _make()
delay = throttle.record_failure("203.0.113.9")
self.assertEqual(delay, LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY)
self.assertEqual(sleep.calls, [LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY])
class Lockout(unittest.TestCase):
def test_not_locked_out_initially(self):
throttle, _, _ = _make()
self.assertFalse(throttle.is_locked_out("203.0.113.9"))
self.assertEqual(throttle.remaining_lockout("203.0.113.9"), 0.0)
def test_reaching_the_limit_locks_the_address_out(self):
throttle, _, _ = _make()
_trip(throttle)
self.assertTrue(throttle.is_locked_out("203.0.113.9"))
def test_the_limit_is_reachable_inside_the_window(self):
# Regression guard for the old 60s window: with a ramping delay it
# takes ~80s to reach LOGIN_FAIL_MAX, so a 60s window expired the
# earliest failures first and the lockout could never fire.
throttle, clock, _ = _make()
start = clock.now
_trip(throttle)
self.assertLess(clock.now - start, LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW)
self.assertEqual(throttle.failure_count("203.0.113.9"), LOGIN_FAIL_MAX)
self.assertTrue(throttle.is_locked_out("203.0.113.9"))
def test_one_failure_short_of_the_limit_is_not_a_lockout(self):
throttle, _, _ = _make()
for _ in range(LOGIN_FAIL_MAX - 1):
throttle.record_failure("203.0.113.9")
self.assertFalse(throttle.is_locked_out("203.0.113.9"))
def test_lockout_expires(self):
throttle, clock, _ = _make()
_trip(throttle)
self.assertTrue(throttle.is_locked_out("203.0.113.9"))
clock.advance(LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS + 1)
self.assertFalse(throttle.is_locked_out("203.0.113.9"))
def test_remaining_lockout_counts_down(self):
throttle, clock, _ = _make()
_trip(throttle)
full = throttle.remaining_lockout("203.0.113.9")
# the final record_failure applied a delay, which the fake clock has
# already advanced, so what is left is the lockout minus that delay
self.assertAlmostEqual(full, LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS,
delta=LOGIN_FAIL_MAX_DELAY + 1.0)
clock.advance(full / 2)
self.assertLess(throttle.remaining_lockout("203.0.113.9"), full)
self.assertGreater(throttle.remaining_lockout("203.0.113.9"), 0.0)
def test_further_failures_while_locked_out_extend_it(self):
throttle, clock, _ = _make()
_trip(throttle)
clock.advance(LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS - 1)
throttle.record_failure("203.0.113.9")
self.assertTrue(throttle.is_locked_out("203.0.113.9"))
class Isolation(unittest.TestCase):
def test_one_address_does_not_lock_out_another(self):
throttle, _, _ = _make()
_trip(throttle, "203.0.113.9")
self.assertTrue(throttle.is_locked_out("203.0.113.9"))
self.assertFalse(throttle.is_locked_out("198.51.100.7"))
def test_successful_login_clears_the_address(self):
throttle, _, _ = _make()
for _ in range(LOGIN_FAIL_MAX - 1):
throttle.record_failure("203.0.113.9")
throttle.clear("203.0.113.9")
self.assertEqual(throttle.failure_count("203.0.113.9"), 0)
self.assertFalse(throttle.is_locked_out("203.0.113.9"))
def test_old_failures_age_out_of_the_window(self):
throttle, clock, _ = _make()
throttle.record_failure("203.0.113.9")
clock.advance(LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW + 1)
self.assertEqual(throttle.failure_count("203.0.113.9"), 0)
class BoundedMemory(unittest.TestCase):
def test_tracked_addresses_are_evicted(self):
throttle, clock, _ = _make(max_tracked_ips=8)
for i in range(64):
throttle.record_failure(f"198.51.100.{i}")
clock.advance(LOGIN_FAIL_WINDOW + LOGIN_LOCKOUT_SECONDS + 1)
throttle.record_failure("203.0.113.9")
self.assertLessEqual(throttle.tracked_addresses(), 8)
def test_sleep_is_never_called_under_the_lock(self):
# If the lock were held across the sleep, one slow client would stall
# every other login — a self-inflicted DoS.
throttle, clock, _ = _make()
order = []
def spy(seconds):
order.append("sleep:start")
clock.advance(seconds)
order.append("sleep:end")
throttle._sleep = spy
throttle.record_failure("203.0.113.9")
self.assertEqual(order, ["sleep:start", "sleep:end"])
# A second address can still be recorded while the first is "sleeping".
self.assertEqual(throttle.failure_count("198.51.100.7"), 0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()
tests/test_ssh_exposure.py
+64
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"""Guards for when port 22 is open in the firewall.
sshd-localhost.nix gives every role "ssh root@localhost" by listening on
127.0.0.1 only. NixOS opens sshd's ports in the firewall by default whether or
not sshd listens on them, which left port 22 open on every role, Desktop Only
included, with nothing behind it. The roles that really publish SSH open it
explicitly, so the default has to stay off.
Like the other nix-file checks these read the modules as text: nothing is run
and nothing touches the network.
"""
import os
import re
import unittest
_ROOT = os.path.normpath(os.path.join(os.path.dirname(__file__), ".."))
def _read(*parts):
with open(os.path.join(_ROOT, *parts), encoding="utf-8") as f:
return f.read()
def _without_comments(src):
return "\n".join(l for l in src.splitlines() if not l.lstrip().startswith("#"))
class LocalhostSshdDoesNotOpenThePort(unittest.TestCase):
def test_the_firewall_is_not_opened_by_default(self):
code = _without_comments(_read("modules", "core", "sshd-localhost.nix"))
self.assertRegex(code, r"openFirewall\s*=\s*lib\.mkDefault\s+false\s*;")
def test_it_still_listens_on_loopback_only(self):
code = _without_comments(_read("modules", "core", "sshd-localhost.nix"))
self.assertRegex(code, r'addr\s*=\s*"127\.0\.0\.1"')
self.assertNotIn("0.0.0.0", code)
class PublishedSshOpensItsOwnPort(unittest.TestCase):
"""Turning the default off must not close the roles that want SSH open."""
def test_the_sshd_feature_opens_22_and_only_when_enabled(self):
src = _without_comments(_read("modules", "sshd.nix"))
self.assertRegex(src, r"lib\.mkIf\s+config\.sovran_systemsOS\.features\.sshd")
self.assertRegex(src, r"networking\.firewall\.allowedTCPPorts\s*=\s*\[\s*22\s*\]")
def test_remote_deploy_opens_22_and_only_when_enabled(self):
src = _without_comments(_read("modules", "core", "remote-deploy.nix"))
self.assertRegex(src, r"lib\.mkIf\s+cfg\.enable")
self.assertRegex(src, r"networking\.firewall\.allowedTCPPorts\s*=\s*\[\s*22\s*\]")
class DesktopOnlyDocumentsWhatItOpens(unittest.TestCase):
def test_security_policy_says_desktop_opens_no_tcp_port(self):
text = " ".join(_read("SECURITY.md").split()) # the file is line-wrapped
self.assertIn("opens no TCP port", text)
self.assertIn("UDP 5353", text)
if __name__ == "__main__":
unittest.main()