Arena.ai Agent
c33457fff2
The Hub (sovransystemsos.local), Ride The Lightning (:3051) and Mempool (:60847) sites are meant for the home network. With ports 80/443 forwarded for public services, Caddy also receives requests from other clients, so these sites now check the client address as well as the Host header. A new snippet, sovran_lan_only, closes the connection unless the client is on this computer or the local network: private_ranges, 100.64.0.0/10 (Tailscale), 169.254.0.0/16, fe80::/10 and fc00::/7. IPv6 global addresses (2000::/3) are not filtered: computers on the network often connect over their own global address, which cannot be told apart from one on the internet by the address alone. Only the three local sites import the snippet; the domain sites for public services are unchanged. Clients with a public IPv4 address on the local network are no longer served on these sites. The Hub is still available on port 8937. Checked with Caddy 2.11.4 and the Caddyfile the generator writes: public IPv4 clients get the connection closed on all three sites, local clients are served, and the public domain sites answer as before. Add tests/test_caddy_lan_only.py and a note in SECURITY.md.
128 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
128 lines
5.5 KiB
Markdown
# Security Policy
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## Supported versions
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| Release | Supported |
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| Latest stable release | Yes |
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| `main` / `staging-dev` | Development only |
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| Older than `1.0.0` | No |
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Install the newest stable point release to receive security fixes.
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## Report a vulnerability
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**Do not open a public issue or pull request.** Report privately through:
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- [GitHub Private Vulnerability Reporting](https://github.com/naturallaw777/Sovran_SystemsOS/security/advisories/new)
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- Email: [support@sovransystems.com](mailto:support@sovransystems.com)
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Include the affected version, impact, reproduction steps, and a minimal proof of
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concept. Never send wallet recovery words, private keys, or live credentials.
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We aim to acknowledge reports within two business days. Please allow reasonable
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time for a fix and coordinated disclosure.
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## Security model
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### Local-first operation
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The Hub and core data run on operator-owned hardware. The Hub is intended for a
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trusted local network and must not be port-forwarded to the internet. Public
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services, DDNS, software updates, and optional third-party relays require
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external networks and are outside a “fully offline” model.
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The local Hub currently uses HTTP. Authentication does not encrypt local network
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traffic, so use a trusted LAN and avoid public or guest Wi-Fi.
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Caddy serves the Hub (`sovransystemsos.local`), Ride The Lightning (port 3051),
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and Mempool (port 60847) only to this computer and to clients on your local
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network (private, link-local, and VPN addresses), even when ports 80 and 443 are
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forwarded to this computer for public services. Other IPv4 clients get the
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connection closed. IPv6 global addresses are not filtered.
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### Public services and your home IP address
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Server + Desktop publishes services under your own domain. The Dynamic DNS
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record at Njal.la then points at your home's public IP address, which anyone
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can look up (domain privacy does not hide it), and ports 80 and 443 are open
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to the whole internet. Public HTTPS certificates also list your service
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hostnames in Certificate Transparency logs. Desktop publishes nothing. Node
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publishes nothing unless *Put BTCPay Server Online* or *Lightning Wallet
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Connections* is on. See
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[Server + Desktop and your home IP address](README.md#server--desktop-and-your-home-ip-address)
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for what this means and the alternatives.
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Sovran_SystemsOS does not ask a STUN server, public DNS resolver, or “what is
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my IP” service for your address. The DDNS update asks Njal.la to use the
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address the request came from, and the address Njal.la reports back is the one
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Element calling and the Hub use.
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### Bitcoin stack
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Bitcoin and Lightning modules are maintained in the standalone
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[Sovran_Bitcoin](https://github.com/naturallaw777/Sovran_Bitcoin) repository
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and consumed as a flake input. OS-specific customizations (Second_Drive paths,
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operator user, Hub integration) are bridged by
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`modules/sovran-bitcoin-integration.nix`. The `nix-bitcoin.*` option namespace
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and `/etc/nix-bitcoin-secrets` path remain only for upgrade compatibility.
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### Supply chain and integrity
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`flake.lock` pins flake inputs, and fetched source archives use fixed hashes.
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Builds still depend on pinned Nixpkgs, NixVim, btc-clients-nix, upstream source
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archives, and any configured binary cache. Keeping the Bitcoin modules in this
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repository reduces an external dependency; it does not remove supply-chain
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risk.
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The Hub integrity check verifies Nix store contents and compares the running
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system with a build from local `/etc/nixos`. It does not authenticate the release
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publisher or protect against an attacker who already controls root and can
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change both the system and local configuration.
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### Access and service isolation
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- Firewall enabled by default
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- Public SSH and remote desktop disabled by default
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- Separate service users and systemd sandboxing where supported
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- Administrative service ports bound to loopback where practical
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- Tor enforced for supported Bitcoin traffic and onion services
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- Public web services exposed only when enabled by the operator (this makes
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your home IP address public)
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Tor reduces network exposure for configured Bitcoin services. It is not a
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guarantee against every IP leak, application bug, or traffic-analysis attack.
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### Restricted support access
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Support uses a per-session SSH key on the non-root `sovran-support` account.
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Sessions expire after 24 hours and have a small allowlist of `sudo` commands.
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Wallet paths receive deny ACLs unless the operator explicitly removes them.
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Disabling support removes the key and reapplies the ACLs.
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Support events are written to `/var/log/sovran-support-audit.log`. This is a
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local audit log, not a cryptographically tamper-evident record.
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## Out of scope
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Sovran_SystemsOS cannot protect against:
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- Compromised root or administrator credentials
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- Stolen recovery words, private keys, or backups
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- Malicious or compromised hardware, firmware, or build infrastructure
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- Services the operator deliberately exposes or weakens
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- Physical access without appropriate disk and firmware protections
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## Operator basics
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- Verify downloads and stop if the checksum does not match.
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- Apply stable security updates promptly.
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- Use unique passwords and keep SSH/RDP off when not needed.
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- Prefer a well-reviewed hardware signer for meaningful Bitcoin balances.
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- Keep tested, offline backups in separate secure locations.
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- Never share recovery words or private keys with support.
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- Disable support access when the session ends and review the audit log.
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No software can provide absolute security. Review your configuration and threat
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model before storing important funds or data.
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